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Abstract 
Russian foreign policy in the 1990s, though in many ways chaotic, demonstrated a 
general move from an initial pro-Western strategy to a more 'independent' and 
'pragmatic nationalist' strategy. The main feature of this move was a much more 
critical stance towards the West. Yet the Russian leadership displayed very 
different attitudes to two major Western organisations: while fiercely critical of 
NATO it was neutral or positively disposed towards the ED. 
The thesis tries to discover why this was so by means of two explanatory 
frameworks. The first is an application of realist foreign policy theory. Neoclassical 
realism explains state foreign policy through the study of the international 
distribution of material power and the manner in which state elites attempt to alter 
this in their favour. The second framework uses constructivist insights into national 
culture. National identity strongly influences how policy-makers view the world 
and the possibilities open to them. An understanding of how the national identity 
debate develops helps to explain the policies they undertake. 
The analysis demonstrates that each of the two schemes illuminates many aspects 
of Russian policy-making in the 1990s and that they are complementary rather than 
alternative approaches. Equally they leave much unanswered, and the details of 
policy-making are sometimes not well explained. The suggestion is that further 
research into Russian foreign policy (under Putin, for example) would require a 
more detailed focus on bureaucratic politics and interpersonal rivalries within the 
elite as a complement to the kind of analysis undertaken here. 
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CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION 
The questions that this thesis will try to answer emerge from some of the most 
important events of recent decades. The period under examination came 
immediately after the end of the Cold War, an event whose repercussions continue 
to be felt around the world, and particularly in Europe. One of the two opposing 
blocs suddenly vanished, freeing the republics of both 'inner' and 'outer' empires 
to seek their fortunes. Russia had been the core of the former Soviet Union, and 
was the inheritor of many of the USSR's political and economic legacies and its 
vast nuclear arsenal. It spent the decade under its first-ever democratically elected 
head of state searching for a role in the world and attempting to build an effective 
state and economy, proceeding fitfully towards these targets with many setbacks. It 
was a period of transition. 
The other bloc, centred on Washington, remained in existence. Indeed, two 
great Western alliances of the Cold War - NATO and the EU - even undertook to 
expand their membership into areas formerly under Soviet control. Russia's place 
in Europe and the world would to a great extent be conditioned by the manner in 
which it dealt with these two organisations, and how they dealt with Russia. As it 
turned out, Russia developed very different relations with them. The key question 
asked in this thesis is: why did Russia act as it did towards NATO and the EU? 
The theoretical frameworks used to find answers to this question are 
developed from realist and constructivist theories of foreign policy. These 
theoretical families encompass a huge variety of work, and the aim here is to distil 
from each of them those elements that are most likely to prove fruitful in the 
particular research being undertaken. The frameworks will guide this research in 
different directions and structure the answers provided in different ways. They 
should enable us to obtain some clearly defined - though perhaps limited -
answers. In the end, the two frameworks should be able to tell us a great deal about 
why Russia acted as it did towards NATO and the EU in the 1990s. 
1 
Realism and constructivism have been chosen partly because they offer the 
prospect of achieving a complementary and well-rounded set of explanations, 
coming from different directions and focusing on different areas of political life. 
One looks at how the international environment shapes a state's politics; the other 
at how the political culture of a state shapes its view of the world. One is concerned 
with how material factors of international relations push states into certain ways of 
behaving; the other how states develop their national interests as a result of shared 
ideas held by members of the nation. Realism suggests that states are 
fundamentally alike, constructivism that it is by studying the unique aspects of a 
state that we can understand its policy. 1 
Using the two theoretical frameworks should also establish some of the 
major influences on Russian foreign policy - the manner in which the international 
distribution of power, or Russian national identity pushed the state elite to act in 
certain ways - which provide the essential background to any detailed examination 
of foreign policy processes in Russia. 
The development of Russian foreign policy after the Cold War 
The newly reborn state of Russia fonnulated its foreign policy in the early years of 
its existence on the ruins of a gigantic superpower of which it had been the driving 
force, inheriting many of the people, traditions, institutions and international 
obligations of that dead state and its predecessor. The period saw a sudden break, 
some continuity, and much confusion, both for those involved and for those 
observing what took place. The interpretation of these events is controversial. 
Many analysts divide Russian foreign policy of the period into various 
phases, which act as useful analytical tools. Most see Russia's foreign policy as 
moving from pro-W esternism during the 'honeymoon with the West', changing to 
a more balanced, 'independent', pragmatic and Eurasianist approach, even if that 
meant clashing with Western interests.2 This has sometimes been seen either as a 
return to geopolitical reality, or a reassertion of Russian culture. It is notable that 
1 Some possibilities for using the two theoretical frameworks together, and the answers thereby 
provided, will be examined in the conclusion. 
2 Among analysts to put this idea forward are Felgenhauer (1995), Dunlop (1995), Sakwa (1996), 
Malcolm et al. (1996), Wallander ( 1996), Webber (1996), Arbatov (1997), Petro & Rubinstein 
(1997), Medvede\' (1999) and Antonenko (1999). 
under Yeltsin there were only three foreign ministers, a rather surprising fact given 
that Russia lived under seven prime ministers and through countless cabinet 
shuffles. Some observers would suggest that the main feature of Russian foreign 
policy has in fact been its constancy,3 with the continuities being more important 
than the changes. Again, some have argued that far from being steady, or following 
a discernable pro-Western - Eurasianist path, it was chaotic, anarchic, too riven 
with internal conflicts to be anything except the reflection of personal antagonisms 
and ambitions.4 
Despite such controversies, it is generally accepted that Russia viewed the 
EU far more positively than it viewed NATO. In the Russia of the mid-1990s, 'the 
only issue we have more or less unity on, is our disapproval of NATO' (Rogov, 
1996: 27). At the same time, Yeltsin, Kozyrev, Primakov and other senior figures 
of Yeltsin administrations repeatedly stated that EU expansion was welcome or 
presented easily resolvable problems. During the whole period, in fact, NATO 
expansion was regarded with overt hostility, while that of the EU with more 
ambivalence or even lack of interest. Thus, 'views about the European Union are 
generally positive and they contrast strongly with the widespread criticism levelled 
at NATO' (Light et aI., 2000: 6). Statements from all parts of the political spectrum 
support this conclusion (Shearman, 2001: 161). What caused this to occur? Was it 
to do with the manner in which Russian national culture affected the way policy-
makers viewed the world? Or was it determined by material forces? Was it 
something about Russian national characteristics, or would any state in that 
position have followed more or less the same path? 
Studying foreign policy in the 1990s 
There are many approaches to the interpretation of foreign policy. Sovietology and 
post-Sovietology have sometimes been accused of remaining somewhat 
unconnected to developments in the social sciences in general and foreign policy 
analysis in particular. A recent study of Russian foreign policy and international 
relations research has suggested that 'the combination of contemporary study of 
Russian foreign policy and IR theory is still far from mainstream and is 
3 For example, Freedman (1997: 151). 
4 See, for example, Reddaway & Glinski (2001) and Lo (2002). 
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conspicuously underdeveloped' (Pursiainen, 2000: 3), and concludes that 'what is 
needed [is] ... to involve this field of study in those questions that are central in the 
contemporary IR debates' (Pursiainen, 2000: 212). The contention here is not that 
this should be the thinking behind all research into Russian foreign policy, but that 
a theoretical approach can provide a useful set of guidelines to a detailed empirical 
examination.5 
Realism and constructivism 
The empirical evidence will be tackled here through the medium of, first, a 
neoclassical realist approach, focusing on the influence of the distribution of 
material power; and second, a constructivist approach, focusing on national 
identity. The end of the Cold War and Russia's emergence as an independent state 
energised debates among social scientists about how to explain what had happened, 
what was happening, and to predict what was to come. It could be said that, 'just as 
Russia is experiencing an identity crisis today, so too is the study of international 
relations theory ... Both Russia and the community of scholars who specialize in 
international relations theory and Russian foreign policy are experiencing one 
aspect of the Cold War's end that is a boon for both: all seemingly fixed viewpoints 
have been under critical assault for the last ten years' (Hopf, 1999: 4-5). However, 
by the end of the decade, not only was it possible to look back on almost ten years 
of Yeltsin as president of independent Russia, but to see that realism and 
constructivism had been at the heart of the debates III international relations 
scholarship of that decade. The exercise of trying to understand Russian foreign 
policy using these two theories promised to provide some profound understandings 
of the new Russia. 
Realism aims to explain foreign policy by reference to the need for states to seek 
security in a dangerous world, with a focus on the external forces of material power 
that shape policy. Realist theories dominated the study of international relations 
during the Cold War (Shearman, 1997), much to the chagrin of theorists of other 
persuasions, but the collapse of the Soviet Union acted as a spur to renewed debate 
and a shift in emphasis to classical - or neoclassical - variants of realism. Russian 
5 See King (1994) on this debate. 
foreign policy experts recognise the problems involved in national interest and 
power (see for example, Tsigankov, 2002: 290), but it is still a powerful, if not 
dominant source of analysis in Russia and in the West. Realism offers convincing 
explanations of why Russia went from 'naYve', 'romantic' pro-Westemism, to a 
policy more in keeping with its true status. In Chapter 2 a variant of realism will be 
outlined which uses the realist focus on the international distribution of power, but 
uses the neoclassical variant of realism that seeks to understand the particular case 
of a state in its own unique situation (taking account of some of the effective 
criticisms of neorealism of the late 1980s and early 1990s). 
From the realist viewpoint, the shift in Russian policy from pro-W estemism 
to Eurasianism was inevitable, owing to the effects of material power (a 
combination of military, economic, technological and demographic factors) on 
rational policy-makers. The focus is on how Russian policy-makers used all of the 
tools at their disposal to alter the balance of force in Russia's favour. Given the end 
of the Cold War, the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and then the loss 
of Soviet republics, this was a task that took place in extremely unfavourable 
circumstances. 
Constructivist studies of Russian foreign policy are relatively few, but the 
literature is expanding.6 These studies were given a boost by the end of the Cold 
War and realism's failure to predict or explain that event. Constructivist research 
has theorised how individual and national identities are formed and how national 
identity in tum forms the basis of a state's foreign policy by framing the 
perceptions of decision-makers. National identity is continually shaped by the 
members of a society, influenced by history and ongoing relations with external 
actors. In the constructivist view, Russia's shift to an overtly 'pragmatic-realist' 
foreign policy is the result of an alteration in the dominant view of Russian national 
identity held by members of the elite. In this view social norms provide the basis 
for action. 'National interests' result from the specific debates about identity within 
a country. 
6 See for example, Wallander (1996), Prizel (1998), Hopf(1999), Newnann (1999), Hopf(2002) 
and Fawn (2004). 
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In both of these frameworks, as Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate, the focus is on 
empirical research focused on the state elite. In neoclassical realism, members of 
the elite respond purposefully and predictably to the dictates of the international 
environment. In constructivism, shared understandings influenced by history and 
ongoing interactions with external actors need to be understood. The relationship of 
the two theories to evidence is different because they take a very different view of 
the relationship between individuals and the world they inhabit. They do share, 
however, a belief in empirical research: realism sees external factors as having a 
direct influence on domestic decision-making because decision-makers are 
predictably purposeful in their reactions; constructivism sees the continuous 
development of national identity as shaping the way policy-makers view the world; 
the influence of the outside world only 'makes sense' because of the way the 
shared understandings of their particular identities filter reality. These 
understandings can change rapidly and in ways that strongly influence how the 
external world and the actions of other actors are perceived. 
In Chapters 4, 5 and 6 the realist framework will be applied to the research 
questions. Chapter 4 will examine, in the first place, Russia's global and regional 
position in terms of material power (military, economic, geopolitical and 
demographic factors). This, along with a brief examination of the decision-making 
structures and personnel in Russia in the 1990s, will establish the background for 
the chapters dealing, in tum, with NATO and the ED. 
Chapters 5 and 6 focus on Russia's relations with NATO and the ED, 
respectively, and how the Russian elite adopted policies towards the two 
organisations in reaction to the imbalance of material forces in the particular cases 
under examination. These policies were aimed at improving Russia's security by 
increasing its power relative to other international actors. The chapters deal with 
change - each will attempt to show, first, how policy-makers perceived the 
changing situation in terms of the distribution of power, altered threat, and the 
possibilities open to Russia as a result; and, second, what policies were carried out 
in response (such as balancing, bandwagoning, regional versus global goals, and 
the use of bargaining chips). In conclusion, it will be possible to see whether and 
when these policies were successful in their aims. 
6 
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 apply the constructivist framework to the case studies. 
Chapter 7 aims to identify which aspects of Russian history were resurrected as 
important and relevant parts of the contemporary national identity debate, in which 
NATO and the EU played contrasting roles. It lays the groundwork for the two 
chapters that follow by establishing the context in terms of the wider national 
identity debate in Russia. It also describes the various groups which pushed for 
their favoured view of Russian identity, and how the arguments among them 
developed over the decade. The chapter shows how the overall tone of the debate 
was influenced by disappointments and successes (as interpreted against this 
historical evidence) in such relations. These points will form the basis for 
understanding the specific questions in Chapters 8 and 9. 
Chapters 8 and 9 use the framework developed Chapter 3 to explain the 
divergence in policy between that focused on the EU and that focused on NATO. 
They therefore examine the interactions between, first Russia and NATO and then 
Russia and the EU. The aim is to try to understand Russian foreign policy towards 
these two institutions against the background of Russia's domestic national identity 
debate and how interactions with NATO and the EU influenced in tum Russian 
perceptions of the outside world. 
Chapter 10, in conclusion, summanses the findings of the realist and 
constructivist explanations. It also examines what the frameworks were unable to 
explain, or seemed to explain poorly. It demonstrates that, working together, the 
two theories provide a broader picture than they do separately, and that they 
provide a useful basis for further research this field (of the Putin presidency for 
example); but the suggestion is made that as a result of the findings of this thesis, 
they should be complemented by a more traditional foreign policy focus on 
bureaucratic and interpersonal politics. 
7 
CHAPTER 2 
REALISM AND THE STUDY OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
IN THE 1990s 
A realist framework is likely to provide an effective way of explaining Russian 
policy towards NATO and the EU in the 1990s. There are many varieties of realism 
and the debate among realists is fierce, as are critiques of realism from outside. 
Over time, challenges from liberalism, Marxism and more recently constructivism,7 
as well as the changing international environment, have caused realists to modify 
their views while still remaining true to their core beliefs. Among the various 
realist theories, none is necessarily inherently superior to the others; yet some are 
clearly more suited than others to the research questions of this thesis. 
Realism in the post-Cold War world 
All realists found their theories on a belief in the essentially conflictual nature of 
human collective behaviour. The solution to Hobbes' war of all against all, the 
Leviathan, is the very thing lacking in anarchic international relations. This leads 
realists to posit the need for alternatives based on self-help. States must ensure their 
own security by building up their domestic power and by diplomacy (for example, 
forming alliances). Owing to the constant threat of conflict, the fundamental 
motivation of states is survival as independent entities. But attempts to ensure 
survival by one state lead to insecurity for others, because of the lack of trust in the 
anarchic system. States are therefore caught in a cycle of mistrust, known as the 
security dilemma. 
Given the basic assumptions, realism can first be classified into 'classical' 
or 'structural' varieties. 8 The classical variant, associated with, for example, 
Machiavelli and Morgenthau, emphasises the timeless and repetitive character of 
political life: 'Social forces are the result of human nature in action. Therefore, 
7 See Snyder (2002: 149) for a fe,-iew. 
S There are many other possible subdivisions (see for example Snyder, 2002: 149-1.50), some of 
which are discussed later in the chapter. 
8 
under similar conditions they will manifest themselves in a similar manner' 
(Morgenthau, 1995: 42). Classical realists analysed leaders' calculations. which 
had to take into account human nature and the realities of material power, from the 
medieval prince to the Cold War statesman.9 
Structural realism, which found its most famous exposition III Kenneth 
Waltz's 1979 Theory of International Relations, preferred a 'scientific' approach. 
This came from a desire to avoid classical realism's theorising on humanity'S 
timeless drives and interpretations of the calculations of leaders. Weak states 
balance against powerful states owing to the work of structural forces over time; 
patterns emerge from the anarchic coaction of sovereign bodies. Waltz and other 
structuralists 'insist that social science must move beyond self-conceptions and 
motives because individuals are constrained by structural forces over which they 
have no control and of which they may possess no knowledge' (Buzan et aI., 1993: 
8). But in asserting that the nature of international life is determined by the 
distribution of military power, they accept that human life is insecure as a result of 
the aggressive nature of other humans, and that it will always be so - and hence 
'smuggle in' classical realist pessimism.1o 
Waltz always insisted that he was interested in long-term patterns of 
behaviour, and sidestepped such controversies. The goal was a parsimonious 
scientific theory explaining a few things well, founded on laws which are merely 
regular and repeated behaviour patterns (Waltz, 1979: 6).11 In this it succeeded, 
because the theory showed that such patterns did emerge over long periods of time 
and provided powerful reasons as to why that was. It was unable to explain 
individual state foreign policies, but did not aim to. 
Following the Cold War, high-profile academics in Russia and the West 
including John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, Kenneth Waltz and William 
9 Morgenthau was prone to describing both the manner in which state leaders generally do act, and 
also to prescribing the manner in which they should act. Jervis (1998: 976) argues. for example, that 
Morgenthau's lecturing of the American people on the need for US foreign policy to follow the 
country's national interests 'would have been unnecessary had his descriptive argument been 
without flaws'. This is true of all realist analysis. However, realism doesn't deny that some state 
leaders operate more effectively than others; ineffective leaders can have disastrous consequences 
for their state. 
10 One of Waltz' s problems is the implicit acknowledgement of the effects of ideology (and other 
unit-level variables) in his theory. Questions of ideology and domestic politics in general creep into 
his explanations to make them plausible. On this see Heikkia (1999: 67). 
11 Tickner (1995: 58). among others, has attacked such attempts by neorealists to impose order 'on a 
chaotic and conflictual world'. 
9 
Wohlforth, as well as politician-academics such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry 
Kissinger, have espoused the realist policies that the West should adopt in dealing 
with the new Russia,12 or used realist theory to understand and predict Russian 
policy.13 Russians have also applied realist ideas to explanations of post-Soviet 
international developments and to outline the foreign policies that Russia should 
adopt as a result, often borrowing from Western sources (Sergounin, 1996: 6).14 
They include commentators and politicians across Russia's political spectrum, 
from Vladimir Lukin and Aleksei Arbatov of the liberal Yabloko party, to the 
conservative Evgenii Primakov and Evgenii Shaposhnikov; and also influential 
intellectuals such as Sergei Rogov, and the arch-conservative Aleksandr Dugin 
(who borrowed heavily from Mackinder).15 
Neorealism to neoclassical realism: focusing on foreign policy 
With the sudden end of the Cold War, neorealism came under fresh attack for its 
failure to have predicted the event. Many neorealists, such as Waltz, had claimed 
that the Cold War situation of bipolarity - the system dominated by two competing 
hegemons (dominant states) - was stable. The neorealist focus on structure and 
hence on long-term patterns was criticised for blinding it to the real factors that 
12 According to Tsigankov (2002: 10) 'Today ... from 80 to 85% of all the world literature on 
international relations, is published in the USA'. 
13 See MacFarlane (1999) and Donaldson & Nogee (2000) for further examples of a realist analysis 
of Russian foreign policy. 
14 Tsigankov has described the transition of Russian international relations theory from the state-
controlled Soviet period to the 1990s, when 'The fundamental social-political changes in the 
country gave rise to urgent "social demand" for the elaboration of a scientific basis in solving such 
tasks, like an effective political socialization of society, an increase in the level of political culture 
and political participation of the people' (Tsigankov, 2002: 11). Unfortunately, while 'there are a 
great number of centres for international politics research ... their disconnected efforts in the 
majority of cases were directed towards the implementation of immediate demands and prognoses 
of the political situation [rather than] the elaboration of the fundamental problems of international 
relations ... In the majority of national higher education establishments, unlike in the many excellent 
universities in the "far abroad", international relations has not become an independent subject of 
study (Tsigankov, 2002: 11-12). However, such text books do exist. See, for instance, Moscow 
State Institute of International Relations, 2000. 
15 Arbatov was from 1995 Chairman of the Duma Subcommittee for International Security and 
Arms Limitations; from 1999 Deputy Chairman of the Defence Committee of the State Duma and 
head of the Commission for Defence, Security and Ratification ofInternational Treaties; Lukin was 
Ambassador to the US (1992-1993) and Chair of the Duma Foreign Affairs Committee (1995-
1999). Primakov was Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (1991-95); 1996-1998 Foreign 
Minister; 1998-1999 Prime Minister. Rogov was head of the Institute of USA and Canada Studies, 
of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Dugin was notable for the publication of his book Osnovii 
Geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe Budushee Rossii [The Foundations of Geopolitics: the Geopolitical 
Future of Russia (1997)]: Shaposhnikoy was the first commander of the CIS armed forces. 
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cause change in international affairs. Neorealists argued otherwise, but many 
realists moved towards explanations of foreign policy rather than the 'structural' 
factors of international life, largely as a result of having to explain the end of the 
bipolar Cold War structure, and the new situation that was perceived by most as 
one of unipolarity.16 Realism has in fact continued to thrive in the post-Cold War 
world. The activity of realists in responding to their critics and in explaining this 
new situation led to an array of theories all of which could be called realist, many 
of which built on - and branched out from - neorealism. 
The structural realism primarily associated with Waltz, while discredited in 
some people's eyes, does provide powerful tools on which theories that attempt to 
explain the behaviour of individual states and rapid change in international 
relations have been able to build. Waltz never denied that, in order to examine 
individual state foreign policy, we would have to go beyond the international 
structure and look inside the state itself (Buzan et aI., 1993).17 Thus, in order to 
explain Russian foreign policy, a realist explanation that does exactly this will be 
necessary. Neoclassical realists examine the way individual states respond to the 
international distribution of power and so build on neorealist insights; but they 
explain better some things that neorealism has been shown to be poorly equipped to 
deal with. 
The key fact for realists after the Cold War was that they could argue 
strongly that 'states haven't disappeared, the conflicts among them continue to 
exist, the diplomatic and strategic behaviour of the powers ... remains a fact of 
world politics' (Tsigankov, 2002: 289). They could argue that the international 
structure of anarchy among sovereign states was still the key factor in international 
affairs (as neorealism had powerfully argued), but that this could be combined with 
examination of foreign policy: they contend that state interests follow from the 
requirement to survive in an anarchic international environment and that state 
policy is influenced by material power distribution in the international system. But 
16 Kapstein & Mastanduno (1999) among others are clear that the new situation is one of 
unipolarity. Waltz on the other hand believed that 'bipolarity endures, but in an altered state' 
(Waltz, 1993: 52). The question of how long the current situation. however it is characterized, will 
last - its durability - is also the subject of vigorous debate. See, for example, Deudney & Ikenberry 
(1999: 103). 
17 Buzan et al. (1993) argued that unit level factors could be included \\ithin structuralist realism to 
expand its explanatory power. Elman (1996). howewr, made the case that Waltz's realism could be 
used for a foreign policy analysis. 
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they examine the manner in which state decision-makers act on this situation and 
therefore study the workings of state policy-making deliberately ignored by 
neorealism, while taking as their starting point the international distribution of 
power. 18 In Russia, Yermolaev (2000: 1), for example, argued that the post-Soviet 
environment 'exerted a substantial influence on the nature of Russia's foreign and 
defence policy' . 
The meaning of power 
Power in the realist view is defined in terms of capabilities. It is the sum of 
capabilities controlled by a state: its military, economic and human resources. But 
the main point is that military power ensures security and therefore relative military 
power is the primary factor in international relations. 
The realist view of the means by which economics affects international 
politics is that economic strength translates into military power as it allows for 
funding of the military and the overall development of society, including such vital 
factors as scientific and technological advances. Economic growth is necessary to 
maintain military power, and so the search for economic growth is linked to 
national security. But in some theories, economic power is also seen as an element 
of power in its own right, strengthening the state's influence and its ability to attain 
allies. 19 'Given ... the intimate connection between wealth and power, sensitivity to 
relative gains is evident in the economic realm as well' (MacFarlane, 1999: 222). 
The population of a state in crude terms is the means by which economic and 
military might are created; a large, educated and dynamic population is more likely 
than the opposite to provide the domestic conditions conducive to a thriving 
economy and a strong military. 
The state's physical attributes of size, global position, access to trade routes 
and resources are also 'a tangible element of the relative strength of a country' 
(Sergounin, 1997: 27). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's astonishing 
change in size and borders (as well as other geopolitical factors to be examined in 
18 What Mastanduno & Kapstein (1999: 4) called an 'ongoing effort to elaborate an alternative 
realist vision, one that goes inside the "black box"'. The black box is a way of referring to the state. 
which realists try to avoid looking into and thereby avoid examining the details of state policy 
making. 
19 See KelT (1995: 983) on the links between economics and geopolitics. 
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Chapters 4, 5 and 6) were a crucial part of the environment in which Russia had to 
operate.20 Russia was clearly in a very different situation from the Soviet Union. 
The global distribution of power had altered radically. All realists would point to 
the new international distribution of power as being of vital importance in 
explaining Russia's foreign policy. Governments use various techniques to alter the 
balance of power in their favour, forming alliances and building up domestic 
power. But beyond that there are some differences among realists as to what 
policies will (and should) be undertaken in such a situation. 
State policy options 
Many realists suggest that a state will attempt to ensure its survival and 
independence in the anarchic environment by balancing (i.e. forming alliances with 
other states) against the most powerful state in the system. Most realists see 
balancing as the strategy most likely to result in the state's survival and 
independence. In realism from classical to neorealist times, it is seen as the most 
common form of international diplomacy.21 
The situation facing Russia and all other states in the 1990s was one of 
unipolarity, with the US as a global hegemon. Many realists argued that the other 
major powers in the world would logically begin to balance against the US. 
However, others suggest that this was not to be expected because states balance 
against threat, not power; or that in such a situation, allying with the power of the 
US was more likely than balancing against it or suggested that bandwagoning was 
more likely. 
Balancing against threat 
Walt's balance-of-threat theory (dating from before the end of the Cold War) 
argues that, rather than balancing against power, states will balance against those 
states that pose an immediate threat to their survival or interests. Walt (1987: vi) 
defines threat as a 'function of power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, 
and perceived intentions'. The threat is therefore a result of the analysis by one 
state of another's specific characteristics in these areas. It suggests that Russia 
20 See, for example, Trenin (2001). 
21 Doyle (1997: 164-165) has outlined some of the many balancing patterns recognized throughout 
history, such as 'Kautilya's circles' and checkerboard patterns. 
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would be more likely to perceive threats among states lying close to the country's 
borders than among those further away; or would find a threat in the fact that 
distant states with great offensive capabilities, such as the US, form alliances in 
neighbouring regions. Walt's examination of the evidence suggests that balancing 
is far more common than bandwagoning (the alliance of weak states with a 
preponderant power, or alignment with the source of danger) and that states 
balance against threat rather than power alone. 
Yet Walt does allow that in some circumstances states are forced into 
bandwagoning, because, for example, they are located so close to an overwhelming 
power that resistance is useless. 'In general, the weaker the state, the more likely it 
is to bandwagon rather than balance' (Walt, 1987: 29). Walt's theory was a detailed 
exposition of the need for states to examine the each others' intentions. But later 
analysis, notably of the post-Cold War situation, widened further the possibilities: 
bandwagoning is more likely to take place in the unipolar world than before, and is 
likely policy for medium-sized (or second-tier22) states rather than only the very 
weak identified by Walt. This is a result of the United States' overwhelming 
military superiority. Thus Walt's theory retains its usefulness by focusing on threat 
and not only power (from which threat is in large part derived), but is too restricted 
in its predictions of policy. 
Bandwagoning from a position of weakness 
Schweller (1994: 93) showed that a state faced by an unfavourable balance (of 
either threat or power) has a variety of options which follow from realist reasoning. 
He sees the national interests as arising from the search for positive rewards, not 
just the avoidance of negative sanctions (as Walt, Waltz and others do). It becomes 
more likely that weak states will carry out 'piling on' bandwagoning with the 
stronger status-quo coalition. 
Wohlforth (1994) has also provided evidence that bandwagoning is more 
likely for second-tier states (or declining challengers), when faced with 
22 In the theories in question the tenn refers to medium-sized states, rather than weak or extremely 
unstable states. Russia was of the second-tier, because it was able to dominate the weak states in its 
renion but was not strong enough to form a global pole as the USSR had done in the Cold War. c , 
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hegemons. 23 Bandwagoning, as a result of unipolarity in the post-Cold war world, 
has grown in likelihood in this view. In a unipolar world, Wohlforth demonstrated 
that 'the raw power advantage of the United States means that an important source 
of conflict in previous systems is absent: hegemonic rivalry over leadership of the 
international system. No other major power is in a position to follow any policy 
that depends for its success on prevailing against the United States in a war or 
extended rivalry... second-tier states face incentives to bandwagon with the 
unipolar power as long as the expected costs of balancing remain prohibitive' 
(Wohlforth, 1999: 8). In this situation, local balances of power may loom larger in 
the calculations of other states than the background unipolar structure. 24 
Russia was no longer a great power - it was a second-tier power in a 
unipolar world. As Snyder says, 'One can think of other ways in which conciliatory 
policies might be useful even to an expansionary state. For example, conciliatory 
tactics ... might appeal to an offensive-minded state as a means of discouraging the 
formation of balances against it, or of weakening opposing alliances. Diplomatic 
detente could be a useful policy during periods when a state's power buildup has 
been frustrated by opposition' (Snyder, 2002: 166). Bandwagoning becomes a 
tempting policy, along with concurrent attempts, within the confines of that overall 
policy, to build domestic and regional power and position (Snyder, 2002: 166, 
footnote 24). 
This is not to say that second-tier states will not try to increase their relative 
power, even if that takes place against an overall bandwagoning policy. 'The 
advent of unipolarity therefore does not mean the end of all politics among great 
powers ... Second-tier great powers will not suddenly stop caring about their 
standing vis-a-vis other states ... We should expect evidence of states' efforts to 
explore the new structure and determine their place in it' (Wohlforth, 1999: 35-36). 
23 Realism has traditionally been concerned with great powers. Was Russia a great power in the 
1990s? This was arguable, but not vital to the application of realist theories that are explicitly 
interested in second-tier powers. With its stockpile of weapons of mass destruction, as well as its 
vast regional weight, Russia could lay claim to this modest title (hence the importance of the Anti-
Ballistic Missile treaty to Russia). Fedorov (2002: 6) argues that 'while helping to deter large-scale 
aggression, nuclear weapons as such cannot be converted into political power,' but this is 
debateable and was a tactic used by Russia in the 1990s. Its success or otherwise will be examined 
in Chapter 5. 
24 Walt's focus on geographic proximity in threat perception is therefore still rele\'ant. However. the 
argument below will be that sensitivity to the regional situation is not necessarily about balancing 
against threat: it can be local expansion under a global bandwagoning policy umbrella. 
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The key is that regional and second-tier competition should not be confused with 
balancing to restructure the system towards multi polarity. 
These arguments open up interesting and likely possibilities: among them 
that a state such as Russia, when faced by a hegemonic global power, is likely to 
bandwagon with that power, unless it felt that this was putting its security at greater 
risk than an alternative strategy. Yet at the same time, such a policy might change 
as threat perception changes, and the state will be searching for advantage where 
possible. The point of Walt's work is not lost: the focus on threat. But the range of 
possibilities is much wider than he acknowledges. 
The work of Snyder, Schweller and W ohlforth suggests a way towards a 
more detailed and narrative approach to explaining Russia's foreign policy. 
Empirical examination can show when and how Russian decision-makers decided 
to act. Their predictions move the focus beyond balance of power and threat 
perception and balancing to suggest a more complicated picture in which 
balancing, bandwagoning, local and global strategies are combined.25 States fight 
to maintain or improve their situation in terms of relative power, and this is a fight 
that takes place in several arenas at any time. It is complex and might involve 
elements of bandwagoning, bluff, aggression and retrenchment. While the strategy 
of this fight is conditioned by the external environment, the environment does not 
determine the intricacies of policy tactics. 
Power and elite perception 
The distribution of power is hard, if not impossible, to calculate with minute 
accuracy. Moreover, in the real world, 'crude quantitative indicators of capabilities 
cannot accurately represent decision-makers' assessments' (Wohlforth, 1994: 98). 
There is no clarity about either what the objective threat is, or what should be the 
resulting policies. 
Walt's balance of threat theory has already shown the need to understand 
why and when threat is perceived. Decision-makers can only decide on the basis of 
assessments that they make. The argument followed by neoclassical realists is that 
'the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost 
25 MacFarlane (1999) reaches a very similar conclusion, without expanding on it, in his analysis of 
Russia's post -Cold War foreign policy. 
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by its relative material capabilities. This is why they are realist. They argue further, 
however, that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect 
and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening 
variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical' (Rose, 1998: 146). 
Decision-makers are not necessarily rational or operating in conditions of 
'bounded rationality' .26 But they are purposeful in their pursuit of relative power 
and security (Taliaferro, 1999: 3). Domestically, state leaders aim to increase the 
viability of the state - to raise revenues for military expenditure, establish a 
productive and technologically advanced economy, and create the conditions for a 
healthy and educated population and also a political system in which decision-
making is not hindered by domestic problems or inefficiency. In these 
circumstances, the elite will aim to establish an efficient system of rule, based on 
coherent institutions with agreed rules, and may see nationalism as a useful tool for 
achieving it (Tuminez, 1996). 
Neoclassical realism 'predicts that an increase in relative material power 
will lead eventually to a corresponding expansion in the ambition and scope of a 
country's foreign political activity [and vice versa]... It also predicts that the 
process will not necessarily be gradual or uniform ... because it will depend not 
solely on objective material trends but also on how political decision makers ... 
perceive them' (Rose, 1998: 167).27 What neoclassical realist theory shows is that, 
in the long run, a state's foreign policy 'cannot transcend the limits and 
opportunities thrown up by the international environment' (Rose, 1998: 151).28 
Neoclassical realists then specify the mechanism through which policy inputs 
translate into policy outputs - namely, the various diplomatic, military, foreign 
economic, and national security strategies that states actually pursue (Taliaferro, 
2000: 155). 
Russian statesmen could have witnessed the effectiveness of their foreign 
policy decisions by judging the ongoing process of success and failure, for 
26 The concept of 'bounded rationality' takes account of the fact that people clearly aren't 
comprehensively rational, because of the 'the physical and psychological limits of man's capacity as 
alternative generator, information processor, and problem solver [ which] constrain the decision-
making processes of indi viduals and ofganizations' (Allison, 1971: 71). 
27 Research has shown that statesmen's perceptions of power can change suddenly in response to 
shock events. See for example Jervis (1976) and Friedberg (1988). 
28 See also Kapstein & Mastanduno et al. (1999: 8). 
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example, in relation to the expansion plans of NATO or import tariffs set by the 
EU. The judgement of success and failure would be a process on which these twin 
expansions would cast a continuous and revealing light. When the calculations go 
wrong, it can have serious consequences: territory or trade can be lost, areas of 
influence seized by an opponent. Threat must be recalculated, the possibilities of 
balancing and bangwagoning reconsidered. Foreign policy decision-makers will act 
in response to alterations in the distribution of power internationally and threat with 
coherent and purposeful policies. 
Defensive and offensive realism 
Defensive neoclassical realists suggest that the range of possibilities open to states 
is wider than offensive realists allow. To defensive realists, states aim to maximise 
security not power, and thus their concern is to maintain their relative position 
within the system and not to maximise power as far as possible. A 'retreat from 
confrontation' makes sense to a defensive realist when it is deemed to be 
necessary, given a position of weakness. But aggressive expansion is also feasible 
in certain cases.29 Defensive neoclassical realists posit a more complex link 
between the crude distribution of power and the policies of individual states - than 
offensive realists. And the effects of intervening' structural modifiers', such as the 
offence-defence balance, geographic proximity and access to raw materials, 
'influence the severity of the security dilemma between particular states' 
(Taliaferro, 2000: 131). Offensive and defensive realists differ in the weight and 
the range of options available to leaders as a result, and hence the differences 
between them are a matter of degree. In practice, defensive and offensive realists 
often agree on likely policy. In general, security-driven expansion becomes more 
likely when leaders perceive that they have a good chance of military victory and if 
such a victory will redress the perceived power imbalance and improve security. 
Empirical study of policy can show how policy-makers perceived the situation and 
the correct response to it. 
29 Taliaferro (2000: 152) also makes this point. 
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External pressures and state policy-making 
Realism - even of the neoclassical variety - rests on a "top-down" conception of 
international politics. All realists treat the pressures of the external environment as 
being more important than the preferences of actors within states. W ohlforth argues 
that 'If power influences the course of international politics, it must do so largely 
through the perceptions of the people who make decisions on behalf of states' 
(Wohlforth, 1993: 2). Yet 'the distribution of capabilities exists apart from the 
perceptions of statesmen, and influences ... outcomes ... In the final analysis the 
outcomes of state interactions will be influenced by the real distribution of power' 
(Wohlforth, 1993: 6).30 
Relative material power therefore 'established the basic parameters of a 
country's foreign policy ... [But] there is no immediate or perfect transmission belt 
linking material capabilities to foreign policy behaviour. Leaders must aim to grasp 
the progressive waxing or waning of relative power through calculations of their 
own and other states' capabilities and intentions, as well as through trial and error 
in diplomatic and military ventures. States will calculate where they can push for 
advantage, and where they are forced into retreat. They can play various bargaining 
chips in this way in a continuous struggle to realize advantage within the overall 
strategy.31 Another means of calculation is through the lens of geopolitics and the 
geographical evidence of size and resource base. In this way states can calculate the 
effectiveness of their policies and hence any required changes in policy. Perception 
of threat will also change as the international environment changes. 
Foreign policy choices are made by actual political leaders, and so it is their 
perceptions of relative power that matter' (Rose, 1998: 147). However, the 'menu' 
of possibilities available to state leaders is limited by actual relative power. 
30 Defensive realism has been attacked for taking account of elite perceptions and misperceptions 
and other domestic factors, which sacrifices a supposedly core realist assumption that states are 
unitary, rational actors. Critics on these grounds include Legro & Moravcsik (1999). Yet as 
Taliaferro (2000: 158) argues, there is no reason why realists cannot take some account of 
additional factors if these add to our understanding of the real world. In this case, such additional 
factors simply complicate, but do not break, the link between the realities of the international world 
and state responses. 
31 Likely tactics include making concessions in some areas in return for concessions from the 
opposing side in others; using 'bargaining chips' to gain advantage where possible; attempting to 
weaken the ties binding potentially threatening alliances; and threatening the use of force. Pikaye\' 
(2000: 2), for example, sees the change in Russian foreign policy associated with the mid-1990s 
consensus as a search for bargaining chips (diplomatic assets), which included its powerful nuclear 
arsenal and influence in various regions. 
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Neoclassical realism, of both offensive and defensive varieties, posits a strictly 
limited role for domestic politics. The key point that arises from the discussion is 
that an examination of how the elite responded to the international environment in 
a case-study analysis can utilise this view of foreign policy to 'trace how, in actual 
cases, relative power is translated and operationalized into the behavior of state 
actors' (Rose, 1998: 16). It is decision-makers who translate relative power into 
policy. Realism predicts that leaders will act in a purposeful manner which is 
strongly influenced by the distribution of power. The perception of threat, for 
example, will be governed by the material capabilities and offensive potential of 
rival states. Policies are complicated and multi-faceted and change rapidly with 
changing realities, but this does not preclude the existence of overall strategy and 
pattern. The empirical chapters will be able to see exactly what policies were 
undertaken by the Russian leadership under the international conditions that 
obtained. 
Therefore, once the overall distribution of power is established, the 
composition of the elite will be the next factor to establish: the decision-making 
elite forms the link between the distribution of power and policy. It is the elite's 
perception of developments and changes and possibilities in the international 
environment that leads to policies designed to alter the distribution of power 
(whether by balancing or bandwagoning, or, as suggested, some mix of the two) to 
the state's benefit. The case studies will aim to illustrate the complex ways that 
Russia perceived and responded to international developments that resulted in 
changes to the perceived relative distribution of power and how the elite perceived 
threats and possibilities. The objective facts of the distribution of power condition 
what the elite perceives to be the threatening aspects of that distribution. Leaders 
decide (within the limits set by the possibilities of relative power) what action they 
take. This perception can change rapidly, as can the decisions taken on the basis of 
the perception. 
The possibilities for state action are limited by the realities of power, but 
can be complex and take place in different arenas at the same time. A state will use 
all the means possible to ameliorate its relative position. These means - which can 
be conceived of as bargaining chips - include those factors of material power (such 
as the threat of nuclear retaliation, embargoes of vital goods and alliance-building), 
20 
which can be used to defer an unwanted development. Chapters 5 and 6 therefore 
examine how the elite reacted to the perceived threat posed by NATO and the EU. 
Russia, NATO and the ED in the neoclassical realist framework 
A neoclassical realist approach offers a powerful framework for tackling Russian 
foreign policy-making in the circumstances of the 1990s. It shows how the 
distribution of power in the international environment influences state policy-
making. It suggests that to understand a state's policies we need to take this fact 
into account; but it also directs research towards an examination of the policies 
adopted by a state in these circumstances. A state's leaders act within the 
constraints of the international environment to improve their state's relative 
position. Because state leaderships are in a constant struggle to identify the correct 
policies within a changing environment, 'different states or even the same state at 
different times pursue particular strategies in the international arena ... while 
building on Waltz's assumptions about anarchy, neoclassical-realists explicitly 
reject the injunction that theories ought not to include explanatory variables at 
different levels of analysis' (Taliaferro, 2000: 134). 
Neoclassical realism posits a relatively complex link between the 
distribution of power and policies that result, which a structured narrative account 
can illuminate. It also suggests a relatively wide range of possibilities available to 
the state elite. In practice, it is clear that a state has various facets of power that it 
can use in its favour to counterbalance its weaknesses. 
States pull on all potential means of exerting international influence, using 
military and economic resources. Policy-makers will be desperate to slow down 
and reverse processes that weaken the state domestically, and react sharply to 
perceived attempts to exploit or further exacerbate any weakness. Thus as NATO 
and the EU carried out their policies of expansion and other activities in the 
military and economic areas, Russian policy-makers would have been acting to 
ensure that these were not to Russia's detriment, sought to exploit any advantages 
possible to improve Russia's position, and carried out all diplomatic and military 
actions deemed necessary to do so. The perception of threat would have been a 
major factor in such calculations. 
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NATO's continuing existence, combined with its enlargement and out-of-
area military activity, highlighted Russia's contemporary weakness: Russia's 
politicians had to devise policies to react to this constantly changing situation (of 
threats and opportunities) within the global strategy of balancing or bandwagoning. 
The EU was primarily an economic and political alliance. To a realist this would 
mean that the EU did not present a threat, except that, by excluding Russia from 
trade and economic assistance, it could accelerate Russia's economic decline and 
relative economic weakness relative to other states. Russia's economic situation in 




CONSTRUCTIVISM AND THE STUDY OF RUSSIA~ 
FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1990s 
The argument in Chapter 2 was that a realist framework focusing on the 
international distribution of material power would be a productive way of 
explaining the policies adopted by Russia in the 1990s towards NATO and the EU. 
This chapter takes a very different approach, putting the case for a constructivist 
account that focuses instead on national identity. The argument here is that Russian 
national identity frames the way policy-makers view the world and shapes their 
foreign policy.32 
Constructivism in the post-Cold War world 
Like neoclassical realism, constructivism gained a boost at the time of the end of 
the Cold War, and since then has established an authoritative position, in both 
Russia and Western countries. 'Hardly known a decade ago, constructivism has 
risen as the officially accredited contender to the established core' (Guzzini, 2000: 
147), and often seemed to be seizing the 'middle ground' (Adler, 1997) of 
international relations research.33 Such a development was partly based on a 
powerful critique of neorealism and neoliberalism, the established core at the time. 
What spurred the constructivist critique of mainstream research was its 
failure to predict or explain the end of the Cold War. Prior to this event, 
international relations research had been dominated by neorealism and 
neoliberalism. Both assumed that actors respond in a rational way to external 
circumstances, primarily the international distribution of power in anarchy. 
However, the end of the Cold War seemed to come about not by an alteration in the 
32 The manner in which the theoretical frameworks used in Chapters 2 and 3 are compatible (if they 
are) will be examined in the conclusion. 
33 At times scholars have responded with hostility from both sides of this middle ground. Keohane 
(1988) condemned constructivism's lack of concrete research results. Critical theorists have 
criticised its 'masked rationalism and positivism' (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998: 260). 
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material distribution of power, which many argued had not changed significantly,34 
but in ways of thinking. 'If the US and Soviet Union decide that they are no longer 
enemies, "the Cold War is over'" (Wendt, 1995: 135). 
The constructivist alternative 
States, on this reading, are not simply rational actors. Each - or more precisely the 
leadership of each - has changeable interests. Constructivists argued that 
'intersubjective rules, and not some unchangeable truths deduced from human 
nature or from international anarchy, give meaning to international practices' 
(Guzzini,2000: 155). This is because 'the distribution of power may always affect 
states' calculations, but how it does so depends on the intersubjective 
understandings and expectations, on the "distribution of knowledge" that constitute 
their conceptions of self and other' (Wendt, 1995: 135). Constructivists and others 
were therefore trying to account for precisely those factors that rationalists assume 
are unimportant (being to all intents and purposes identical) and do not accept the 
unproblematic nature of the tenn national interests.35 They tried to understand the 
manner in which the identities and hence interests of actors are constructed through 
intersubjective understandings of the world.36 
These arguments are based on a philosophical grounding very different 
from that of neorealists and neoliberals. Constructivists do not deny the existence 
of the outside world and the physical objects in it. But they do oppose the view that 
'phenomena can constitute themselves as objects of knowledge independently of 
discursive practices ... our interpretations are based on a shared system of codes 
and symbols, of languages, life-worlds, social practices. The knowledge of reality 
is socially constructed' (Guzzini, 2000: 159-160). Actors can only understand the 
world by means of socially created systems of meaning, and 'social identities are 
said to constitute actors' interests and shape their actions' (Price & Reus-Smit, 
34 (Ruggie (1998: 25), for example, argued that 'in this instance brute force remained entirely on the 
side of the status quo'. 
35 Some critics of realism could accept that it provided useful insights but was underdetermining 
(Risse-Kappen, 1996: 185-186), others argued that it was more deeply flawed, because its view of 
humans as rational actors. Risse-Kappen's conclusion was that 'ideas intervene between material, 
Eower-related factors in the one hand, and state interests and preferences on the other'. 
6 It was also evident that realists such as Brzezinski, Kissinger and Waltz often implicitly accept 
that cultural or ideological factors influence foreign policy. As Weldes (1999: 7) notes, 'Even 
Morgenthau said that "the idea of interest is indeed the essence of politics'''. 
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1998: 266-267).37 Agents and the socially constructed structures in which they 
operate 'are joined in a "dialectical synthesis" with the agents who create and 
inhabit them' (Wendt, 1987: 357). The key ideas of constructivism are therefore, 
first, that it is through shared (intersubjective) understandings that people make 
sense of the world and, second, that these are created in a 'structurationist' manner: 
agents and structures are co-determined. These structures, or systems of meaning, 
influence agents; in turn, agents influence the reproduction of these structures. 
People communicate with each other, make sense of the world and make 
themselves comprehensible to others. Just as spoken and written language are 
always changing, so do other shared understandings of the world, such as national 
identity. People act as a result of their understanding of the world and the 
appropriate or reasonable actions, which are based on such shared understandings -
not as a result of some pre-determined 'rational' responses. The constructivist 
approach to foreign policy therefore involves an analysis of the manner in which 
such understandings come about and are reproduced, and how this affects the way 
state leaders carry out their interactions with outsiders. 
To constructivists, a key concept here is national identity: the way in which 
members of the nation understand the characteristics which unify them and identify 
outsiders. National identity is considered to be the root of the national interest. The 
national interest is the way in which policy-makers perceive required action in the 
field of foreign policy, and this is formulated by their understandings of what gives 
the nation its unique identity. 'By studying the way in which national identity is 
formulated and understood by policy-makers, we can gain insight into the foreign 
policies they undertake' (Weldes, 1999: 4). 
The usefulness of the concept 'lies in its subsuming ideology, political 
history, culture, and experience, variables that have been variously examined in the 
context of foreign policy roles' (Le Prestre, 1997: 9), an amalgam of 'language and 
religion as the basis of national unity, cultural and historical values and national 
and historical memory' (Tsigankov, 2002: 292-293). National identity production 
and reproduction are a result of domestic debates in which people - agents -
discuss or demonstrate through their words and actions, either deliberately or 
instinctively, those things that make the 'nation': on issues of citizenship, religious 
37 See also McSweeney (1999: 139). 
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and ethnic membership, borders, enemies, friends and historical traditions. Public 
speech and action together create what can be considered a continuous public 
debate. 
Several recent works have applied constructivist (or similar) approaches to 
understanding Russian foreign policy or closely related cases.38 Such work deals in 
a comprehensive way with the history of Russian culture and ideologies such as 
Marxism-Leninism, and how relevant they are to foreign policy-making, offering 
'explicit arguments about the relation between behavior and normative 
frameworks' (Pursiainen, 1999: 168). 
History and national identity 
To constructivists, national identity draws on history (including the history of and 
continuing relations with outsiders, usually in this context called 'others,).39 It is 
continually reproduced by the interpretation of that history and interaction by 
members of the group with outsiders - these are major influences on the manner in 
which agents reproduce the national identity. Thus the existing national identity, 
developed historically, is interpreted by agents in the present and used as the basis 
for the ongoing debate. Members of a nation use the collective national past for 
inspiration, for guidance to what should be the appropriate role for the nation and 
for understanding of what it is that makes the nation unique.4o 
The group's past strengthens the present sense of group identity. Those 
factors that loom large in the collective memory tend to be traumatic or triumphant 
events such as invasion, military victory and defeat or periods of oppression and 
expansion. These historical factors are one reason why different groups with 
different histories see the same situations in very different ways: what is seen as a 
threat by some is quite the opposite to others. Current relations with outsiders also 
influence national identity and interpretations of the past (see below). 
38 Including those by Szporluk (1994), Prizel (1998), Kortunov (1998 and 1999), Risse-Kappen 
(1996), Neumann and Williams (2000), Kassianova (2001), Zevelev (2002b and 2002c), Hopf 
(2002) and Fawn (2004). 
39 The term 'identity' as used here originally comes from social psychology, 'where it refers to the 
images of individuality and distinctiveness ("selfhood") held and projected by an actor and formed 
(and modified over time) through relations with significant "others". Thus the term (by convention) 
references mutually constructed and evolving images of self and other' (Katzenstein, 1996: 59). 
40 Hunt (1987), for example, has analysed the continuities of cultural attitudes among the US elite 
and how they have influenced foreign policy. 
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People in a nation do not VIew such matters uniformly, and there is 
continuous 'competition' among individuals and groups over interpretation of the 
facts. There was a fierce struggle among groups and individuals in Russia, for 
example, after the Soviet period, in the search for guidance as to what constituted 
the core factors of 'Russianness' that could be used to hold together and provide 
purpose to the nation in the post-Soviet period. Among nationalists, the pre-
revolutionary past was often evoked as a guide to the present. The Soviet period 
was frequently considered to have involved some kind of break with the natural 
historical process in Russia, and as having had a disastrous effect on Russian 
identity through its attempts to merge nations and suppress Russia's national 
individuality.41 Communists and indeed many nationalists saw the Soviet period as 
providing a usable history in defining Russianness in the post-Soviet period, 
although the Russian Communist Party quickly adopted nationalist clothing. 
Russia's foreign policy has often been seen as heavily influenced by culture 
and ideology, the result of the country's geography, mixture of 'Asiatic' and 
'European' peoples and customs, Orthodox (and Muslim) religion, Bolshevism42 
and state-people divide, to name a few of the factors often considered important. 
Both native and foreign observers have often inferred that Russia's role in the 
world is or should be different in some way from that of other nations. 43 In the 19th 
century, for example, the broad Westemiser-Slavophile divide pitted two versions 
of Russia against one another: one in which the West was inimical to Russia, and 
one in which Russia lagged behind but should aim to be more like European 
countries.44 Nikolai Gogol's question, in Dead Souls (1842) - 'Russia where are 
you flying to? Answer! She gives no answer' (Gogol, 1967: 259) - summed up the 
feelings of many. The Westemiser-Slavophile divide persisted throughout the 
Soviet period and beyond. In post-Soviet political writings and party political 
programmes, in the media and in other public forums, there was an explicit quest to 
discover the 'Russian idea' (or a tacit acceptance that there was a self-evident 
41 Although at times the Soviet leadership, particularly under Stalin and Brezhnev, did toy with 
Russian nationalist rhetoric (see Chapter 7). 
42 See Pravda (1988) and Kramer (1999) for analyses of the role of ideology in influencing and 
constraining Soviet foreign policy making. 
43 As King (1994) has pointed out, Sovietologists' view of the significance of the rebirth of Russia 
differed according to how much weight they placed on Russia's cultural specificity. 
44 See Berdiaiev (1947), Neumann (1999) and Figes (2003) for overviews. 
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Russian idea and that the state should be adhering to it).45,46 Repeating Gogol's 
question in Dead Souls, Pravda was asking 'Where are you going Rus? There is no 
answer', in February 1992 - the answer was still being sought 150 years after 
Gogol first asked it.47 Continuities in the practices of political culture were evident 
too, despite the highly unsettled and continuing debate. 
Russian history has often been regarded as taking place in cycles. 
Continuities in Russia's authoritarian traditions and political culture throughout the 
Tsarist and Soviet periods, as well as the role played by the West in Russian 
national identity, have been identified by Medvedev (1999) in his analysis of the 
long-tenn character of Russian society and by Reddaway & Glinski (2001: 19), 
who see Russian history as being similar to a 'pendulum swinging between 
progress and conservative backlash, between despotic, bloody police regimes and 
the anarchic "times of troubles"'. This takes place through a fonn of "'path 
dependence" as every new round... was shaped by memory of past and 
comparisons with previous similar experience'. Kortunov (1998: 2) also cites 
Kvasha's periodisation of Russian history into repetitions of 'planning and energy 
accumulation' followed by 'straining of all forces that strengthens the state and 
creates a strong leader'. 
The role of the other 
An examination of how Russian history was interpreted in building an idea of 
contemporary Russianness needs to be complemented by a consideration of how 
relations with outsiders (in the past and as an ongoing fact of national life) 
influenced the ongoing fonnation of national identity. Constructivists emphasize to 
varying degrees the importance of outsiders, or 'others', in the construction of the 
self. Kubalkova (2001: 33), argued that 'identifying "others" against whose alleged 
identity one fonns one's own identity simplifies the equation, [of identity 
45 The Russian state (in both Tsarist and Yeltsin periods) has also directed research to codify and 
make official what is unique about Russia and thus what its relations with the rest of the world 
should be. 
46 Duncan (1998) and Hosking (1998), to take two examples, have shown in their historical studies 
the various though limited continuities in Russian political culture from Tsarist times through the 
Soviet period . 
. p Kuda neseshsia Rus? .. Ne daet otveta was the title of an interview with Ruslan Abdulatipoy, 
Chair of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet's Soviet of Nationalities, in Pravda, 19 February 
1992. 
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formation] especially insofar as groups are concerned'. Most research in this field, 
indeed, suggests that it can only be through a dialogue with external others that the 
self can have any meaning. 'We can understand the state as having no ontological 
status apart from the various acts that constitute its reality... Difference is 
constituted in relation to identity' (Campbell, 1998).48 The individual, in fact, 
'needs her own identity in order to make sense of herself and others and needs the 
identities of others to make sense of them and herself (Hopf, 2002: 4-5). 
Similarly, 'ethnic groups [are] reproduced by the very maintenance of the 
boundaries that separate them from other groups, who were seen to be constituted 
by their lack of this or that trait' (Neumann, 1999: 36). 
This process becomes a never-ending dialogue between separate groups in 
international relations. 'Foreign policy provides a channel for engagement with the 
external environment, supplies evidence of the outside world's perception and 
appraisal of the collectivity, and functions as an instrument for realisation of the 
self-image ... The process involves defining "us" against "them" by comparison 
with the chosen referent(s), differentiation, and drawing boundaries' (Kassianova, 
200 I: 821-822). 
At the same time, 'national identity and security strategy are closely linked. 
Their relations are dialectical by nature. The problems of security strongly 
influence the process of national self-identification. And vice versa' (Baburkin, 
2003: 2). Thus a country perceives another country through the lens of its own 
identity, 'and creates a new reality by interpreting the initial step through its own 
perception of the move. Identity and self-image are the main factors that determine 
how the actions of other countries are perceived' (Zevelev, 2002c: 456). The 
national identity debate consists of the public statements that can be understood as 
relating to 'us' and 'them'. 
Russian foreign policy was conducted on the basis of the sense of Russian 
national identity shared by members of the elite, which in tum was influenced by 
the manner in which relations with important external actors developed. While the 
outside world and events that occur in it are given meaning by national identity, the 
threats, problems and opportunities that are seen to arise, and which are 
48 See also Der Derian (1997: 61). 
successfully or otherwise dealt with, are in turn reinterpreted and affect the 
developing internal national identity debate, giving meaning to the nation itself. 
The nation's history and relations with others are the two crucial aspects of 
its identity formation. But as noted, the constructivist view is that institutions like 
identity only exist because people make them exist. Therefore it is vital to 
understand which interpretations of history and outsiders (others) come to 
dominate and become the accepted version of foreign policy and how this occurs. It 
is individuals who make identity and foreign policy - which is the expression of 
national identity. 
Individuals and the formation of identity: the pre-eminent role of national 
elites 
The national identity debate is conducted by people. But some people hold more 
influential positions in society than others and thus have more power to determine 
the generally accepted vision of the nation. Power is understood by constructivists 
to be 'not only the resources required to impose one's view on others, but also the 
authority to determine the shared meanings that constitute the identities, interests 
and practices of states ... Because social reality is a matter of imposing meanings 
and functions on physical objects that do not already have those meanings and 
functions, the ability to create the underlying rules of the game, to define what 
constitutes acceptable play, and to be able to get the other actors to commit 
themselves to those rules because they are now part of their self-understandings, is 
perhaps the most subtle and effective form of power' (Adler, 1997: 336). Power is 
therefore seen as the 'central link between the construction of knowledge and 
social order. .. First, people are attributed labels [which affect how they perceive 
themselves and how others perceive them] ... Second, power analysis emphasizes 
the link ... between the social production of knowledge and collective action. Here 
the focus is on those social groups empowered to provide the authoritative vision of 
the world. Both types of power analysis which are profoundly intersubjective link, 
on each level, the theory of knowledge with social theory' (Guzzini, 2000: 172). 
As Prizel suggests in his term 'guardianship of national identity', and as 
Urban (1998), Ponarin (1999) and Kassianova (2001) have pointed out, this applies 
to national identity. Defining the national interest and ensuring a successful foreign 
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policy is considered by members of the nation and outsiders to be the business of 
officials within the structures of the state. The foreign policy elite consists of those 
within the formal structures of power who are in the most powerful position to 
influence the debate and also put into practice what the prevailing concept of 
national identity suggests is correct foreign policy. State officials are considered 
not only by other members of the nation, but also by other state officials in the 
outside world, to be responsible in this way. Thus the foreign policy elite adopt 
responsibility for interpreting history and of interpreting ongoing interactions with 
others. 'Since the state is the central site at which national interest is defined, the 
most important language is that of state officials' (Weldes, 1999: 112). 
Thus the focus of empirical research is on the statements and actions of the 
elite. The relevant elite is, however, broader than the membership of official 
policy-making circles. As well as the state foreign policy elite, various other people 
are influential in national identity because the Russian national identity debate 
includes the input of a variety of authoritative voices. The wider cultural elite of 
journalists, academics and religious figures is influential because it adopts and is 
accorded the authority to expound upon issues of national significance. 
The elite can be conceived of as being of primary importance in the study 
of identity formation, which is 'particularly important in newly emerging or re-
emerging states, since nationalism and national identity are often the main if not 
the sole force binding these societies together. .. Nationalism and national identity 
are the glue that gives coherence to ... all polities' (Prizel, 1998: 2_3).49,50 In a 
country such as Russia after the collapse of Communist rule, given the lack of 
stable 'intermediate associations' between society and government, this elite plays 
'an enhanced role in shaping change' (Checkel, 1999: 7). 
In every country the relationship between policy decision-makers and the 
public at large is different (Tsigankov, 2002: 294-295). In empirical work we can 
find the relevant people who regularly 'produce and express views and evaluations 
in the area, who are recognised as experts by the official power, or who come out 
as spokesmen of the legislative power and government in the corresponding area 
49 See also Richter (1996: 71). 
50 See also Elshtain (1995: 349-350). 
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and who serve the state power at the federal as well as regional levels' (Ossipov, 
1999: 183). 
In Russia, rapid 'changes in the internal and external environment. .. led to 
core changes in foreign policy' (Prizel, 1998: 2). The role played by significant 
others in the outside world was crucial in this struggle for power. The perceived 
success or failure of different concepts of national identity were a result of how 
these interactions with other actors in the international world played out and were 
interpreted in the domestic debate. There was clearly a confused and highly 
competitive period in which different groups and their ideas struggled for 
dominance. This is crucial because a 'shift in the custodianship of national identity 
[leads to] a shift in the foreign policy orientation' (Prizel, 1998: 3). The 
competition between the various branches of the elite - between parliament and 
presidential apparatus, between Foreign Ministry and Defence Ministry for 
example - was fierce; among other things, over the correct interpretations of 
national identity; these contests therefore are one area of interest to Chapters 8 and 
9. 
Roles: national identity and individual action 
The link between individual actors and intersubjectively shared understandings can 
be understood through the concept of roles. This shows how individuals are both 
influenced by and influence the terms of the national identity debate. The 
'custodians' of national identity are influenced to act in certain ways (in carrying 
out foreign policy, and, in tum, interpreting its results) because, as constructivists 
argue, the world is given meaning - makes sense - because of the way it is 
interpreted by individuals. These interpretations are based on identity, and operate 
as road maps to understanding 'reality'. Shared understandings such as national 
identity reduce the complexity of real-life situations and lead to people acting in 
fairly predictable ways. National identity therefore provides a basis for behaviour 
in the international realm. 'Perceptions of the situation in which actors find 
themselves and the courses of action which they view as reasonable to pursue are 
constructed in the context of their identities' (Williams & Neumann, 2000: 362). 
The sudden disappearance of the Soviet empire, heir of the Russian empire, left 
Russians facing a 'profound identity crisis' (Baev, 1999). As Richter (1996) has 
suggested, this leaves elites searching for ideas that legitimise foreign policies. 'It 
is not ... easy to ... grasp the logic of action in this process [the quest for non-Soviet 
legitimisation of the state] without first analysing the corresponding normative 
vocabulary, ways of perception and evaluation used by the political elite' (Ossipov, 
1999: 183) 
The logic of appropriateness shows how individuals understand what they 
should do, and how it is to be made comprehensible to others. The 'self-perceived 
identity of the actors is central to their understanding of what is appropriate action 
in a given situation. The logic of appropriateness is intrinsically social and 
relational: what counts as appropriate action is determined in the context of a social 
structure within which the actor is located and on the judgement of others ... To be 
recognised as a certain kind of actor is to adhere to the recognised behaviour 
deemed appropriate to the situation, and thus to be a legitimate actor within it. 
Undertaking specific actions in that situation is equally a sign of being a particular 
kind of actor. Analysed in this broadly social context, legitimate identities are 
inextricably bound to roles, and to structures of power' (Williams & Neumann, 
2000: 363-364). Thus the roles adopted by actors, such as foreign policy-makers, 
result in what is seen as appropriate behaviour. Given that these identities are 
intersubjectively created, the roles also make sense to other members of society. 
Thus the individual's identity reveals itself in the roles he or she performs. 
These are cultural norms and values, interpreted as 'a national "ideology" or belief 
system in foreign policy, in the sense that ideas of who "we" are serves as a guide 
to political action and basic world views ... Thus, this conceptual lens through 
which foreign policy-makers perceive international relations, tends to set the norm 
for what is considered by themselves "rational" foreign policy-making' (Aggestam, 
1999: 5). For Aggestam, 'Role conceptions suggest how norms and values become 
operationalised in terms of verbal statements about expected foreign policy 
behaviour. Role provides an essential link between agent and structure, as it 
incorporates how foreign policy behaviour is both purposeful and shaped by the 
institutional context (Aggestam, 1999: 9). As Little (1988: 37) pointed out much 
earlier, 'the belief system [is] a property of the social group rather than the 
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individua1.51 It is a 'set of ideas that transcends the individuals who are committed 
to it ... [that makes] otherwise incomprehensible social situations meaningful, to so 
construe them as to make it possible to act meaningfully within them ... The 
willingness of individuals to conform is hardly surprising given that much 
individual behaviour only makes sense in the context of an extemalised belief 
system' (Little, 1988: 42-43). Yet members of the elite also try to push forward 
their own interpretations of what is appropriate as there is not a homogeneous 
vision of what the national identity is. These debates sometimes resolve themselves 
into areas of common acceptance, at other times views seem to be irreconcilable. 
In practice, perceptions of what is perceived and defined as being 
acceptable and viable goals and interests in foreign policy - the roles adopted by 
policy-makers - are clearly identifiable in their language. 'With their successful 
repeated articulation, these linguistic elements come to seem as though they are 
inherently or necessarily connected, and the meanings they produce come to seem 
natural, come to seem an accurate description of reality' (Weldes, 1999: 99).52 
Empirical research aims to show (by analysing elite actors' statements), what they 
perceive to be their role as foreign policy-makers in relation to certain situations. 
The role of the wider population 
The elite and their self-conceptions are the focus of a constructivist analysis of this 
kind, focusing on national identity and foreign policy. But these roles can only be 
understood in the context of a wider societal debate. In Russia there has 
traditionally been a specific form of state-people divide, and to many observers 
that continued into the 1990s. The debate on identity in that period was dominated 
by elites (Kortunov, 1999: 23). Yet, even in a very elitist society, core values held 
widely across society are common to all members of the nation. 
51 See also Carlsnaes (1986), who focuses on ideology. 
52 Similarly, Guzzini uses Bourdieu's concept ofajield - a social subsystem which is a 'patterned 
set of practices which suggests competent action in conformity with rules and roles, [ and which] 
relies intrinsically on a historically derived system of shared meanings which define agency and 
make action intelligible. Being historical, fields are open and change over time' (Guzzini, 2000: 
165). Collective memory becomes 'the "natural" way of doing, perceiving and thinking things' 
(Guzzini, 2000: 166). Williams and Neumann (2000: 360, footnote 16) also draw on Bourdieu for 
the concept of 'symbolic power', emphasizing 'the power which legitimate conceptions of identity 
have on what is understood as appropriate action by the actors concerned'. 
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The elite are not hermetically sealed from the rest of the population. There 
is a flow, perhaps limited, of people and ideas upwards and across, and there are 
similarities in educational and cultural experiences. The wider population in Russia 
in the 1990s was able to express its opinion at least to some extent through opinion 
polls, the media and elections. The elite and the mass public inevitably share many 
ideas, owing to their shared historical education. Empirical analysis can show to 
what extent this was important in the case in question, but the elite cannot push 
forward any vision of national identity. To some degree, 'interpretations of old 
traditions and inventions of new ones by intellectuals and politicians "must be 
consonant not only with the ideological demands of nationalism" but should also fit 
particular ethno-histories and have a popular resonance' (Tolz, 1998: 269). In 
Ponarin's (1999: 2) scheme, 'the situation can be pictured as a 'marketplace where 
"masses" are potential buyers with a certain demand and elites are competing 
sellers whose profit is political power'. Yet he admits that sellers can 'sometimes 
shape demand'. 
Thus the elite and the wider population are connected to some degree, and 
'examining the language of the national interest, whether found in speeches, policy 
documents, memoirs, or other sources, helps to explain why claims about the 
national interest are believed. Even the most outrageously cynical statements are 
powerful because they make sense to at least some in their audiences ... even 
exaggerated "rhetoric" thus provides a good indication of what makes sense in a 
particular political environment at a particular time' (Weldes, 1999: 114-115). 
Empirical research and national identity formation in Yeltsin's Russia 
The first point to be established, then, is the nature of the elite and how they 
entered into the national debate. The relevant influential historical political-cultural 
debates on Russia's national identity formation in the 1990s - those that were being 
revived and reinterpreted in the 1990s - will be the next matter to be examined, as 
will the ideas which became dominant, which parts of the elite espoused the 
various interpretations, and whether there was a dominant view of national identity 
and the national interest (see Chapter 7). In specific case studies, an analysis is 
required of how external actors are perceived: in this case, the manner in which 
NATO and the EU - two major organizations representing 'the West' - were dealt 
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with in the Russian domestic debate and how the elite perceived Russia's 
appropriate actions with regard to them. According to the framework established in 
this chapter, such perceptions should be founded on the historical debate about 
national identity. 
The evidence for this work comes from the public debates conducted in 
Russia, mainly by the state and cultural elite. These include debates in the various 
media, in parliament, and the results of public opinion polls that deal with Russia's 
place in the world, with ethnicity, borders, on threats and the perception of the 
major external influences on Russia. One recent empirical approach to using an 
elite-focused constructivist analysis of Russian foreign policy was undertaken by 
Kassianova who, in a similar argument to that used here, suggests that the state can 
be considered as the 'producer rather than the mediator or arbiter of the identity 
discourse' (Kassianova, 2001: 825). Her methodology is to focus on 'the texts of 
major official documents [ which] may be singled out as a specific component of 
the national self-consciousness discourse for they provide a set of authoritative 
state-sanctioned visions of the principal questions of the state's and nation's 
objectives and prospects ... it amounts to a state-authorised message addressed both 
inwards, to the nation, and outwards, to the world. In the latter capacity such 
documents are taken seriously by observers, experts and politicians browsing them 
for clues to predict the state's behaviour' (Kassianova, 2001: 827). However, the 
clues as to the significance of these major texts will be found in the wider domestic 
debate, including by reference to the wider resonance of such ideas in opinion polls 
and election results. The requirement here is to study documents and speeches from 
a wider spectrum of the elite, those produced by the institutions of state, the media 
and by senior politicians, commentators in the major journals and newspapers and 
academics at the major state institutes, in parliamentary debates, party programmes 
and in personal memoirs. These were the means by which those with political 
power to influence the national identity debate did so. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RUSSIA'S POWER RELATIVE TO THE WEST IN THE 1990S 
Realists believe that decision-makers must react to the facts of the international 
distribution of power, and the threats and possibilities that present themselves, to 
ensure the survival of their state (see Chapter 2). They build domestic strength and 
carry out diplomacy to ensure, at a minimum, that the position of their state does 
not worsen relative to other states, with the ultimate goal being either security or 
hegemony. 53 Domestic politics play a limited role because it is the international 
distribution of material power that is of paramount importance in determining state 
strategy. 
Realism predicts that leaders will act in a purposeful manner. Policies 
change rapidly with changes in the environment, but this does not preclude the 
existence of strategy. The aim of a case-study analysis utilising this view of foreign 
policy is to 'trace how, in actual cases, relative power is translated and 
operationalized into the behavior of state actors' (Rose, 1998: 166). This chapter 
lays the groundwork for the two case-study chapters that follow by examining the 
key structural factor - the decline in Russia's military and economic capability 
compared to that of other states and alliances (primarily in relation to the West but 
also in the wider regional and global view); it also describes the decision-makers 
and institutions responsible for foreign policy in Russia in the 1990s. 
Most realists regard the post-Cold War international structure as unipolar. 
'The United States is the first leading state in modem international history with 
decisive preponderance in all the underlying components of power: economic, 
military and geopolitical' (Wohlforth, 1999: 7). Its one potential competitor had 
disappeared. 
53 Offensive realists argue that states will inevitably seek as much power as possible, aiming for 
hegemony; defensive realists that the ultimate goal is security. In practice, however, policies will 
usually turn out to be the same, as both scenarios involve a continuous struggle for relative power 
and position. 
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Russia and the West in the post-Cold War era the new distribution of power 
The new geopolitical situation 
In December 1991 the democratically elected leader of Russia, with his Ukrainian 
and Be10russian counterparts, signed the decree that officially dismantled the 
Soviet Union and formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (they were 
later joined by most other former Soviet republics). The Russian state was reborn 
in a commonwealth at the heart of a shattered Union. 
The geopolitical retreat of the Soviet Union from the West had begun under 
Mikhail Gorbachev, when the east European countries were allowed to secede from 
Moscow's control and Moscow accepted unwillingly that Germany would be 
reunited within NATO. At a party plenum, on 25 December 1989, Gorbachev 
claimed that 'the inclusion of a united Germany in NATO would represent an 
unacceptable "shift in the balance'" ,54 and he also stated that his hope was for 'new 
structures created within a pan-European framework' (Gorbachev, 1997: 683). 
However, Germany was indeed reunited within NATO, and NATO remained 
vigorously alive. 
In December 1991, Russia had to face up to the fact that the USSR 
(successor to the Russian empire) was no more, the former Soviet republics were 
independent, and Moscow was no longer the centre of a superpower state. Russia's 
borders were those of many centuries earlier, and new states had appeared on those 
borders in huge territories that had previously been under Moscow's control. Many 
of these territories the Russians considered to be historical homelands - parts of 
Russia - such as the Crimea, Belarus and the Ukraine. Areas with large, densely 
settled Russian populations, such as northern Kazakhstan, Moldova and the Baltic 
republics, were now also found in independent states.55 The military and economic 
infrastructure built up by the Soviets was left stranded in various parts of the 
former Soviet Union. 
The collapse of the USSR led to plans to withdraw a 500,OOO-strong army 
from the territory of Soviet allies in Europe. Russia indeed began to withdraw its 
54 Cited by Wohlforth (1993: 286). 
55 Many millions of Russians were left outside the country's borders; the precise number was 
uncertain, as the definition of 'Russian' was unclear. The number usually quoted is 25 million (see 
Chapter 7, footnote 2). 
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armed forces far away from the centre of the continent, in a situation in which pay 
or even housing could not be guaranteed for the troops. From the Western 
perspective, Russia offered a much reduced conventional military threat. From 
Russia's point of view, 'for the first time in 300 years (in peacetime) the Moscow 
military district has turned from the deep rear into the advanced defense line of 
Russia' (Arbatov, 2001: paragraphs 13-15). The separation from Western Europe 
did have one military advantage in that it created a barrier between the military 
forces of the Western powers and Russia in case the former did harbour hostile 
intentions. This buffer zone would disappear, however, if the eastern European 
states allied themselves with NATO. 
As Russia moved further away from Europe, its routes to the sea were 
restricted. Russian ships seeking access through the Baltic, because of the 
shallowness of the Gulf of Finland, depended on the good will of Estonia and 
Finland (Jonson, 1997: 311). This situation, coupled with an unsatisfactory deal 
with Ukraine on the Black Sea Fleet, increased the significance of the east of the 
country and the ocean outlets in that direction (Chung, 1999: 266), although the 
Pacific Fleet also fell into disrepair. 
Despite these facts, Russia was by far the most powerful state in the former 
Soviet empire militarily and economically. It was the legatee of the Soviet Union's 
international treaties, and the inheritor of its arsenal of nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons. Russia remained a gigantic country and regional power with 
an area of 17 million square kilometres, almost as large as the United States and 
Canada combined. 
Russia's economic collapse 
The Soviet Union's economic situation was very poor even before Gorbachev came 
to power, and this was one of the most important factors motivating his reforms. 
Yet these reforms and the shock therapy of Yeltsin and his reformist government, 
begun in January 1992, caused an economic catastrophe. 56 Between 1989 and 1994 
Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) fell by almost half, while annual inflation 
56 It is clear that Gorbachev and then Yeltsin were right to attempt some reinvigoration of the Soyiet 
economy. But the shock therapy begun in 1992 \\'as ineptly and corruptly carried out. 
39 
averaged 230% (Mason & Sidorenko-Stephenson, 1997).57 Russia's real GDP 
(US$ at 1996 prices), dropped from around US$ 700 billion in 1988, to less than 
US$ 600 billion in 1992, continuing its decline to around US$ 420 billion in 1995, 
then holding steady before dropping again to a decade low of USS 400 billion in 
1998, before starting to rise again. 
There were signs of stability and even some growth in the mid-1990s - in 
1997, it was felt that 'parts of the officially measured economy may be rebounding' 
(Russian Economic Trends, 1997: 3) - but the 1998 crash followed, another serious 
setback, before the economy again embarked on a period of growth, helped by high 
oil prices. Examining the percentage change in GDP (real change per annum) is 
another way of viewing the picture and shows the same pattern. The change was -
5% in 1991, -14% in 1992, -13% in 1994, -5% in 1995, then +1.38% in 1997 with, 
again, a decline of5% in 1998, and a decline of6% in 1999.58 In sum, an important 
part of Yeltsin's legacy 'is an economy only about half of the size of the one he 
inherited' (Ellman, 2000: 1420). As Putin said in 1999, '''in the 1990s the Russian 
GDP fell almost 50%. By size of GDP we lag 10 times behind the USA and five 
times behind China. After the crisis of 1998 the per capita GDP fell to about 3500 
dollars. This is approximately one-fifth of the average of the G-T" (cited by 
Ellman, 2000: 1420).59 
Part of the reason for Russia's calamitous economic performance was the 
break-up of the Soviet communications and resource-allocation system. Some 40% 
of Soviet GDP was accounted for in the CIS and Baltic countries (Trenin, 1996: 
33). This suggested a need for some form of economic reintegration in the CIS, 
although many argued that in fact the CIS would be a drain on the Russian 
economy, as these republics had been in Soviet times. 
57 See also Rogov (1997) and Reddaway & Glinski (2001) for an extended analysis along these 
lines. 
58 All of these figures are taken from The Economist Intelligence Unit. Online at: 
http://www.eiu.com. 
59 Lieven's (1999: 186-187) view was that, 'By the year 2000, if present trends continue, Russian 
GNP will be only twice that of Poland which renders absurd the idea that Russia could once more in 
the foreseeable future dominate Central Europe'. 
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Economic decline relative to the West 
During the 1990s, meanwhile, the 15 EU states were demonstrating very different 
economic results: GDP in the 15 EU states (US$ at PPP) in 1991 was 6,404 billion 
(when Russia's was 1,148 billion); it was 7,432 billion in 1995 (when Russia's was 
819 billion), 8,461 billion in 1998 and 8,780 billion in 1999 (when Russia's had 
shrunk to 856 billion). The only year showing negative growth was 1993 when 
GDP (% real change per annum) was -0.04%. The EU's GDP per head (US$) in 
1991 was 18,950 (when Russia's was 429); in 1995 it was 22,990 (when Russia's 
was 2,120); in 1999 it was 22,770 (when Russia's was 1,339).60 Percentage change 
in GDP (real change per annum) in the EU 15 was fairly steady throughout the 
decade: 4.5% in 1991, 1.3% in 1992, -0.3% in 1993,2.8% in 1994,2.5% in 1995, 
2,/% in 1997,2.9% in 1998 and 2.8% in 1999. 
The US economy, too, was dramatically different to that of Russia's in the 
1990s. Nominal GDP (US$ at PPP) was 5,803 billion in 1990, 6,338 billion in 
1992,7,072 billion in 1994, 7,398 billion in 1995, 7,817 billion in 1996,8,304 
billion in 1997, 8,747 billion in 1998 and 9,268 billion in 1999. In the US, GDP per 
head was (US$ at PPP) 23,200 in 1990, 23,653 in 1991, 24,671 in 1992, 25,580 in 
1993, 26,846 in 1994, 27,753 in 1995, 28,987 in 1996, 30,429 in 1997, 31,679 in 
1998, and 33,185 in 1999. In the US, GDP percentage change (real change per 
annum) was -0.2% in 1991, 3.3% in 1992, 2.7% in 1993, 4.0% in 1994, 2.5% in 
1995,3.7% in 1996,4.5% in 1997,4.2% in 1998 and 4.5% in 1999. 
Western aid was required to help Russia get through its difficulties, 
primarily in the form of IMF credits. In 1992, these totalled just over US$ 1 billion, 
increasing to US$ 1.5 billion in 1994, US$ 5.5 billion in 1995, then down to US$ 
3.8 billion in 1996, US$ 2 billion in 1997, US$ 6 billion in 1998, dropping sharply 
to US$ 645 million in 1999 and to zero in 2000. Russia's IMP debt during the 
decade, accordingly, rose from zero in 1991 to more than US$ 19 billion in 1998 
before beginning a gradual decline. Russia's overall net debt in the same period 
rose from almost US$ 60 billion in 1990 to more than 160 billion in 1998 before 
again, making a gradual descent. The IMF's loans were tied to economic 
developments in the country (,reform ') and even to certain figures being retained in 
key posts in the administration (Anatolii Chubais and Aleksandr Nemtsov being 
60 Figures from The Economist Intelligence Unit. Online at: http://www.eiu.com. 
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notable examples) which had an influence on Russian domestic politics, as well as 
providing fuel to critics of Y eltsin' s policies. But at the same time the loans turned 
out to be disappointing, materialising in quantities that when broken down over 
time, and taking into account repayments, were far less impressive than the huge 
numbers occasionally trumpeted by Western and Russian leaders. 61 
Social misery, a population in decline 
These economic data show clearly how the gap between Russia and the West in 
economic terms grew dramatically in the 1990s. But Russia's economic statistics 
also spelt social misery, collapsing infrastructure, and an inability to fund military 
reform, despite the hope pinned on the long-term success of shock therapy. Real 
wages fell by half between 1991 and 1996 (Mason & Sidorenko-Stephenson, 
1997).62 Arrears of wages between 1992 and 1996 stood at 7.5 billion dollars 
(Lieven, 1998: 170). The health of the population also suffered enormously during 
the 1990s. The total population of Russia fell from 148,164 million in 1990 to 
147,609 in 1995 (World Bank, 1996).63 Life expectancy fell from 74.27 for women 
and 63.79 for men in 1990 to 72.20 for women and 59.00 for men in 2000.64 
According to a report from the World Health Organization (written in 2003), 'in 
the last decade Russia has been experiencing a shock unprecedented in peacetime 
to its health and demographic profiles ... A combination of a dramatic fall in the 
birth rate and increasing mortality meant that since the mid-1980s, Russia's 
popUlation has shown declining growth rates, which became negative in 1992. The 
size of the population, estimated at 144.8 million in 2000, has fallen by 3.5 million 
61 IMF figures show that disbursements by the Fund to Russia totalled 719 billion (SDRs [Special 
Drawing Rights]) in 1992 and 1,078,275,000 in 1993 when Russia paid charges of56,082,833 
SDRs. In 1994 IMF disbursements to Russia totalled the same as in 1993, Russia now paying 
charges and interest of 122,264,400; in 1996 disbursements totalled 2,578,861,200, while charges 
paid were 323,567,770. In 1997 disbursements were 1,467,252,800, while charges and interest paid 
reached 423,093,268; in 1999 disbursements were a mere 471,429,000, while charges and interest 
paid were higher than this sum, at 528,469,919 (figures from the International Monetary Fund. 
Online at: http://www.imf.org). 
62 See also Rogov (1997: 2) and Reddaway & Glinski (2001: 2). 
63 In the EU 15, by comparison, the popUlation was around 400 million throughout the 1990s. In the 
US, the population rose from 250.1 million in 1990 to 266.6 million in 1995 and 279.3 million in 
1999. 
64 World Health Organization, Office of the European Region Tuberculosis Control Programme, 
personal communication, 20 August 2004. 
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in the period 1992-2000 (Tragakes & Lessof, 2003: 11).65 This decline would 
have been worse were it not for net immigration in the early part of the decade of 
ethnic Russians from other former Soviet republics. 'During the 1990s, mortality 
rose for all age groups except infants and children, and for both sexes, though the 
increase was far greater for males. The greatest increase in mortality was among 
males aged 40--49, which nearly doubled (87% increase) in the period 1990-1994. 
Life expectancy is now among the lowest in Europe, particularly in the case of 
men, which is almost 13 years lower than the average for the European Union .... 
Male life expectancy dropped from 63.8 in 1990 to 57.6 in 1994, and it was 59.15 
in 2000 (Tragakes & Lessof, 2003: 12). The Russian popUlation was growing in 
1990 but by 1995 had stagnated, and in 1999 was falling by 0.40%.66 
As in many areas of Russian life, the relevant laws relating to health 
insurance looked excellent on paper. The relevant law was "On Health Insurance of 
the Citizens of the RSFSR" of 28 June 1991 (No. 1499-1), 'setting out the basic 
framework for the establishment of a health insurance system for publicly provided 
health care services, and amended and reissued on 2 April 1993 (Law No. 4741-1). 
Reforms of the health system 'were undertaken at a time of great upheaval and in 
response to pressing demands ... The reforms were drawn up with a clear aim of 
preserving access to a basic package of care for the whole population ... This has 
not proved to be the case [and]... de facto rationing now takes place without 
scrutiny ... as the system comes to be increasingly financed out-of-pocket and 
under-the-table, in the absence of a formal cost-sharing mechanism in place, equity 
is clearly being compromised. Health status in the early part of the 1990s was 
severely affected' (Tragakes & Lessof, 2003: 179). 
Economic power relative to the other former Soviet states 
The economic statistics throughout the former Soviet Union, excluding the Baltic 
States, show a similar pattern of sudden economic decline in 1991-1992, followed 
by halting recovery during the rest of the 1990s. In 1992, all of the countries in the 
FSU (except Kyrgyzstan) showed enormous drops in GDP, from Georgia and 
Armenia (percentage real change per annum of -40%) to Kazakhstan and 
65 The report states that 'In 1992, the death rate in the Russian Federation was greater than the birth 
rate for the first time, and has been so eyer since'. 
66 Figures from Economist Intelligence Unit. Online at: http://\\ww.eiu.com. 
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Turkmenistan (the best perfonners) with declines of around 5%. In 1993 and 1994 
only one or two of all the FSU states showed positive growth, while by 1996 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan were all 
registering some sort of growth. But these year-on-year percentage change figures 
reflect the even worse perfonnance of the previous year (hence Russia's relatively 
impressive showing in 1999). 
In tenns of GDP, Russia stood head and shoulders above the other FSU 
states: in 1999, and despite the disastrous economic perfonnance of the previous 
decade, GDP stood at 856 billion (US$ at PPP) compared to Ukraine's GDP of 
US$ 183 billion (US$ at PPP), clear in second place. This difference was actually 
in many instances greater than earlier in the 1990s because of the poor perfonnance 
of the FSU states when compared to Russia. Yet GDP per head shows a somewhat 
different story, and the numbers are closer, though Russia is still the best 
perfonner. Russia's GDP per head (US$ at PPP) was 7,896 in 1990, compared to 
7,242 in Ukraine and 5,948 in Kazakhstan. By 1995 Russia's GDP per head had 
fallen to 5,539, Ukraine's to 3,950, and Kazakhstan's to 4,417. Most of the other 
FSU states hovered around US$ 2,000 in 1995, rising slightly by the end of the 
decade, while Russia and Ukraine's GDP per head had not moved upwards much 
from the 1995 level. 67 
Military weakness, failed reform 
One result of Russia's economic collapse was the state's inability to prevent a 
severe decline in military capability in tenns of upkeep of weaponry, research and 
development, morale and training. Estimates are difficult to make, because of lack 
of transparency in both Soviet and post-Soviet periods, and complications in rouble 
: dollar conversions. According to one estimate, however, by the mid-1990s Russia 
spending 14 times less on defence than the Soviet Union had spent in the 1980s 
(Trenin, 1996: 33). Another, similar, estimate is that in 1997 the military 
expenditure of Russia and the fonner Soviet states was around one tenth that of the 
USSR in 1988.68 The USSR had been spending around 7-13% of its GDP for 
military purposes up until the 1990s, a huge sum compared to other states in the 
67 Figures from The Economist Intelligence Unit. Online at: http://www.eiu.com. 
68 Data from GlobalSecurity Org (2004), Russian Military Budget. Online at: 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/worldlralmo-budget.htm. 
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world, while the US had been able to maintain its forces at equiYalent levels with a 
far lower percentage of its GDP. With the foundation of the Russian Federation , 
military expenditure dropped to 5.5-2.8% of GDP by the late 1990s. Owing to the 
fact that GDP itself had dropped dramatically, there was in fact a 70% decrease in 
real defence spending in the 1990s. The year-by-year figures show that spending 
(by constant US$) fell precipitously in 1992 (owing to the cuts in military spending 
of the reformist government) from US$ 324.5 billion to USS 86.9 billion. The 
decline continued steadily until a sudden drop in 1995 to USS 46.6 billion, and 
rising in 1999 to US$ 56.0 billion.69 One further estimate is that the Russian 
military budget in 2000 rose to 110 billion roubles, up from 93 billion in 1998 and 
81.7 billion in 1999.70 One outcome was that in Russia between 1988 and 1993, 
'weapons production ... fell by at least 50% for virtually every major weapons 
system. Weapons spending in 1992 was approximately 75% less than in 1988,.71 
Thus there was a steady increase in spending, in 1999 at least, but not nearly 
enough to balance what the US was able spend on its own military: the 110 billion 
roubles of 1999 equates to around US$ 4.3 billion (using the exchange rate of 13 
September 1999); the US defense budget, meanwhile, had increased from USS 271 
billion in 1998, to US$ 280 billion in 2000. By the end of the 1990s the Russian 
defence budget had 'shrunk to 2 per cent of the American budget' (Arbatov, 2000: 
paragraph 22). As a result of the devaluation of the rouble in 1998, 'Russia 
appeared as a country with a GDP less than $200 billion... its defense budget 
dwindled to a level below $4 billion - two orders of magnitude smaller than that of 
the United States. The country's annual foreign debt servicing (approximately S 17 
billion) consumed three fourths of annual federal income' (Pikayev, 2000: 3). 
The need for reform 
One other result of the gigantic military effort of Soviet times was the vast amount 
of equipment that had remained. Thus 'Russia also still possesses approximately 
69 Data from GlobalSecurity Org (2004). Russian Military Budget. 
70 Data from The Military Balance, 1998-1999: 105-109. 
71 The huge inflation experienced in Russia in the rnid-1990s 'rendered formal budgets nearly 
meaningless' (GlobalSecurity Org, 2004: 2). Moreover, a high level of secrecy remained, so that 
after 1998 (and a period of relative openness), 'there are only 3 open lines in the military budget, 
with only one (open [but so general as to be meaningless]) line accounting for 90% of the budget' 
(Taylor, 2000: 3). 
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10-30 per cent more military equipment than the United States ... [which] only 
serves to exacerbate the contradiction between the size of the armed forces and the 
available financial resources for their support' (Locksley, 2001: 9). Such was the 
miserable condition of the finances for Russia's defence that in the summer of 1996 
the Moscow military district filed a court case against the Ministry of Defence and 
the Ministry of Finance to force them to pay servicemen's wages. The Russian 
military went through a grotesque series of catastrophes, with examples of the 
effects of lack of funds being daily reported in the media. The loth Guards Tank 
regiment, brought back from Potsdam, for example, returned to find no quarters for 
the men. In the army, problems of morale, hunger, often murderous bUllying and so 
on meant that 'soldiers are mostly unwilling to serve and there is much mutual 
antipathy. The officers not sunk into apathy and disillusion are divided on the 
future direction of the service and, increasingly, between those who are cynically 
profiting from the crisis and those who struggle to make ends meet and act 
professionally' (Dick, 1997: 9). 
The case for a smaller, more efficient and less expensive armed forces was 
clear to the foreign policy elite. It resulted from economic weakness and modem 
warfare requirements - NATO's new strategy, unveiled in 1991 was also calling 
for such reformed forces. 'Military reform was required to produce a significant 
diminution in the size of the defence budget ... the Russian armed forces must 
become an affordable institution for the Russian state and society during times of 
economic uncertainty while being capable of handling all possible threats and 
military contingencies' (Locksley, 2001: 5)72. However, 'without military reforms 
you cannot conduct an economic reform because you have a tremendous hole in the 
federal budget... The gap is widening between the budget and the force structure 
which the military wants to keep' (Rogov, 1997: 2). 
Moreover, 'the military legacy of the Soviet Union ... bore no relation either 
to Russia's current geo-strategic position and economic capabilities or to those vital 
national interests which might need to be defended by military means ... Russia, 
which represents slightly above 50 per cent of the territory and population of the 
former USSR, inherited roughly 80 per cent of its armed forces and defence 
industry. This, together with deep economic crises, a dramatic decline in GNP and 
72 See also Grau & Thomas (1996: 447). 
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falling industrial production, has predefined a widening gap between the armed 
forces and the state ... the new Russian state is definitely unable to maintain this 
military heritage and urgently needs to bring the Soviet military legacy into line 
with its security interests and economic capabilities' (Konovalov, 1997: 196).73 
Against this background can be seen the keenness with which the Russian 
leadership quickly sought cuts in nuclear weaponry. Yeltsin announced in January 
1992 that by reducing the number of nuclear weapons, while retaining their 
deterrent effect, substantial savings could be made. Under START-2 Russia's 
strategic arsenal would be reduced to 3,000 warheads.74 
The desperate need for reform was expressed frequently by Yeltsin, 
Minister of Defence Pavel Grachev 75 and others. Reform meant a reduction in the 
numbers of serving personnel and nuclear warheads in order to have less of 
everything but improve the quality of what there was; a more modem, professional 
force; and updating of equipment to keep pace with potential rivals. Russia also 
needed to begin a process of military reform at the same time as NATO countries 
(with the USA to the fore) were undertaking some extremely technologically 
advanced and expensive new military developments, which threatened to widen 
further the military imbalance, not least National Missile Defence (NMD). The first 
stage of Grachev's programme 'envisaged a "reform" of the General Staff of 
Russia's Armed Forces and the so-called "central apparatus" of the Defense 
Ministry with a planned 50 percent reduction in personnel. During the second stage 
of reform, due to take place from 1993 to 1995... a new "rapid-deployment 
operational command" would be established. From 1993 to 1995 the Russian 
Armed Forces were to have been "rebuilt" with the number of servicemen cut to 
2.1 million by 1995 (Felgenhauer, 1997: 3). 
73 Felgenhauer (1997: 2) argued similarly that 'Russia inherited an armed force built to fight and 
win an all-out global war. After the Cold War suddenly ended, however, the Russian military was 
left with a shambles of an army and a totally confusing military doctrine.' 
74 Izvestiia reported, on 20 December 1992, that 'The US and Russia ... will own about 3,500 
nuclear warheads by 2003 ... the treaty might be implemented by 2000 if the general state of the 
Russian economy allows it to carry out this work quickly .... Russia and the US will not only cut 
their "powder kegs" by two thirds, they will also destroy their most destabilising forms of 
armaments - heavy intercontinental [missiles] ... in the absence of full information about the results 
obtained, even thought this might sound over grandiloquent, one can confidently say, that 2-3 
January 1993 will remain historic days, printed in history as days when the two largest nuclear 
~owers took a decisive step towards a safer world. ' 
5 Grachev was Minister of Defence from 1992 to 1996. 
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These facts were also acknowledged in the major policy documents. Thus, 
for example, the 1997 National Security Concept document stated that: 'The main 
objective of the organizational development of the Russian Federation Armed 
Forces and other troops is to create and develop troops (forces) capable of 
defending the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the country, 
the security of the citizens, and the other vitally important interests of society and 
state in line with the military-political and strategic situation in the world and the 
real potential of the Russian Federation'. 
Effective military reform proved impossible for various reasons, however. 
'Without clear-cut guidelines, not knowing what kind of enemy to counter, with 
President Yeltsin as a commander in chief who is unwilling to give extensive 
political leadership to the armed forces, and with utterly insignificant budget 
funding, the Russian armed forces under Grachev had no chance to "reform" in any 
meaningful way' (Felgenhauer, 1997: 4). Moreover, according to Felgenhauer, 
members of the General Staff were sabotaging reform efforts to buy time until a 
future rise in budgetary resources. Yeltsin admitted failure in February 1995 when 
he said that 'the army has begun to fall to pieces,.76 In March 1996, Yeltsin 
declared that 'military reform made practically no headway in 1995 and said that 
he would press for the creation of a "combat-ready, professional army'" (RFEIRL, 
1 March 1996). In May 1996, however, he stated that 'Russia must ensure its 
military security despite the reduction in international tension since the end of the 
Cold War ... [and] condemned plans to expand NATO eastward, saying that the 
West is trying to "reinforce its world leadership", by advancing "the NATO 
military machine to the east". He said that Russia must reform its military to adjust 
to its new strategic situation. Instead of "hundreds of divisions which only exist on 
paper", he said, "what we need is a few dozen divisions made up entirely of 
professionals' (RFEIRL, 30 May 1996). In June 1996 Grachev was sacked.77 
Failure to carry out such reforms led to the frustrated comments by Yeltsin 
III a radio message on 28 February 1997 that 'The financing of the army has 
improved, but not enough so far ... it is equally important to use more thriftily the 
76 Cited in Felgenhauer (1997: 7). 
77 The new Defence Council also pushed for reform, while clashing with the ~finistry of Defence. 
The need to reduce spending was again given as the reason why this was essential (Felgenhauer, 
1997: 13). 
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money which our society can realistically spend on defence needs today. And this 
is possible only with the start of a genuine, deep reform'. In July of the same year 
he called for support for reforms, promising soldiers a better life if they backed 
him. In some ways the situation actually grew worse, owing to the proliferation of 
(and increase in numbers of personnel manning) the other armed services, such as 
the interior troops, border troops, and the Federal Agency for Government 
Communications and Information troops. 
The failure to reform was a result of domestic political and economIC 
circumstances. The economic situation meant that cuts took place, but they were 
not part of a general reform effort. The infighting between ministries was a primary 
cause, as was lack of decisive leadership from the top. For one thing, Yeltsin 
needed the support of the military, especially after the October 1993 showdown 
between himself and parliament. This compromised the leadership's ability to 
effect change. The Chechen disaster compounded the crisis situation in the army 
that prevented well-thought-out reform from taking place. 
Military comparison with the West 
One reason why reform and reinvigoration of the Russian armed forces was so 
important was because of the new military distribution of power in Europe. 
NATO's military forces in comparison to those of Russia were well trained, well 
maintained and technologically advanced. The greatest burden was borne by the 
US. In 1990 the total defence expenditure of European NATO countries was 
around US$ 186 billion US dollars. US military spending was US$ 306 billion; in 
1995 the figures were US$ 184 billion and US$ 279 billion respectively; in 1999, 
US$ 180 billion, and US$ 281 billion respectively. In the late 1980s 'the European 
countries controlled merely 4.6 percent of the world reserves of nuclear weapons 
while the United States controlled 46.8 percent and the Soviet Union 45.8 percent' 
(Inozemtsev, 2002: 128). 
US military spending was far higher than that of Russia - or that of any 
other state in the world - in the 1990s. This was in spite of the 'peace dividend' to 
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be expected after the end of the Cold War. 78 In 1993, the US administration 
requested US$ 281 billion, a decline of 4.5% in real tenns from 1992 which 
represented, perhaps, this 'peace dividend,.79 In 1997, the Clinton administration's 
budget request for the 1998 fiscal year was US$ 265.3 billion, to which Congress 
added US$ 2.3 billion. The budget in 1998 was US$ 271 billion in 1998, up to USS 
280 billion in 2000. 
The upshot of this was that, although 'since the late 1980s NATO has cut its 
force structure and weaponry by about 25-30 percent ... it retained the essence of a 
collective defense organization with the most developed countries in North 
America and Western Europe accounting for about half the global GDP, 
approximately 60 percent of world military expenses and 80 percent of 
international expenditures on defense-related research and development. In 
conventional weapons, accountable under the CFE Treaty, NATO now enjoys a 
three-to-one superiority over Russia, while in previous decades the Soviet Union 
dominated the European military balance. The Alliance possesses the only efficient 
integrated defense organization capable of using military coercion if necessary 
(Rogov, 1999: 2-3). 
Russia did have its superpower-sized stock of nuclear (and chemical and 
biological) weapons. The early stages of the development of the NMD system in 
the US, however, threatened even this advantage. While NMD remained unproven 
and unpredictable, it was a disquieting development, boding ill for the future of 
Russia's ultimate deterrence, and if nothing else, demonstrating the difference in 
research potential between the US and Russia. Thus NMD was an important 
diplomatic aspect of the 1990s when the US Government was aiming for 
alterations to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty in order to allow the 
development ofNMD. 
The decline from superpower to local power 
Russia was a severely weakened superpower, whose economic and military might 
was clearly outweighed by that of the Western countries and their alliances. But it 
78 The imbalance therefore increased in the 1990s despite the fact that in the immediate post-Cold 
War environment, US commentators were noting that 'real reductions in military expenditure [had] 
become possible because of the ... disappearance of the "Soviet threat'" (/zvestiia, 6 January 1992). 
79 Data from The Military Balance 1992-1993: 16. 
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was at the same time the most powerful legatee of the Soviet Union - a local and 
Eurasian powerhouse. It remained easily the most powerful state economically in 
the CIS. Militarily too, Russia dominated the former Soviet Union. This was down 
to both conventional and nuclear power. Nuclear weapons were removed from the 
territory of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan to Russia (although the threat of 
returning nuclear missiles to Belarus was sometimes made). 80 Russia also acceded 
to most of the USSR's international commitments, 'most importantly in the 
military and security areas. Consequently, Russia has assumed the USSR's posture 
as a major power in the East of Europe' (Krivosheev, 1997: 186). 
* * * 
Moscow controlled forces that were a pale shadow of Soviet times. It was in the 
West, and with regard to NATO, that the imbalance was most stark and where 
Russia's weakness was most clear (Trenin, 2001: 145). As regards the EU there 
was little military aspect to the relationship; but the EU's economic might also 
provided a clear contrast to Russia's steep decline. 'The collapse of the Soviet 
Union produced the greatest change in world power relationships since World War 
II. With Moscow's headlong fall from superpower status, the bipolar structure that 
had shaped the security policies of the major powers for nearly half a century 
vanished, and the United States emerged as the sole surviving superpower' 
(Wohlforth, 1999: 5). 
The threats to the new state were conceived in very different ways by 
different actors, but there were some obvious facts that had to be dealt with. Rough 
consensus soon emerged on what these threats were and agreement was reached on 
the general outlines of a foreign policy strategy for Russia, which changed from 
pro-Westernism to a more independent and balanced approach that emphasised 
Russian national interests. The consensus suggested a need for unsentimental and 
realistic cooperation with the West, limiting of the possible negative effects of the 
80 The issue of nuclear weapons was dealt with by a number of agreements in December 1991. 'The 
timetable for the relocation of tactical weapons was achieved ahead of schedule; the transfer of 
strategic weapons to Russia was completed in November 1996' (Sakwa & Webber, 1999: 382). 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine all acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
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enlargement of NATO and the EU, consolidation of Russian dominance of the 
former Soviet Union, and the rebuilding of trade and political contacts which had 
been broken at the end of the Cold War. This consensus, or compromise, was to a 
great extent a result of the inescapable and harsh realities of the international 
distribution of power. The devil, however, was in the detail. 
The foreign policy elite and institutions 
Elite continuities 
The end of the Soviet Union caused a revolution in Russia in that it destroyed the 
all-Union organs of power and removed the very highest ranking leadership of the 
old state. Yet the second, and later third tier of nomenklatura, 'younger and more 
dynamic' (Lieven, 1999: 65), as well as many of the managers of large industrial 
enterprises, stepped into their shoes. As Sakwa (1996: 61) puts it, 'Y eltsin 
decapitated the political leadership of the old regime and placed himself at the head 
of its elite hierarchy'. Many would conclude that 'it is the extent of elite continuity 
that distinguishes Russia's political transformation',81 but it is continuity of a 
specific character. 82 
The President was constitutionally the most powerful figure in the country, 
particularly after October 1993 and the adoption of the new constitution.83 But 
Yeltsin's habit of attempting to balance (or see-saw) the conflicts going on beneath 
him, led to confusion and duplication in policy-making. It was clear, however, that 
81 Lilia Shevtsova, cited in Lieven (1998: 165). 
82 The nomenklatura was of course the Soviet appointments system, a list of approved names; but 
the term implies a wider network of personal relationships, 'clans' and patronage. The former 
nomenklatura have been identified as forming a sort of social class (see for example, Sakwa [1996: 
160-161]), such that 'although the communists and their allies have a majority of seats in the 
Duma ... its leaders share many values with the elite, especially the perception that there is a gulf 
between the elites and the masses' (Jensen, 1998d: 2). Others suggest that in fact the alliance among 
the members of the new elite is closer than this (Reddaway & Glinski [2001]; see also Lieven 
[1999: 370]). Further evidence comes from the voting records of such 'opposition' parties as 
Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democrats and the Communist Party, both of which consistently supported 
the government when it counted, for example on budgets, the war in Chechnya, and so on. Yet the 
struggle was in many ways genuine, even if cooption succeeded in many instances, and is best 
characterised as one of conflict within the new elite. 
83 The President is head of state (Article 80.1 in the 1993 constitution). Article 80 goes on to state 
that the President 'determines the fundamental course of the state's domestic and foreign policy' 
and 'as head of state represents the Russian Federation ... in international relations'; article 86 
specifies that the President 'exercises leadership of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation; 86a 
that he conducts negotiations, signs international treaties ... and instruments of ratification ... and 
accepts letters of diplomatic accreditation' (Konstitlltsiia Rossiskoi Federatsii, 1996). 
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on major Issues he was the reference point from which the Foreign Minister, 
Defence Minister and military chiefs had to obtain support. Unfortunately, his 
influence was often inimical to clear policy-making. 
Allies of Yeltsin who headed important agencies in the early years, like 
Gennadii Burbulis, who directed the State Council and became a kind of overseer 
of foreign policy in 1992, and Anatolii Chubais, in charge of privatisation and later 
a First Deputy Prime Minister, took on vital roles. Some were old colleagues from 
Sverdlovsk, others from the democratic movement in Moscow, yet others (like 
Egor Gaidar) were plucked from academia. But a very large proportion of those 
filling middle and low level ranks in the political and bureaucratic structures had 
done so under the old regime. 84 Moreover, the high positions of government began 
to be taken over by representatives of the old guard, beginning in December 1992 
with the appointment and ratification of Chermomyrdin as Prime Minister. 85 
According to one study, 19% of the 1988 elite were in leading positions of 
private business in 1993; 48% of the 1988 group were still in the political elite in 
1993 ' (Jensen, 1998d: 1). Kryshtanovskaya presented survey results in 1996 
showing that '75% of the new political elite and 61 % of the new business elite 
comes from the Soviet nomenklatura, businessmen mainly from Komsomol (38%) 
and economic positions (38%) in the old nomenklatura. She stressed the role 
played by a few leading banks favoured by the government in unifying the new 
elite' (RFEIRL, 12 January 1996). The founders of 'financial-industrial groups' 
and other beneficiaries of what came to be known as insider privatisation often 
84 Others suggest that far from simply reacting quickly to the new circumstances, and being in a 
position to profit, the old nomenklatura was the very engine of a 'bourgeois revolution: the "second 
Russian revolution" was in fact a revolution in which a younger generation of the nomenklatura 
ousted its older rivals ... [It] led to a shift of power into property, based upon the privatisation of the 
key sectors of the infrastructure: finance, retail trade, international economic relations, and the most 
profitable sectors of industry' (Kryshtanovskaya & White, 1998: 97; see also Jensen [1998d: 1], 
Reddaway & Glinski [2001], Simonia [2001: 269] and Hoffmann [2002]). 
85 According to Willerton, Yeltsin also relied on a network of longer-term proteges or associates 
from his past, though augmented by his new allies in industry, extractive sectors and former Party 
apparatus, particularly in the presidential administrative structure. Thus, 'while a significant 
number of Sverdlovsk associates assisted Yeltsin in his early years as Russian President, many 
failed to survive even the first year of the post-Soviet transition. Those who did surviye tended to 
hold administrative support positions for Yeltsin rather than wielding major decision-making power 
in the government' (Willerton, 1998: 75). 
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came from levels of the Communist Party below the top rank, or from the 
Komsomol or outside the Party. 86 
Many of the top economic managers of the Soviet period retained their 
positions in the new regime, converting power into property. A powerful group 
within the new elite, many controlling and holding large stakes in enormous 
economic resources, came from the ranks of the 'Red Directors' (directors of large 
industrial concerns on Soviet times, often the beneficiaries of privatisation). 
Chernomyrdin's appointment was an apparent victory for the new sectoral elite 
against both 'reformers' like Gaidar, whom he replaced, and the free marketeers, 
like Chubais, who represented the interests of many of the oligarchs. New Yeltsin 
allies in 1992-1995 tended to be linked to powerful economic sectors, like Deputy 
Prime Ministers Vladimir Shumeiko, Aleksandr Zaveriukha and lurii larov. 
Increasingly, Russian monopolists (mainly in the field of oil and gas) came to 
influence the process of formulating foreign and security policy. Some of the 
largest concerns, such as Gazprom and Lukoil, lobbied for a foreign policy which 
would serve these interests (notably in the Caspian region). The oil industry also 
carried out a successful struggle with the Foreign Ministry over the means of 
securing rights to Caspian hydrocarbon reserves. For instance, the Union Treaty 
with Belarus 'primarily serves the interests of Gazprom, which is interested in a 
regular functioning of the pipeline crossing the country and going into Europe. 
Gazprom wants good relations with Ukraine and Moldova as well' (Parkhalina, 
2002b: 4). 
The oligarchs, usually identified as six men, came to symbolise the new 
Russia,87 and, it should be noted, came from outside the Soviet elite. All exploited 
or created links in the confusion of the early post-Soviet period to the political elite, 
which was the key to cashing in on the bonanza of the early Yeltsin years. The 
oligarchs gained access to the inner circle of state power and control of the media 
(being credited with managing Yeltsin's victory in the 1996 presidential election). 
Boris Berezovskii was briefly Deputy Secretary of the Security Council and chair 
86 The Komsomol had been given exclusive rights under Gorbachev to set up profit-making 
concerns, and many of them went on to become the new rich in post-Soviet Russia. 
87 They were: Vladimir Gusinskii, Vladimir Potanin, Boris Berezovskii, Aleksandr Smolenskii. 
Mikhail Khodorkovskii. and Mikhail Friedman, though sometimes the list includes ,\I10sco\\ mayor 
Iuri Luzhkov (in, for example, Hoffmann [2002]). 
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of the CIS Council. Their influence on foreign policy was generally to push for 
reasonable relations with the West, for business reasons. 
The elite represented a variety of interests (including organised crime). 
Yeltsin's preferred method of rule was to sit above and manage this balancing act. 
The major feature of the period was the uneven and somewhat chaotic rebuilding of 
a strong 'vertical state' (Medvedev, 1999: 30). Sakwa (1996: xii) saw the period as 
witnessing the emergence of a 'hybrid political system... tom between ... 
democracy, state unity, transformative goals, and the simple desire of elites to stay 
in power'. Vladimir Ryzhkov88 identifies one of the maj or themes of Russian state-
building in the 1990s as being the victory of bureaucracy over representative and 
judicial bodies (Ryzhkov, 2000: 12).89 Victory in the presidential elections of 1996 
did briefly reinvigorate the Yeltsin regime, and led to important changes in 
personnel and the launch of a new round of reforms which ended in failure with the 
financial crisis of 1998. One might discern here the ultimate victory of a form of 
statism that emphasises state authority for its own sake. 
Many analysts agree that a rough consensus - ideas on which most of the 
political spectrum could agree - had emerged in the late Kozyrev era, even before 
the establishment of Primakov at the Foreign Ministry.9o Where domestic interests 
coincided, the consensus was strongest. Thus, for example, many in the Duma 
argued for rearmament programmes for Russia's 'friends' in the Middle East and 
for the lifting of sanctions on Iraq, as part of a required shift away from an 
Atlanticist foreign policy. This would enable Iraq to begin exporting its oil 
profitably again to repay its huge debts to Russia. Obviously 'defence industrialists 
and officials in this domain are among the most consistent supporters of easing the 
UN sanctions' (Allison, 1998: 7), as they would profit from an Iraq with hard cash. 
A revolution of sorts did take place in 1991, with the reborn Russian 
republic asserting its independence from the central Soviet structures. However, the 
88 Himself a deputy in the State Duma. 
89 Others reason that the centre itself weakened during the decade (Robinson, 2000: 37). 
90 Primakov left foreign intelligence to become Foreign Minister (January 1996-September 1998), 
and later Prime Minister (September 1998-May 1999). For much of his career he was a Pravda 
analyst and correspondent in the Middle East, usually interpreted as involving clandestine work. 
Later he headed the Institute of Oriental Studies and the Institute of World Economy and 
International Relations in Moscow. Under Gorbachev he held high-level posts, and made the 
transition to post-Soviet life as head of the Foreign Intelligence Service. In January 1996 he was a 
popular choice in the Duma for Foreign Minister, though he initially refused the offer (Mlechin, 
1999: 265). 
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elite dominating the new state was made up of many of the same people who had 
dominated the old Soviet state. The general picture in the 1990s was of an increase 
in the power of a conservative old guard at the expense of the reformers. There 
were striking continuities of personnel. This calls into question the loyalties and 
possibilities for original thinking among the elite, and would also help explain the 
move towards a pragmatic nationalist centre ground with which much of the 
old/new elite was comfortable. 
Institutional holdovers 
As well as continuities III personnel, there were institutional holdovers, the 
institutions in which the elite just described operated and managed the levers of 
state power. 'Nearly all of the institutions of the Soviet state existed for some time 
after 1991. Most have been modified but few disappeared entirely ... While old 
institutions have disappeared in the Soviet system they have not been replaced by 
new institutions' (Wallander, 1996: 207-208). The Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, for example, simply took over the offices of its Soviet equivalent on 
Prospekt Mira (Mlechin, 1999: 268). 
The President and his administration (a huge body of approximately 1,500 
people which often bypassed or competed with the government), the Foreign 
Ministry, the Ministry of Defence, economic and atomic agencies, regions, the 
Security Council, the Defence Council, the Council of Ministers, powerful 
economic interests and Parliament, all vied for power in the new Russia. But during 
and after the showdown of September 1993, the state did to a certain extent 
successfully bring power into the central bodies. 
Russia found itself emerging from 'the husk of the Soviet Union with a 
Congress of People's Deputies and a Supreme Soviet with an executive presidency 
[grafted] onto [the] two-tier parliament, itself an odd structure that blurred the 
definition of the real separation of powers' (Sharlet, 1993: 318). The constitution 
inherited from the Soviet era 'was ambiguous. The Congress of People's Deputies 
was described in Article 104 as the supreme organ of state power. When the 
executive presidency was later created, a constitutional amendment described the 
country as having a separation of executive and legislative power. But article 104 
was never amended' (Steele, 1994: 283). 
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There was an inherited problem of a lack of clarity in the jurisdictions of 
state institutions, a result of the suddenness of the Soviet Union's collapse, which 
'had some very serious consequences ... the old order in Russia ... was not pregnant 
with a new order' (Reddaway, 1993: 282). In the end the 1993 crisis came about 
because of the failure to solve these fundamental questions of power. Even after 
1993, 'the system could not at any stage be said to have settled into a regular, 
readily comprehensible system, as different players came and went, and the power 
of different institutions waxed and waned, which was perhaps normal for a state 
undergoing such a sudden transition' .91 
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs had already been in flux before the Soviet 
system came crashing down. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also went 
through several years of turmoil, but Russia, perhaps surprisingly, made do with 
only three Foreign Ministers during the 1990s (Andrei Kozyrev, 1990-1996; 
Evgenii Primakov, 1996-1998; and Igor Ivanov, 1998-). 
The Foreign Ministry at first comprised no more than 70 people, later (in 
November 1991) 240, and eventually, 'about 3,200 in October 1992, not much less 
than the 3,700 in the Soviet ministry in November 1991' (Sakwa, 1996: 281).92,93 
Soviet diplomats traditionally graduated from the Higher Diplomatic School 
(HDS), later Diplomatic Academy (1974), 'which trained Communist Party recruits 
to 'reinforce' the diplomatic service. The latter were trained at the Moscow State 
Institute of International Relations... The Moscow State Institute of International 
Relations (MGIMO) was the alma mater for the majority of the Soviet diplomatic 
corps, government elite, academicians and international journalists' (Tiouline, 
91 Tatiana Parkhalina, interviewed by the author, Moscow, 12 July 2002. 
92 On 18 December 1992 Yeltsin 'brought the Soviet diplomatic service under Russian control, and 
on 22 December the Soviet foreign and defence ministries were abolished. The Soviet Ministry of 
External [economic] Relations was merged with Russia's ... Yeltsin placed himself in direct control 
of the Russian foreign ministry, and Burbulis took over routine operations. Russia inherited the 
mantle of responsibility and sought international recognition of its status by being acknowledged as 
the primary successor state' (Sakwa, 1996: 277-278). 
93 Kozyrev said in 1992 that 'up to 60 percent of the Foreign Ministry apparatus are either people 
totally demoralized by the system with cynical attitudes or are members of the direct political 
opposition' (interviewed in Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 1 April 1992; cited in Russia and Eurasia 
Documents Annual. 1992), Nezm'isimaia Gazeta (in which Boris Berezovskii had a controlling 
stake) was edited by Berezovskii's ally Vitalii Tretiakoy (Fossato and Kachkaeva. 1998), 
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1999: 175). These bodies were responsible for training the vast majority of those 
diplomats in influential positions in the 1990s.94 
Under Kozyrev (and afterwards to a lesser extent) vanous bodies 
undermined the predominance of the Foreign Ministry in the field of Russian 
diplomacy. Some of these were charged with overseeing the ministry's work (such 
as the Security Council), some simply acted in direct competition with it (including 
at times the Ministry of Defence, the nuclear energy agency, MinAtom, and private 
companies like Lukoil). Others, notably Parliament, subjected Kozyrev and the 
ministry in general to withering attack. It has been argued that after 'changes 
among the top Foreign Ministry officials in 1995, the first steps were taken to 
overcome the fragmentation ... of Russian foreign policy. Since then [the Foreign 
Ministry] has concentrated increasingly on defending the national interests of 
Russia. There was a slow turn in Russia's policy on Asia - an intensification of the 
Russian presence in the Middle East, the establishment of a strategic partnership 
with China in April 1996, the first steps towards a normalization of relations with 
Japan and the first serious efforts to create the preconditions for integration with 
individual CIS states' (Simonia, 2001: 273). 
Yeltsin seemed to heed the problem of fragmentation when, in March 1995, 
he 'issued a new "Statute on the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs" that 
consolidates its authority over all aspects of foreign policy and made the [Foreign 
Ministry] directly responsible to the President. The Russian press has interpreted 
this decree as sharply enhancing the foreign ministry's role in coordinating both the 
strategy and implementation of foreign policy, but has voiced skepticism over how 
well it will be observed' (Petro, 1997: 98-99). Later that year (26 December 1995) 
a new body headed by the president, the Council on Foreign Policy, was founded 
with the stated goal of coordinating the functions in the foreign policy of the 
Russian Federation. The Council included the ministers of foreign affairs, defence, 
foreign economic relations, CIS affairs, finance, the intelligence chiefs 'and the 
"apparatus" of the President's Assistant on Foreign Policy (Dmitrii Riurikov). It 
was supposed to become a "superagency" to assist the President in the conduct of 
foreign policy, and co-ordination of foreign policy efforts of separate agencies, 
94 According to Parkha1ina (interviewed by the author, Moscow, 12 July 2002) this explains the 
persistence of Soviet-style anti-Western attitudes in the diplomatic corps in the 1990s. 
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including the Foreign Ministry' (Rodin, 1996). The creation of the Council on 
Foreign Policy 'reflected Yeltsin's attempt to concentrate foreign policy 
decisionmaking in his own hands, in an effort to impose order on the chaotic 
Russian foreign policy process' (Sakwa, 1996: 284-285). 
That same month, Yeltsin officially declared his 'dissatisfaction' with 
Foreign Ministry performance and mentioned the 'strengthening' of the Ministry. 
The end came for Kozyrev only a few weeks later. 
With the appointment of Primakov, the Foreign Ministry was able more 
clearly to play its role as formulator of Russian foreign policy. This was a result of 
Primakov's authority and popUlarity among the elite and in parliament. A 
Presidential Decree of 1996 officially backed up his position, stating that the 
foreign ministry was to be the 'primary coordinator of foreign policy' (Tiouline, 
1999: 186). In the mid-1990s, then, under Primakov (and beyond, into Ivanov's 
period), the ministry established a more solid position in relation to other 
government agencies.95 Igor Ivanov provided a stable foreign policy, 'consensus' 
style, and thus continuity from the Primakov period. 
The Ministry of Defence, army and security services 
Yeltsin had ordered the creation of a Russian Army, on 7 May 1992, (Russia was 
one of the last CIS states to form a national army) with himself as Commander-in-
Chief. On 18 May, General Pavel Grachev was appointed Minister of Defence and 
'pledged to maintain Russia as a military "Great Power" and to call a halt to the 
strategic retreat begun by Gorbachev' (Sakwa, 1996: 302). The head of the 
Ministry of Defence therefore remained a soldier, as in Soviet times, and under 
Grachev (1992-1996), Igor Rodionov (1996-1997) and Igor Sergeev (1998-) 
struggled with military reform. It was a conservative body involved, as was to be 
expected, in matters of defence and security in foreign affairs. 
95 In 1996 a Presidential decree stated that 'The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation shall provide direct implementation of the foreign policy course approved by the 
President of the Russian Federation. The Foreign Ministry of Russia shall be in charge of 
coordination of foreign policy activities pursued by federal bodies of executiw power and of control 
over them' (Decree by the President of the Russian Federation of March 12, 1996, #375. "On the 
Coordinating Role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation during the Conduct 
of Unified Foreign Policy Line of the Russian Federation"). 
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The military and security services were prominent in foreign policy, using 
platforms in Parliament and the media. In the Fifth Duma (1995), 370 military 
figures registered as candidates for election (Sakwa, 1996: 111). The army proved 
itself very willing to get involved in foreign policy, in the CIS for example, where 
the Foreign Ministry was initially rather inactive. Several bloody wars in the 
former Soviet Union had heavy Russian military involvement: Transdniestr, 
Abkhazia in Georgia, and Tajikistan. At its most basic level, the army's 
performance in battle has been a foreign policy tool. In Chechnya, where it failed 
with appalling loss of life, the army's reputation was ruined. Nevertheless it served 
some purpose, by demonstrating utter ruthlessness and the power to lay waste to 
any nearby country. 
The KGB, broken up and reorganised several times, was overtly involved in 
politics. Primakov, for example, came to notice in the post-Soviet era as the first 
head of the successor to the KGB's First Chief Directorate of the KGB, the Foreign 
Intelligence Service (FIS). In 1993, the FIS published a report attacking NATO 
expansion as a threat to Russian security - and he did so at a time when the Russian 
Foreign Ministry was taking a much more conciliatory line. 'On the eve of 
Yeltsin's visit to Washington in September 1994, Primakov again upstaged the 
Foreign Ministry by publishing a warning to the West not to oppose the economic 
and political reintegration of Russia with other states' (Andrew, 1999: 730-731). 
Other institutional actors in foreign policy 
Several other institutions competed with the Foreign Ministry or worked separately 
in the field of foreign policy. Many of these were new institutions, created during 
the 1990s by Yeltsin. The Security Council was the most important of these, 
established in order to create oversight of foreign policy under Y eltsin' s control, as 
part of his goal of centralisation of policy-making. The new body, according to the 
Russian constitution (and which was controversially included in the constitution 
[Natsionalnaia Sluzhba Novostei, 1997: 1]) co-ordinates Russia's military strategy 
and confirms the use of military forces outside Russia. It contains about a dozen 
members, 'representing the key ministries involved in matters of national security: 
the Foreign Minister, Minister of Defence, head of the Foreign Intelligence 
Service, head of Federal Counterintelligence, the Minister of Interior Affairs. the 
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Minister for Nationalities and Regional Politics, the Minister of Civil Defense and 
Emergency Situations. As a concession to the legislature, after the Chechen 
invasion, the heads of both the upper and lower houses ... were added' (Petro, 
1997: 1 03). The idea was to create a unified policy from the top and put an end to 
the confusion afflicting foreign policy-making, hence the representation from the 
major institutions of state power. The Security Council took responsibility for the 
formulation of the major foreign policy documents of the 1990s. 
The Defence Council was set up in July 1996 'to coordinate defence-related 
policies and programmes' and therefore had an overlapping remit with the Security 
Council: it was unclear where each has its own exclusive area of concern, and thus 
exemplified Yeltsin's system of rule. The Defence Council led to, among other 
things, 'more infighting, this time between Iuri Baturin, Secretary of the Defence 
Council and the new Defence Minister, Igor Rodionov (Felgenhauer, 1997: 9). 
Parliament, as well as influencing the executive through law-making and 
some oversight powers, contained permanent committees in both the Duma (such 
as the Committee of Foreign Affairs headed for many years by Vladimir Lukin, the 
Security Committee, and the Committee on Geopolitics), and in the upper house 
(Foreign Affairs Committee and Security and Defence Committee). These were 
often used to advocate policy changes in foreign affairs. 
* * * 
There was, in sum, a high degree of continuity from the Soviet period with regard 
to the decision-making elite and institutions of state. By the middle of the 1990s, 
central control was being reasserted - though in an uneven and often chaotic 
manner - by the President, through the Foreign Ministry and the Security Council. 
Nevertheless, the Foreign Ministry was still seriously undermined at times, often 
acting in competition with the Ministry of Defence and others. The move towards 
central control improved under Primakov, and policy-making on the major issues 
became more coherent. Thus while the Russian state could be said to have acted in 
incoherent fashion at times, there was the potential for consistent policy-making 
led by the President. The Security Council emerged as the most powerful of the 
new institutions and, with some setbacks, proved able to coordinate the 'consensus' 
policy of the mid-1990s. 
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CHAPTERS 
RUSSIA AND NATO: 
THE NEOCLASSICAL REALIST EXPLANATION 
Russia in January 1992 was a second-tier state. It was militarily weak compared to 
the US and NATO - and the gap was growing. Economically, both the US and the 
EU (not to mention many other states around the world) were outperforming 
Russia to a great extent and so again the gap was growing. By the end of the 
decade, the distribution of power between the Western states and Russia was worse 
than in 1992. Within the former Soviet Union (FSU), however, Russia remained 
easily the most powerful state both militarily and economically. 
NATO was the means by which the US, Canada, and their European allies 
had maintained forces in Europe to defend against the threat of the USSR. After the 
disappearance of the USSR, two major strategies marked the change from the past: 
NATO's enlargement into central and eastern Europe, and out-of-area operations, 
which were undertaken in the former Yugoslavia. These strategic moves, as well as 
the bombing of Iraq, US plans for a renewed "Star Wars" programme and the 
downplaying of the CSCE/OSCE,96 were the major influences on the shift in 
relations between Russia and the West generally and between Russia and NATO 
specifically. 
Following the neoclassical realist framework of Chapter 2 and given the 
facts established in Chapter 4, this chapter will first analyse how Russian policy-
makers perceived the changing situation in terms of the altered threat to Russian 
national security. The first section therefore describes how the material factors 
outlined in Chapter 4, and the specific policies of NATO, were seen in Russia as 
representing an increased threat - a threat not only of attack, but of a worsening of 
Russia's relative position. The following section examines the policies that were 
carried out in response; the focus will be on whether Russian strategy can be 
classified as balancing ·or bandwagoning, what tactics were used to improve 
96 The CSCE became the OSCE on 1 January 1995. 
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Russia's situation, and whether coherent regional and global policies existed 
together. In conclusion, it will be possible to see whether and when these tactics 
were successful in their aims. 
Changing perceptions, a consensus on NATO 
NATO and the foreign policy consensus 
Russia's relations with NATO took place within the overall development of 
Russian foreign policy, from the 'honeymoon' (when Russian leaders even 
discussed joining NATO) to 'pragmatic consensus' (when relations were marked 
by some hostility combined with pragmatism). In the early, heady days of 1992, 
Russia started out with a generally positive attitude towards NATO. This was true 
of the President, the reformist government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Yet 
from the start many of Russia's elite were extremely sceptical of NATO, and 
therefore even during the first phase there were many dissenting voices, and a 
pattern of contradictory and confusing statements on the subject was established. 
The Russian leadership 'expected the West to reward Russia for helping to defeat 
Communism by admitting it immediately into the Western community. On 
December 22 1991, a week before the Soviet flag came down, Yeltsin sent a 
message to Brussels saying that Russia planned to join NATO soon. It produced 
such a reaction that two days later he claimed it had been the mistake of a typist, 
who had left out the word "not"!' (Rogov, 1997: 3).97 
Military links between Russia and NATO were quickly established. After a 
visit by Manfred Womer, NATO's General Secretary, to Moscow in February 
1992, the First Military Committee in Cooperation Session was called, to which the 
Russian Chief of the General Staff was invited. In May 1992, Russian State 
Secretary and leading light of the reformist government Gennadii Burbulis even 
suggested that NATO would help Russia with its troop withdrawals from the Baltic 
97 Prior to independence some formal structures had been put in place. In summer 1991, NATO's 
London Declaration established the basis for diplomatic links between the alliance and former 
Soviet bloc countries. At Rome in November of that year the North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC) was established, and in December the North Atlantic Council (NAC) was inaugurated 
(later replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Council, or EAPC), with Russia becoming a founding member. 
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States.98 There was a sense that (just as Gorbachev had hoped) NATO would 
reward Russia's benevolent attitude by reforming in such a way as to include 
Russia within a pan-European security structure. The Russian leadership's 
persistent attempts to raise the importance of the CSCE/OSCE - of which Russia 
was a member - and decrease that of NATO was a result of the same desire. The 
fact that these hopes were not realised caused immediate disquiet. 
Russian views on NATO continued to be very uneven throughout the 
decade, and aggressive and negative pronouncements and policy proposals were 
found side by side with more positive ones. This was true even when NATO had 
decided to enlarge, and when the composition of Russian governments had 
changed to include more 'centrist' and pragmatic figures, notably Primakov. Yet 
the overall tendency was towards a more negative, hostile tone from 1993. In 
Parliament and the media the hostility was much more overt and aggressive than in 
government and the Presidential apparatus. When the government was purged of 
many of its reformers and a more centrist government established under 
Chemomyrdin, it simply reflected better the broader elite outlook. Yeltsin himself 
was particularly prone to sudden changes of tack, but the Russian view was mainly 
negative as NATO began its expansion plans and out-of-area operations with 
regard to the former Yugoslavia. 
NATO enlargement: an increasing sense of threat 
The Kozyrev period 
Russia's initial reaction to NATO's assertion that it would not only continue to 
exist in its current form (though with an altered strategy established at Rome in 
1991) but also take in new members was the turning point in the relationship. There 
had almost immediately been discussion of enlargement after the end of the Cold 
War: the reunification of Germany within NATO (agreed between Mikhail 
Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl during the 'Two plus Four' conference in Paris in 
July 1990) rather than within a new security structure could be seen as the start of 
the process. The flurry of visits by NATO General Secretary Womer to East 
98 Yet in October, Yeltsin, linking the issue of Russian troops in Estonia with the fate of the Russian 
diaspora, announced the suspension of the withdrawal altogether (though temporarily). 
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European countries III 1991-1992 also suggested that NATO was at least 
considering forming alliances and partnerships in the East. The Czech Foreign 
Minister, Jiri Dienstbier, had in fact visited NATO Headquarters for discussions as 
early as March 1990. 
In February 1993 Kozyrev, writing in NATO's own journal, was hinting at 
the potential pitfalls in the relationship: 'I am worried by how quickly a "school of 
thought" has sprung up in the West which maintains that it is better to have 
dealings with a weakened Russia, left alone with its troubles' (Kozyrev, 1993: 
paragraph 10). Despite NATO's professions of non-aggressive intentions, and its 
frequently voiced commitment to build 'a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe', 
many in Russia remained to be convinced by NATO's statements of pacific intent 
and desire only for democratisation and the stability of eastern Europe (Arbatov et 
aI., 1997: 7). 
Senior academic and political voices in the West could be heard suggesting 
that NATO's primary goal was to protect current and future members from the 
possibility of a renewed Russian threat in the future. Henry Kissinger, for example, 
stated in March 1995 that four hundred years of foreign policy 'indicate a certain 
proclivity' (Kissinger, 1995) on Russia's part.99 Indeed, 'NATO officials have gone 
on record that "enlargement will do nothing to dilute NATO's focus" and that 
following enlargement "the alliance's core mission will remain the collective 
defense of NATO soil, and the addition of new members will improve its ability to 
carry out this mission'" (Hillen & Noonan, 1998: 1). 
While in the first two years of Russia's independent existence anti-NATO 
sentiments were relatively restrained among the leadership, many Russians (mainly 
those outside the immediate decision-making group, often in parliament and the 
media) quickly took a very negative view of NATO, and there was soon a change 
across the leadership spectrum as a result of the hints and then concrete 
affirmations of NATO's intention to enlarge its membership.lOo Yet the uneven 
tone persisted. On his visit to Warsaw in the summer of 1993, 'Yeltsin effectively 
said to the president of Poland, Walesa, that the question of its accession to NATO 
is Poland's choice and not Russia's. The conditions did not allow this idea to 
99 See Chapter 7 for further examples of this school of thought. 
100 Yeltsin even criticised the space-based anti-missile system in February 1992. at his fIrst meeting 
with Bush as President of independent Russia. 
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develop ... but anyhow, this statement was immediately seized abroad and in 
Russia and it was presented almost as a sign that Moscow, even if it doesn't 
support the enlargement of NATO, will not say anything about it' (Primakov, 
1999: 226-227). In spring 1993, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR) visited Moscow and agreed on a cooperation programme with Grachev, 
the Russian Minister of Defence. Yet in 1993 the general tenor of Russian 
statements was extremely negative towards NATO, and even Kozyrev talked about 
the need to "defend Russian national interests at all costs" (Kortunov, 1999: 34). In 
the autumn of 1993, Kozyrev himself 'started openly to express the idea that a 
power vacuum was likely to arise along the borders of Russia in the event of a 
Russian military withdrawal from these states. This power vacuum, he said, might 
be filled by "other powers, which are not friendly and could even be hostile to 
Russian interests'" (Jonson, 1997: 319). 
Discussion within NATO on enlargement began in 1993 when Womer, 
'expressed himself openly on ... the prospect of enlarging NATO's membership' 
(Primakov, 1999: 228). US President Clinton stated in the autumn of 1993 that 
expansion was no longer a matter of if but when. This confirmed earlier hints, and 
after 1994, the process gathered pace. The Brussels Summit declaration of January 
1994 included the statement that 'We expect and would welcome NATO expansion 
that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary 
process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of 
Europe' .101 
Russia's 1993 Military Doctrine states, in somewhat obscure style, that 'the 
existing and potential sources of external military danger for the Russian 
Federation... [include] the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the 
detriment of the interests of the Russian Federation's military security', and 'the 
buildup of groupings of troops (forces) on the borders of the Russian Federation to 
the point where they disrupt the prevailing correlation of forces'. Thus the 1993 
Doctrinel02 did not actually refer to NATO by name, but the implication was clear, 
if not emphasised - as it would be in the major foreign policy and security 
101 NATO (2000), Online Library. Online at: http:/\\ww.nato.intldocu . 
102 Defence Minister Grachev introduced the Doctrine in a press conference in ~o\'ember 1993, in 
which he emphasised that representati\'es of all government ministries took part in its formulation. 
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documents of 1997 and 2000. 103 Instead the 1993 document stated that the main 
challenge to the country's security stemmed from the unfinished nature and 
instability of democratic institutions of administration and power. 
Another example of the shifting weight of elite views on NATO came 
when, in November 1993, a widely publicized study by the Russian Foreign 
Intelligence Service (FIS; headed at the time by Primakov) characterised NATO as 
"the biggest military grouping in the world that possesses enormous offensive 
potential". It called the Alliance an organization wedded "to the stereotypes of bloc 
thinking'" (Adomeit, 1995: 48). The basic points made by the report were that: 'in 
the context of the post-confrontation period and in the absence of so-called bloc-
discipline which had existed before the elimination of the WTO ... the process of 
the entry of the central and eastern European states into NATO, its character, time 
frame, obligations and rights of the new members must take into account the 
opinions of all interested parties including Russia, the prospect of strengthening the 
foundations of collective security on the continent, developing European 
cooperation; only these factors would allow the creation of prerequisites and 
favourable conditions for the cooperation of the Russian Federation with NATO 
and their realisation that would allow translation of other relations into real 
partnership' (Primakov, 1999: 228). As Primakov explains, Yeltsin approved of 
this report. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under Kozyrev, distanced itself, but 
was outmanoeuvred when the report was presented at a press conference in 
Moscow. Yeltsin quickly and publicly aligned himself with the FIS against the 
Foreign Ministry. 
Yeltsin indeed began to argue extremely aggressively against NATO's 
enlargement once it was confirmed as official NATO policy. He felt the need to 
threaten serious consequences if NATO were to enlarge and in December 1994 
caused a stir at the CSCE Summit in Budapest by 'refusing to condemn the 
103 The Outlines of Foreign Policy Concept (adopted by the President in April 1993), and Outlines 
of the Military Doctrine (adopted on November 2, 1993) 'were a result of a new kind of decision-
making in Russia, following the collapse of the Soviet state structure a highly secretive process that 
became more open later in the decade ... The Security Council, with its membership of experts from 
the foreign and defence ministries, the General Staff, ministries and other committees, the 
intelligence seryices and so on, was heavily involved. These two documents were replaced in 2000 
by updated versions, which in turn were the result of formulations and debates in the last year or so 
of the decade' (Nazarkin, 2003: 8). 
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violence in Bosnia and sharply attacking NATO's plans for a fast-track expansion 
into the fonner Soviet satellite states of eastern Europe ... Yeltsin mentioned a 
"cold peace'" (Moscow Times, December 8 1994). Yet he showed himself willing 
to change his stance. This often involved attempts to secure Western aid by 
invoking the threat of what would occur ifhe was removed from power. 
The Russian leadership hoped to boost instead a pan-European security 
structure based on consensus - the CSCE of which Russia was a member - which 
would replace a NATO that created 'dividing lines' in Europe.104 Russia wanted to 
see the role of the United Nations and the Security Council in particular maintained 
and if possible strengthened. An increased role for the CSCE/OSCE was perhaps 
even more desirable to Russia's leaders than the upgrading of the UN (Pursiainen, 
2002: 3). Meanwhile, Russia viewed the 'trend to a unipolar security structure in 
Europe under US leadership and NATO involvement in "external Euro-Atlantic 
security matters" as an alarming development that poses a potential security threat 
to Russia. The military has used that perception to justify badly needed increases in 
the military budget' (Virtual Infonnation Center, 1999). 
Invitations to join the Partnership for Peace (PfP) were first officially made 
at the NATO Brussels Summit in January 1994, but had been openly discussed 
since October 1993. The PfP was described by NATO in the usual language of 
involving a commitment to 'the preservation of democratic societies ... freedom 
from coercion and intimidation, and the principles of international law' and a 
reaffinnation of 'commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the Charter 
of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights' . 105 The PfP was often seen in Moscow, however, as a vetting procedure for 
prospective members. This view was later encouraged by the statement in the July 
1997 Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, that 'we 
strongly encourage the active participation by aspiring members in the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace, which will further 
deepen their political and military involvement in the work of the Alliance'. Some 
in the Russian leadership certainly viewed it this way. Primakov's published notes, 
for example, record that 'on Monday, 15 November 1993 ... I, as director of the 
104 See, for example, Gareev (1992: 543) and Konovalov (1997). 
105 NATO (2000), Online Library. Online at: http://www.nato.intldocu. 
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[Foreign Intelligence Service] was with the president giving my weekly report ... at 
the time we had absolutely reliable evidence that strategic military planning in 
NATO HQ still included the "worst option" with the use of nuclear weapons 
against Russia or China, and that in NATO circles, the approach leading to the PiP 
proclaimed and widely advertised as a universal process in which all countries 
including Russia could find their place.. . [was in reality] a school for gradual 
accession of various candidates, but naturally not Russia. This approach was taking 
over' (Primakov, 1999: 227-228). 
The Russian military leadership clearly also decided that, 'through the PfP, 
the West was once again trying to fool them. This view was held by many 
influential figures close to ... Yeltsin including the Security Council head Oleg 
Lobov ... PfP simply does not interest Russian generals. They have no need for 
expensive, joint peacekeeping operations, considering that the [Ministry of 
Defence] does not even have enough money to pay its soldiers or to buy them food' 
(Moscow Times, December 8, 1994). NATO's gigantic military capacities were 
once again starkly contrasted to those of Russia. 
The proposed signing of the PfP led to enraged voices being raised in the 
Duma. Gennadii Ziuganov, for example, leader of the Russian Communist Party, 
called the signing of the PfP by Russia 'blasphemous', as it fell on the anniversary 
of the invasion of Russia by Nazi Germany (22 June 1941): 'Our foreign minister 
Kozyrev, on behalf of Yeltsin, is signing a treaty on the entry of the Russian 
Federation into the Partnership for Peace programme. Its name is misleading. The 
real aim of this programme is not to guarantee peace, but the gradual introduction 
into NATO of former socialist states which used to be part of the Warsaw Pact. 
The new organisation, in this way, is set to become an instrument of geopolitical 
expansion to confirm a new world order. It was [president]... Bush who first 
introduced the concept of a new world order and he borrowed the term from Nazi 
Germany ... The new twist to US expansionism is aimed above all against Russia's 
rebirth as a great power' (Gosudartsvennaia Duma: Stenogramma Zasedanii: 6. 
paragraph 1). 
It was not NATO per se, but enlargement, that was seen in such a negative 
light. Russia's geopolitical situation was gravest in the West, where e\'en Ukraine 
was apparently considering NATO membership. 'The Russian military ... are 
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concerned with the alliance's real military capabilities. At present neither Russia 
nor NATO could launch a surprise attack in Europe. However, expansion would 
give NATO that capability. The Russian military must treat it as a direct threat of 
invasion, rapidly approaching casus belli proportions' (Moscow Times, December 
8, 1994). 
Realists in Russia argued that the more hard-line, independent course was 
forced on them by the failure of Atlanticism to reap rewards. Russian diplomacy 
had failed. NATO was expanding, the 'near abroad' was escaping, oil and gas 
reserves in central Asia would be bought up by the West and so on. The West was 
accused of wanting to turn Russia into a compliant source of raw materials. Fonner 
Warsaw Pact members fonned close diplomatic ties with NATO and eventually 
some of them joined, others fonning a queue close behind, and sometimes carrying 
out military manoeuvres with US forces (e.g. Centrazbat in Central Asia in 1997 -
although Russian forces were also involved). 
By June 1994, after a long and difficult period of diplomacy, Russia signed 
the PiP Framework Document (of which details are given below), and also in June 
NATO and Russia agreed on a Summary of Conclusions, defining the mam 
elements of an enhanced dialogue between them beyond the NACC and PiP. 
The Primakov period 
On becoming foreign minister in January 1996, Primakov outlined his priorities -
the CIS, eastern Europe, Asia-Pacific, Europe and USA - 'to demonstrate to the 
West Russia's capability as a counterweight to NATO and EU enlargement' 
(Sergounin, 1996: 11). In his first speech on accepting the position, on January 12 
1996, he stated that 'Russia was and remains a great power. Her foreign policy 
should correspond to that status.' He expressed a desire for reasonably friendly 
relations with the USA, though 'we proceed from the need for an equitable ... 
mutually beneficial partnership.' Any further expansion of NATO would disrupt 
this equilibrium: 'I have a negative attitude to the possible expansion of NATO. I 
think it is counterproductive for the stabilisation of the situation in Europe and 
would undoubtedly create a new geopolitical situation for Russia.' 106 In January 
1996, meanwhile, Russian troops began deployment as part of the Implementation 
106 Quotations from this speech taken from Leighton (1999: 3). 
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Force (IFOR) in Bosnia. There were several 16+1 Council meetings in early and 
mid-1996, as well as NAC foreign minister-level meetings. Such gatherings took 
place in most months of 1996. 
On Christmas Day 1996, Minister of Defence Rodionov stated plainly that 
'the activity of the North Atlantic alliance, which has made a radical decision to 
expand eastward, is a potential source of danger which could grow into a military 
threat' .107 Among the Russian elite at the time, 'the only issue we have more or less 
unity on, is our disapproval of NATO' (Rogov, in Kozyrev et aI., 1996: 27). 
By January 1997, however, the two sides had prepared the ground for talks 
between Javier Solana and Primakov on a NATO-Russia document. These talks 
went through six rounds, before the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, 
Cooperation and Security could be agreed on, approved by the NAC in May 1997, 
and the Founding Act could be signed. 108 This led to the formation of the 
Permanent Joint Council (PJC). The North Atlantic Council Meeting in July 1997 
issued the 'Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation'. This 
reaffirmed the statement that NATO would 'expect and welcome the accession of 
new members' made at the Brussels Summit. It confirmed that (as the 'Study on 
NATO Enlargement' of 1995 had stated) 'NATO's military effectiveness should be 
sustained as the alliance enlarges'. The declaration also saw the official invitation 
to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks, with a view to 
membership of the countries becoming effective by the time of the 50th anniversary 
of the Washington Treaty in 1999. The alliance confirmed its openness to further 
new members. On 12 March 1999, the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland took place. 
Out-of-area operations and an increased sense of threat 
NATO's actions in Bosnia caused an increase in Russian alarm. They demonstrated 
that NATO was willing to act outside its area of responsibility - defence of its 
members - without United Nations sanction and without apparent regard for 
Russia's interests. To many in Russia, this represented an extreme threat, the 
realisation of many of their fears regarding the future: that NATO was now so 
107 Cited in Felgenhauer (1997: 14). 
108 NATO (2000), Online Library. Online at: http://www.nato.intJdocu. 
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powerful as to be able to carry out military strikes against states it did not approve 
of suggested the possibility of its doing so in the former Soviet Union and thus 
completely eclipsing Russian control of the CIS. Some in parliament also 
suggested that this could mean that NATO was developing plans to attack Russia 
itself. 109 
Russia's major foreign policy and security documents demonstrate that 
NATO was increasingly seen as a threat to Russian national security in official 
circles. The change between the 1993, 1997 and 2000 documents is clear. The 1997 
National Security document finds a threat in the 'attempts to create an international 
relations structure based on domination by developed Western countries in the 
international community, under US leadership and designed for unilateral solutions 
(including the use of military force) to key issues in world politics in circumvention 
of the fundamental rules of international law'. Both the 1997 blueprint and the 
2000 National Security Doctrine 'state that "military factors in world politics" 
(1997 version) and "military force and violence" (2000 version) are still important 
factors in international politics' (Godzmirski, 2000: 5), but the 1997 version 
expresses the hope that these might be ameliorated in international affairs. The 
1997 document is critical of the 'threat to stablilization' posed by 'attempts to 
introduce into international parlance such concepts as "humanitarian intervention" 
and "limited sovereignty" in order to justify unilateral power actions bypassing the 
UN Security Council are not acceptable'. 
In 1998, however, the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) agreed to continue 
Russia's cooperation with The Stabilisation Force (SFOR), and condemned 
Belgrade's use of force in Kosovo as well as attacks by Kosovar fighters. Similar 
statements on the need for diplomatic solutions continued through late 1998. 'This 
approach permitted Russian isolation anxiety resulting from the first NA TO 
enlargement round to be cushioned politically' (Spillmann and Wenger, 1999: 
paragraph 13). 
109 In 1995 the Russian Institute for Defence Studies (reportedly commissioned by the .'v1inistry of 
Defence) produced a report which concluded that 'The US and its allies represent the main threat to 
Russian national security', and suggested a return to nuclear stand-off and reoccupation of the Baltic 
States, as well as economic protectionism, a military-nuclear alliance with Iraq, Iran and Libya and 
the creation of a new state including Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine C\L~I Chronology of 
Events, 20 October 1995). 
The Kosovo conflict was a major reason why the official documents were 
altered further between 1997 and 2000, a reflection of increasing alarm. This 
period saw perhaps the low point in Russia-NATO relations. In April 1999, a 
revised NATO Strategic Concept was also approved after 15 months of debate. It 
emphasized 'new patterns of cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic security structure 
that would allow a role in security matters external to NATO which could 
potentially spill over into the alliance (as in the Balkans). Invitations for 
membership of NATO were extended to the Baltic States' (Virtual Information 
Centre, 1999).110 Russia, 'concerned with this disturbing change in NATO strategy, 
was simultaneously debating changes to its military doctrine to clearly delineate its 
perceived security interests and concerns within the changing environment. 
NATO's expansion into Poland, combined with the Kosovo bombing campaign, 
provided Russian military hard-liners with broader political support for a doctrine 
of confrontation' (Virtual Information Center, 1999). The Russian National 
Security Concept of2000 demonstrated the anxiety of Russia's elite that, 'elevated 
to the rank of strategic doctrine, NATO's transition to the practice of using military 
force outside its zone of responsibility and without UN Security Council sanction 
could destabilize the entire global strategic situation. The growing technical 
advantage of a number of leading powers and their enhanced ability to create new 
weapons and military equipment could provoke a new phase of the arms race and 
radically alter the forms and methods of warfare. The 2000 document is generally 
'much more pessimistic' (Godzmirski, 2000: 9). It reflected Russian reactions to 
NATO enlargement, the bombing of Kosovo, the 1998 economic collapse and 
conflict in Chechnya. 
The end of the decade - a new security doctrine 
The 2000 National Security Doctrine summed up the elite perception of threats 
facing Russia at the end of the 1990s. The main threats in the international sphere 
came from the 'striving of individual states and inter-state associations to lower the 
role of the existing mechanisms of ensuring international security, above all the UN 
and the OSCE; the danger of weakening the political, economic and military 
110 An updated NATO Strategic Concept was approved at the i\A TO Summit ~eeting held in 
Washington, DC, 23-24 April 1999. 
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influence of Russia in the world; the strengthening of military-political blocs and 
unions, above all the eastward enlargement of NATO; the possible appearance of 
foreign military bases and large military contingents in direct proximity to the 
Russian borders; the proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their delivery 
vehicles' . 
Threats to the national security of the Russian Federation in the 
international sphere were found in 'the attempts of other states to hinder the 
strengthening of Russia as a centre of influence in the multipolar world, prevent the 
implementation of its national interests and weaken its positions in Europe, the 
Middle East, the Transcaucasus, Central Asia and Asia Pacific'. The Concept also 
argued that, 'The transition of NATO to the use of force (military force) beyond the 
zone of its responsibility and without the sanction of the UN Security Council, 
which has been elevated to the level of a strategic doctrine, is fraught with the 
destabilisation of the strategic situation in the world'. 
Under the heading 'Military-Political Principles', (sub-heading 'Military-
political situation'), the 2000 Military Doctrine argues that 'a destabilizing impact 
on the military-political situation is exerted by: attempts to weaken (ignore) the 
existing mechanism for safeguarding international security (primarily the United 
Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe); the 
utilization of military-force actions as a means of "humanitarian intervention" 
without the sanction of the UN Security Council, in circumvention of the generally 
accepted principles and norms of international law; the violation by certain states 
of international treaties and agreements in the sphere of arms limitation and 
disarmament'. At the same time, 'external and internal threats to the military 
security of the Russian Federation and its allies persist and in certain areas are 
increasing. The main external threats are: territorial claims against the Russian 
Federation; interference in the Russian Federation's internal affairs; attempts to 
ignore the Russian Federation's interests in resolving international security 
problems, and to oppose its strengthening as one influential center in a multipolar 
world; the existence of seats of armed conflict, primarily close to the Russian 
Federation's state border and the borders of its allies; the creation buildup of 
groups of forces leading to the violation of the existing balance of forces, close to 
the Russian Federation's state border and the borders of its allies or on the seas 
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adjoining their territories; the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the 
detriment of the Russian Federation's military security'. In the section on 
'strengthening international security', the doctrine states that Russia would seek the 
'preservation and observance of the [ ABM treaty] - the cornerstone of strategic 
stability. The implementation of the plans by the United States to create a [NMD 
system] will inevitably compel the Russian Federation to adopt adequate measures 
for maintaining it national security at the proper level' .111 
Colonel-general Valerii Manilovl12 backed up the document with the 
statement that 'Today, there are no military threats, which by their scope or 
importance can be a menace to the NATO members ... To survive as a military 
alliance the bloc has to invent new tasks .... So we have what we have: ... an air 
operation in the Balkans in which NATO realized its new strategic conception by 
employing, without a UN sanction, its joint military force outside the sphere of 
competence against a sovereign state' (Manilov, 2000: 3). 
There was strong evidence, then, that some among the Russian elite took 
the military threat from NATO seriously and that this alarm had increased during 
the decade. 'The precision with which various Russian military services imagine 
scenarios involving the large-scale use of NATO forces in the former Soviet Union, 
and the still greater precision with which they describe the capabilities of the 
Russian Air Force or Army must have in order to prevail, seems to blur the line 
between planning yardsticks and genuine threat analysis' (Legvold, 1997: 47-48). 
In May 1998, the head of the Defence Ministry's Main Directorate of International 
Military Cooperation, Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, argued that 'Russia will 
have to increase its strategic forces in the northwest of the country, if former Soviet 
republics become candidates for NATO membership'. He went on to deny '''the 
political speculation by NATO" that Moscow, which is cooperating with the 
organization, has reconciled itself with the alliance's enlargement. It was, he 
claimed "not true. At all official levels, we openly say that, if former Soviet 
Republics become candidates for admission into the alliance, then the situation in 
Europe will become unstable and the geopolitical situation will change"... We 
have asked in a bewildered way: against whom are the present 19 NATO member 
III This translation of the doctrine comes from the Virtual Infonnation Center (1999). 
112 First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Anned Forces of Russia. 
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states, which have about 50 divisions in total, now going to defend themselyes? 
What more powerful enemy in Europe do they have in mind? We have not received 
a clear answer, although it is clear that Russia is implied' (RFEIRL, 28 May 1998). 
* * * 
In short, by the middle of the decade Russia had a 'unique consensus on the 
problem of NATO's eastward expansion. Representatives of the entire political 
spectrum with rare exceptions are against the bloc's expansion' (Rogov, 1999: 3). 
The two major foreign policy documents that came at the end of the decade 
reflected the changing external circumstances. They showed the official view of 
NATO's changing role and argued that it represented a threat to Russia's national 
security. Yet, while some members of the General Staff and opposition parties 
seemed to believe that NATO represented a genuine military threat, to most in the 
elite (the consensus view), the problem was, rather, that NATO's enlargement and 
its outreach via the PfP programme, combined with its out-of-area operations, had 
sidelined Russia from the centre of global and European politics and threatened 
further weakening of its geostrategic situation. Russia would be a minor state 
among other such states in the region, some of which were hostile and had designs 
on Russia's national interests in the CIS. Russia's 'encirclement' and rejection by 
NATO would only exacerbate the negative geostrategic factors found at the 
beginning of the decade, and which had indeed worsened by the end of the decade. 
What could Russia do about it? 
Russia and NATO - change and stability 
The so-called honeymoon period was a period of bandwagoning. With the 
perception that NATO represented a growing threat and the establishment of the 
consensus on a realist, 'independent' foreign policy course, Russia and NATO 
settled into a relationship of hard bargaining, some notable formal agreements, an 
ability to work together at times, but distinguished by suspicion and even the 
occasional threat of war. Russia's response to NATO expansion from late 1993 
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onwards was bargaining to make the best of a bad situation, but policy was often 
incoherent (Kogan-Yasin, 1999: 22) and unsuccessful. 
The development of formal links, notably the PfP and the PJC, shows that, 
despite the very serious disagreements arising from NATO enlargement, contact 
was retained and formal institutions were created and replaced, even as the very 
actions the Russians continually described as unacceptable continued. Institutions 
such as the PfP and the PJC were clearly devised to (among other things) decrease 
Russia's perception that NATO represented a threat. Yet they also set in stone the 
continuing existence and probable future enlargement of NATO and hence were 
received in Moscow with mixed feelings, among which was the realisation that 
there was nothing Moscow could do to stop NATO. The hope in Moscow was 
expressed that they would at least enable Russia to influence the enlargement 
process. In January 1997, the German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel argued that 
Russia's objections to NATO expansion were bargaining ploys: 'Russia knows it 
cannot stop NATO expansion and wants to obtain a good price for it'. 
The Partnership for Peace: the consensus strategy is established 
The PfP, signed by Russia in June 1994, established NATO's decision to look 
towards an active future and increasing depth of relations with states beyond the 
borders of its members. As the Russians perceived, it was also a way to begin the 
process of enlargement. The PfP enabled NATO to test new entrants for suitability, 
retaining treaty-ratified influence over them. Even in states which were not on the 
initial list for membership or even seriously considered for membership, the PfP 
fulfilled a similar purpose. l13 As it turned out, PfP functioned rather well from 
NATO's perspective, as expansion did indeed take place, helped by the close ties 
established in this period with states in eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. 
PfP was also a way to obtain Russian compliance on the Issue of 
enlargement, while avoiding having to make any serious concessions. It was a 
113 For example, the Central Asian states took part in the Centrazbat military manoeUHes in 
September 1997 (with US and Russian forces among others) and Islam Karimov, the president of 
Uzbekistan, later allowed airbases to be used for US attacks on Iraq in 2003. Later, more or less 
permanent bases were established as part of the United States' conflict against the Taleban, and 
remain. 
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victory for NATO diplomacy and a defeat for Russia. Russia's reaction to the 
programme demonstrated an ambivalence that seemed to reflect the fact that it saw 
the PfP as both an opportunity and a threat. Russia reluctantly signed up to the 
Partnership in June 1994, but won some concessions to special treatment on the 
way, and thereby managed to proclaim a diplomatic victory. In the build up to the 
signing of the PfP Yeltsin and Kozyrev played all their diplomatic cards, though, of 
course, (and as Yeltsin admitted), they were 'playing with a weak hand'. At the 
NATO Council meeting in Brussels in December 1994, Kozyrev stated that Russia 
was postponing participation in the PfP. Yeltsin made his extremely harsh speech 
at the CSCE summit in Budapest on 7 December 1994, warning that pushing 
NATO up to Russia's borders risked plunging Europe into a 'cold peace'. Kozyrev 
once again mentioned the idea of subordinating NATO to the CSCE. Early in 1994, 
he proposed that the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) be transformed 
into an independent structure of military-political cooperation, closely linked to the 
CSCE ... the CSCE [would be] assigned the role of coordinator of the efforts of 
NATO, the European Union, the Council of Europe, the Western European Union 
and the CIS in the areas of strengthening stability and security, peacekeeping, and 
protecting the rights of national minorities in Europe' (Donaldson & Nogee, 2000: 
245). 
Kozyrev signed the PfP framework document with a protocol affirming that 
'Russia and NATO have agreed to prepare a wide-ranging individual program of 
partnership, in keeping with Russia's size, importance, and potential'. A 'highly 
placed' Ministry of Defence official said that, 'in the struggle against the foreign 
ministry's opportunistic policies, our line has emerged victorious. The president 
has confirmed a set of measures proposed by the Ministry of Defence which are 
designed to forestall the expansion of NATO' (Moscow Times, 1 June, 1995). 
Kozyrev claimed that 'the alliance had yielded to Russian pressure in deciding to 
postpone talks on [expansion] until 1997... [He] hailed the move as "a victory 
scored by Russian diplomats" and that "Russia's resistance has forced NATO to 
put off its expansion to the east. .. if Russia continues to fight desperately against 
the approach of NATO to its borders, then the West, possibly, will have to make 
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further concessions'" (Moscow Times, 7 October 1995). Similar attitudes were 
shared widely among the elite. 
This kind of opinion was part of the reason the Russian state adopted 
forceful language in its dealings with the West. The manner in which this dialogue 
occurred set the tone for the rest of the 1990s: grudging acceptance of the 
inevitable, fitting the overall bandwagoning strategy. The alternative, balancing, 
was simply impossible, owing to the imbalance in material power. 
In May 1995 Russia signed the Individual Partnership Programme (IPP) of 
the PiP and Areas on Pursuance of Broad, Enhanced NATO-Russia Dialogue and 
Cooperation. In July there was a 16+1 Council meeting on relations between 
Russia and NATO, followed later in the year by more meetings in this format to 
discuss the former Yugoslavia and the CFE treaty.114 Thus in the mid-1990s, 
through the PiP framework, Russia and NATO signed several important 
documents. Meanwhile, however, other major treaties, such as START-2 were 
languishing unratified in the Duma, even though the Duma did begin the 
ratification process in the summer of 1995 with the proviso that modifications to 
the treaty were likely. The NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs in August 
1995 put a stop to any progress. Once again, the Russians reacted sharply and 
Russian media and Parliamentarians voiced outrage at the events occurring in the 
former Yugoslavia. The Duma elected in 1995, moreover, was less likely than its 
predecessor to support such issues. Even with the potential support of 
Zhirinovskii's Liberal Democratic Party, securing the required 226 votes for 
ratification of START-2 appeared to be unlikely (Pikayev, 2004). Yet, with 
114 Given Russia's desire to be able to influence conflicts in and tighten its grip over the CIS, an 
alteration to the 1990 CFE treaty was in Russia's interests. There was also an attempt to use the 
negotiations over START, the ABM treaty and NATO enlargement to secure concessions in an area 
vital to Russia's national security. In fact, Russia simply ignored the southern flank-limitation 
quotas. NATO seemed amenable to proposed changes to the CFE Treaty in 1995. NATO ministers 
apparently told Russian envoy Vitalii Churkin that modifications to the treaty were possible. 
Churkin and diplomats in Moscow 'called those overtures encouraging' (Moscow Times, 22 
September 1995). At the CFE Treaty Conference in October 1995 in Vienna, Russian diplomats 
produced a plan to alter the flank limits in order to allow Russia to station more heavy weapons 
there. In January 1999, the Russian Foreign Ministry called again for an updated CFE Treaty. "The 
Russian side proceeds from the fact that decisive progress at the talks should be reached before ne\\ 
members are officially admitted to 1\ATO ... The entire system of balance upon which the CFE 
Treaty is founded will be upset' by expansion (Summmy of World Broadcasts, -+ January 1999). 
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encouragement from Primakov III 1996 this Duma did begin the process of 
ratification. 115 
The end of PjP negotiations and Russian disappointment 
Soon after the PtP was signed, NATO announced finn plans for expansion, dashing 
Moscow's hopes of having shelved the issue for several years. The supposed 
diplomatic victory looked hollow. The gap between Russia's and NATO's power 
had enabled NATO to steamroller PtP through Russian protests. The threat felt by 
Russia's leadership, however, did not lead to a new strategy: bandwagoning policy 
continued, though modified as Russia demanded compensation - the best deal 
possible in return for its acquiescence - as part of the new, more independent 
foreign policy (and using a smokescreen of fierce rhetoric). Thus, 'as it became 
increasingly evident in 1995 that NATO expansion was inexorable, Moscow 
focused on the preconditions that it would demand for acquiescing to the 
inevitable'. Among these 'were a favourable revision to the CFE Treaty, the 
nondeployment of military bases and nuclear weapons in the newly admitted 
countries, exclusion of the fonner Soviet republics (especially the Baltic states) as 
candidates for NATO membership, and recognition of Russia's security system 
with the CIS states' (Donaldson & Nogee, 2000: 244-245). 
These demands were to be repeated regularly in the following years, and 
became the basis for Moscow's diplomatic bargaining. The history of the PtP and 
its role in the enlargement of NATO shows that, despite all its efforts, the 
fundamental military weakness of Russia enabled NATO to ignore Russia's 
interests. The balance of power in Europe worsened further for Russia. 
The rhetoric from Russia became heated. NATO expansion was described 
as 'the most serious military threat to [Russia] since 1945 ... NATO members 
"have not renounced the use of force as a method to solve foreign policy 
problems" ... This is also a reason why the Kozyrev line of January-February 
115 The US Senate had ratified START-2 in January 1996. Once the desire on the part of the Gnited 
States to alter the ABM Treaty became apparent, START-2 was even less likely to be appealing to 
the Russian side. But again, the prime cause of suspicion was NATO's eastward enlargement plans. 
After the signing of the Founding Act, and protocols signed by Primakov with Madeleine Albright, 
the potential for compromise was increased, yet this was not enough, and after the crisis of 1998 
there was even less chance of ratification taking place. START-2 was, however, eventually ratified 
in April 2000. 
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[1995], offering to accept expansion in return for Western concessions elsewhere , 
was abandoned and Kozyrev himself severely reprimanded by Yeltsin. Apart from 
the uncompromising hostility of the bulk of the Russian establishment to 
expansion, Russians also feel that the West can simply not be trusted to deliver any 
concessions it has promised' (Lieven, 1995: 199). 
Yet the factors preventing Russia from making a complete break from the 
West remained: fear of instability on and beyond its borders and its own military 
weakness and economic dependence on the West. The policy of bandwagoning 
continued after this interruption of frustrated rhetoric. Fortunately for Yeltsin, the 
US government was keen to offer him support against his domestic foes, and thus 
'the revision of the 1990 CFE treaty which Albright proposed could qualify as the 
sort of "binding treaty" that Russia has been insisting on, enabling Moscow to 
acquiesce in NATO expansion while saving face' (RFE/RL, 21 February 1997). 
The end of Kozyrev - and continuation of his policies 
Kozyrev's time was soon to be up. He was replaced by Primakov at the beginning 
of 1996. In an interview with Izvestiia soon after his appointment, in March, 
Primakov said that Moscow would '''more vigorously and effectively" defend 
Russia's interests, rejecting a "strategic alliance [with] former cold war 
adversaries," warning that any enlargement of NATO would only encourage "a 
revival of the Russian military and a more assertive Russian policy in Europe." In 
saying that Russia's goal would also be closer integration of the newly independent 
states, he describes them as "parts of the former Soviet Union" rather than the CIS 
(cited in Goble, 1996). 
As discussed in Chapter 4, there was a slight rise in Russian military 
spending in the mid-1990s, from the paltry 901 million (redenominated) roubles in 
1992, to 8 billion in 1993, 40.6 billion in 1994, to 59.4 billion in 1995. This 
suggested that efforts had already been made to tum the situation around; and that 
some attempts at domestic strengthening were taking place. However, the utter 
failure to carry out meaningful military reform was demonstrated in Chechnya. 
The policy established by the mid-1990s was forced on Russia by its 
weakness in the face of NATO's military power. As Yeltsin put it, 'the change of 
Foreign Minister does not mean a change in the basic principles of Russia's foreign 
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policy. They are defined not by ministers' personalities but by the country's 
interests' (Leighton, 1999: 3). The need remained to push for advantage wherever 
possible, and for Russia to maintain its position regionally and relative to other 
second-tier states. One place where this was perhaps possible, but also where local 
expansion had to operate within the general bandwagoning strategy, was in the 
former Soviet Union. 
Primakov repeatedly asserted that, while NATO expansion was going to 
take place, there was no reason not to obtain as much as possible in return. 
Therefore, despite all that was said, Primakov had continued the core principles of 
Kozyrev's policy. In September 1996 the Minister of Defence, Rodionov, stated 
that, while he and the Russian people remained opposed to NATO enlargement, 
'Moscow would continue to cooperate with NATO, even if it expanded' (NUPI 
Chronology of Events, 27 September 1996). 
In keeping with this strategy, and 'commenting on the NATO Council 
meeting in Berlin in June 1996, Primakov emphasized: "Russia, while retaining a 
negative attitude towards this process ... has singled out the core which is absolutely 
unacceptable - the movement of NATO infrastructure towards our borders. On this 
basis, Russia offers a dialogue to NATO". The Russian Ambassador in Brussels, 
Vitalii Churkin, was even more explicit: 'recently, at a quite high level, we have let 
NATO people know that we are worried not so much by the simple fact of 
"extension" but only by the approach of the alliance's infrastructure towards 
Russian borders ... This attitude opens up some space for a search for constructive 
solutions in the interest of pan-European security' (Zagorski, 1997: 536). Russian 
Minister of Defence Sergeev visited Germany on 28-29 January 1998. He met 
Germany's Foreign Minister and complained that NATO expansion 'doesn't 
threaten anybody except Russia'. In February 1998 Russia criticised a plan to 
create a north-east NATO corps to be NATO's first-ever permanent military 
mission in central and eastern Europe. Sergeev argued that the move amounted to 
NATO's 'advancing toward the Russian border with weapons in its hands' 
(RFEIRL, 6 February 1998). 
In May 1998 Yeltsin had visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to tell them 
that 'the long discussion around the priorities of our foreign policy is over at last'. 
The priorities were: 'preservation of Russia's territorial integrity, protection of its 
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national security, democratisation of society, and refonns and integration of its 
economy into the global market economy'. His remarks on NATO were cautiously 
positive, although he recommended 'radical changes' to NATO in order to 
'strengthen security in Europe rather than threaten it' (NUPI Chronology of Events, 
12 May 1998). 
Regional power projection: the CIS 
Most of the major institutions in Moscow paid little or no attention to the fonner 
Soviet Union in the first few months of the new administration. 116 Quickly, 
however, the CIS came to occupy a prominent position in Russian foreign policy. 
This was the one area where Russia could project its power, where the retreat could 
be halted and reversed and, as it quickly turned out, where NATO would not make 
an aggressive challenge. 117 Moreover, it was frequently cited by the Russian elite 
as being a rational response to NATO expansion, which threatened to include the 
fonner Soviet Union. 
Soon, therefore, the region took on prominence in Moscow's foreign policy, 
and in September 1992 Yeltsin issued a decree to establish embassies in fonner 
Soviet republics. I IS Exactly a year later, after Yeltsin had told the UN that the 'near 
abroad' was a 'sphere of vital Russian interests', Kozyrev coined the tenn 'Yeltsin 
Doctrine' to describe Russia's policy towards the fonner Soviet space. This was 
also sometimes called the 'Monroevskii Doctrine' as it stressed Russia's right to 
dominate the region. 119 As early as February 1993 Kozyrev had stated that, 'It 
should not be forgotten that the Commonwealth of Independent States brings 
together peoples who have been linked to Russia for centuries. It is also obvious 
116 The reformist government claimed that the newly independent states were free to do what they 
wanted. Moreover, with policy focused on Washington, the leadership in Moscow demonstrated a 
lack of interest in the former Soviet states. 
117 The CIS was a means of strengthening Russia's influence as a global player. The West was not 
entirely averse to this doctrine: it was also in Western interests as it seemed likely to lead to greater 
stability in the region. Recent comments by Ivanov on strengthening the CIS Security and 
Cooperation Treaty, have been seen as a means of putting pressure on NATO before the agreement 
of May 2002 (Ivanov, Press conference remarks, at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Daily 
Bulletin, 14 May 2002); see also The Guardian, 15 May 2002. 
118 The post of deputy prime minister for the CIS was created in November 1994. 
119 'This model still appeals to most Russian supporters of a strong state, or derzhava. Influential 
Russian officials regard Russia's keeping its great power status to be in its primary national security 
interest which needs to be defended at all cost. The view that Russia should use the CIS as a string , 
of buffer countries under the influence of Moscow is the preferred scenario for the bulk of the 
Russian political elite' (Trenin, 2001: 66). 
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that the entire geographic area of the former USSR is a sphere of vital interest to 
us' (Kozyrev, 1993: paragraph 5). On 8 April 1994, Nezavisimaia Gazeta 
published a map of Russia showing northern oblasts of Kazakhstan as part of 
Russia. 
A number of treaties were signed among CIS states following the Tashkent 
summit of 1992. Numerous military agreements were signed in that year as well, 
but these 'rarely achieved consensus and failed to lay down workable measures 
relating to either a common defence budget or joint military planning ... during 
1992 the tendency towards national military formation accelerated. Crucially, this 
process involved Russia ... The CIS framework was increasingly hollowed out by 
this process of national military devolution' (Sakwa & Webber, 1999: 383).120 In 
January 1993 the CIS Charter was signed - but only by Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It was also 'a very 
loose document, subject to further reservations and amendments to be introduced at 
the stage of ratification' (Kortunov, 2004: paragraph 40). In February 1994 the 
Russian government announced plans to keep Russian soldiers in the "near abroad" 
by constructing almost 30 military bases out of existing military units located on 
these territories. It became obvious to foreign observers that Russia, seeking to 
assume an international great-power role, intended to regain it primarily by carving 
out a leadership role for itself within the former Soviet Union' (Jonson, 1997: 319). 
Thus Russia sought to strengthen CIS-wide structures and bind the CIS 
countries to commitments in a very stop-start manner. The explicit role of NATO 
in causing bursts of energy in this direction was often acknowledged by the 
Russian leadership. Echoing the frequent concerns of the military establishment in 
Moscow, Kozyrev argued in January 1994 that 'if Russia leaves the "near abroad", 
the security vacuum there "will inevitably be filled by other powers not always 
friendly, and in many cases hostile to Russian interests'" (cited by Kortunov: 2004: 
paragraph 70). Yeltsin also linked NATO enlargement to a strengthening of the 
CIS at a September 1995 press conference, warning the Western powers of the 
120 This was despite the fact that, as one prominent military analyst argued, it was 'completely 
obvious that if one proceeds from long term interests, then a defense alliance [among the CIS states] 
is most expedient for each of the sovereign republics individually and the CIS as a whole ... In the 
event that no new military alliance comes about, it will be necessary to create anew a defense within 
the confines of our own borders ... the entire air defense system will be disrupted' (Gareev, 1992: 
542). 
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possibility of a new military alliance within the CIS. He talked of a return to 
Warsaw Pact days. 'But few of the former Soviet republics seemed enthusiastic 
about the idea. Only Belarus voiced outright support, while Ukraine responded by 
announcing its intention of widening cooperation with NATO' (Moscow Times, 23 
September 1995). Decree number 940 signed by Yeltsin on 14 September called 
for 'the creation of an integrated political and economic community of states ... in 
order to create an effective "collective defence" organization' . 
On 28 March 1996, CIS defense ministers met to discuss increasing 
cooperation. Grachev 'expressed the need to coordinate defense policies, especially 
in light of NATO expansion'. In November 1995 he also linked the establishment 
of a unified CIS air-defence system to NATO expansion, and argued that expansion 
would require Russia to look for allies in the Far East and Middle East. At a 9 
February 1996 press conference following a visit to Belgrade, he said that Russia 
'would take "appropriate measures" to counter NATO enlargement... if NATO 
expands, Russia would "start to look for new partners in CEE and the CIS to set up 
a new politico-military alliance' (RFEIRL, 12 February 1996). Russia dominated 
the CIS institutions, with Yeltsin heading the Collective Security Council (the 
highest political body of the CIS) and Primakov the Council of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs (the highest consultative body on the matters of co-ordination of 
foreign policy). During the Presidential elections of 1996, Yeltsin consistently 
confirmed Russia's interest in the CIS. In December 1996, however (on the fifth 
anniversary of the formation of the CIS), he said that CIS military cooperation was 
not intended as a counterweight to NATO expansion. 
In late 1998, following the Kosovo conflict (see below for details), the 
Duma debated taking measures to 'increase the Russian Federation's defence 
capability ... to strengthen collective security and expand military and technical 
cooperation first of all with the CIS countries' (RFEIRL, 19 December, 1998). Yet 
Russia's hopes of raising military expenditure were dashed by the economic 
collapse. 
The CIS struggled on, performing some basic tasks as a discussion forum; a 
long way from a counterbalance to NATO. The sobering experience in Chechnya 
seemed to suggest that the Russian military was not even able to take care of its 
own country, and thus Moscow's more 'pragmatic' approach, scaling do\\"n 
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ambitious plans in the CIS were forced on it by reality. It was not only 
incompetence and low morale but a 'shortfall in Russian military spending, which 
helps explain the non-implementation or failure of those bilateral and multilateral 
military and security treaties signed by CIS states which Russia has offered to 
underwrite' (Allison, 1998: 4). With Uzbekistan pulling out of the Collective 
Security Treaty (signed in Tashkent on 15 May, 1992) and the withdrawal of 
Russian forces from Azerbaij an (apart from those manning a former Soviet radar 
station) to give two examples, the Russian presence at the borders of the CIS was 
waning by the end of the decade. After several years when Russia's military 
presence seemed likely to increase, the trend has been reversed. 
Strengthening ties with Belarus and Ukraine, and preventing their joining 
NATO, was a vital facet of Russian diplomacy. With the on-off building of the 
Union Treaty with Belarus (which was signed in December 1999), some success 
was achieved in this area. However, Ukraine moved in the opposite direction, 
becoming a serious contender for a place in NATO. Immediately after the 
formation of the CIS, President Kravchuk of Ukraine strongly opposed the idea of 
CIS joint forces. Like Russia, Ukraine achieved high profile relations with NATO 
to the extent of being honoured with a 'Charter on a distinctive partnership' in July 
1997. This, it was said, 'does neither foreclose nor envisage future Ukrainian 
NATO membership, but it explicitly states "the inherent right of all states" to "be 
free to choose or change ... security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as 
they arise' (BITS Press Release, 1997). Thus there was some success with Belarus, 
but outright failure with the Ukraine. 
Hard bargaining: making the most of strategic failure 
Military bargaining: the nuclear chip 
Nuclear weapons were the only parts of Russia's military force that remained 
world class - superpower-sized, if in need of some maintenance. They were an 
increasingly visible aspect of Russia's response to NATO and of Russia's post-
Soviet military doctrines and national security doctrines. 121 Given Russia's 
121 Russia's 2000 National Security Doctrine and Military Doctrine seemed to widen the 
possibilities for the use of nuclear weapons, to include cases in which the county was attacked with 
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economIC and conventional military weakness, nuclear power was an obvious 
means of obtaining advantages. Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons did 
provide Russia with the possibility of ultimate deterrence. l22 Arbatov argued that 
'nuclear equality would require that Washington "continue to treat Russia with 
t'" 123 d h'l 1· respec , an w I e wrang mg over the PfP and NATO's enlargement was 
taking place, 'an admiral, five vice-admirals and other Russian Black Sea Fleet 
officers wrote an open letter to ... Yeltsin, suggesting that Russia should aim its 
intercontinental missiles at the capitals and key installations of NATO members if 
the alliance admits new members' (Moscow Times, January 21 1997). The Defence 
Council was apparently considering a new military doctrine in which first use of 
nuclear weapons in the face of conventional attack would be included, a move 
linked to NATO expansion. 
The events in Kosovo in late 1998 and 1999 led Yeltsin to warn NATO not 
to 'push [Russia] towards military action. Otherwise there will be a minimum of a 
European or maybe even a world war, which must not be permitted' (RFEIRL, 12 
April 1999). Again, this threat only made sense because of Russia's possession of 
large-scale nuclear weaponry. Colonel-General Iakovlev, commander of Russia's 
strategic rocket forces, stressed that Russia's economic situation was 'not 
favorable' for the development of general-purpose forces which he described as 
'extremely necessary' following the expansion of NATO and in view of the 
'absence on the CIS border of a firm system of collective security ... our hopes 
remain pinned on nuclear deterrence forces and their main component - the 
strategic rocket forces'. The intercontinental ballistic RS-12M Topol missile (or 
SS-25) was test launched in September 1998 and Iakovlev also hailed the 
successful launching of 'all 57 of the Topol missiles' (NUPI Chronology of Events, 
16 September 1998). 
Russia's inability to maintain its weapons or indulge in research was, 
however, an embarrassing fact. Moscow pushed for lower levels of weaponry. 
START-2 was to reduce Russia's arsenal to 3,000 warheads. 'In 1992-93 ... The 
conventional weapons, and the situation was "critical to the national security of the Russian 
Federation" . 
122 Fedorov (2002: 12) notes that both American and Russian strategic armaments are still targeted 
at each other. Therefore nuclear deterrence remains a persistent feature of Russian-American 
relations. 
123 Cited in Lo (2002: 111). 
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Kremlin, in fact, agreed to give up strategic nuclear parity with the United States 
by accepting US demands to rapidly scrap the cornerstone of its strategic triad: 
ground-based MIRVed intercontinental ballistic missiles. In order to enter the 
Missile Technology Control regime ... profitable sales of missile engines to India 
were significantly restricted' (Pikayev, 2000: 1).124 START-2 offered what many in 
the Russian elite saw as a means of retaining or even improving the strategic 
balance of power, by reducing to an equal (more affordable) number the warheads 
held by the US and Russia. START-3 was discussed, in which the number of 
warheads would be reduced to 2,000. 
With current technology there was no defence against Russia's nuclear 
weapons (even a massive and surprise first strike), hence their strategic importance, 
and hence also the importance of the ABM treaty. 
ABM treaty bargaining 
On 21 January 1996, the US stated its wish to amend the ABM treaty. Colonel-
General Ivashov, head of the Ministry of Defence's Department for International 
Military Cooperation, immediately responded that it would harm the chances of 
ratifying START-2. Yet, as we have seen, START-2 was necessary because of the 
enormous cost of upkeep of the vast arsenal. Thus in February 1996, Gennadii 
Seleznev125 warned that enlargement of NATO or withdrawal of the US from the 
ABM treaty would kill any chance of ratification of START 2. But he added that 
Russia 'simply does not have the means' to maintain its current nuclear arsenal 
(RFEIRL, 14 February 1996). In March 1999, Vladimir Lukin told Ekho Moskvy 
radio station that there was a real chance of ratifying START-2 because it was 
obvious that the country was not able to finance and maintain its forces at the 
higher level (RFEIRL, 16 March 1999). Again, economic weakness influenced 
Russia's ability to bargain. 
124 The sale of nuclear technology by Russia to Iran, for example, (deal signed 8 January 1995) did 
go ahead. Sales to China also formed a useful coincidence of economic interest and further 
improved relations between Russia and China. 
1~5 Seleznev was elected as a Russian Communist Party member of the State Duma in 1993 and 
1995. From 1995 he was Chairman of the State Duma, and from 1996 Chairman of the 
Interparliamentary Legislative Commission (lower chamber) of the Intergovernmental Executiw 
Committee in the Russia-Belarus Community of Sovereign States. 
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The ABM issue rumbled on and was raised again in the 1998-1999 period. 
On 23 April 1998, acting Deputy Defence Minister Mikhailov also uroed 
o 
ratification of START-2 ... 'any other decisions will mean that the USA \\"ill feel 
free to withdraw from the antimissile treaty, whereas Russia, because of its current 
economic situation, will not be able to continue the arms race which may be 
initiated by the USA' (Summary o/World Broadcasts, 27 April 1998). Howe\"er, in 
mid-March 1999, the Russian Foreign Ministry called it a 'serious threat to the 
whole process of nuclear arms reduction as well as strategic stability'. Primakov 
noted that it came as an 'unpleasant surprise' (RFEIRL, 19 March 1999). A few 
months later, in June 1999, a joint communique issued by Russia and the US 
'concerning strategic offensive and defensive arms and further strengthening of 
stability' stated that the parties reaffirmed their commitment to the ABM treaty, 
while there were possibilities of increasing the 'viability' of the treaty. START-3 
was mentioned in connection with this, implying that ways were being found to 
work around the importance of the treaty for Russian national security. 
Ultimately, Russia's nuclear weapons did not help the country achieve its 
aims regarding NATO. Every time nuclear weapons were brandished, enlargement 
pushed ahead. Fedorov (2002: 6), therefore, argued that 'while helping to deter 
large-scale aggression, nuclear weapons as such cannot be converted into political 
power. .. Russia failed to prevent NATO enlargement, its war against the 
Milosevich regime, and the collapse of the latter'. 
Promoting a moral world order 
Throughout the 1990s, Russia made use of the United Nations as a forum for airing 
its grievances and proposing alternative visions to that conjured up by NATO. 
Russia 'needed to participate in constructing a new UN- and multilaterally based 
democratic international system to make up for its lack of effective traditional 
foreign policy instruments, such as military power' (Lo, 2002: 90). In this vein, 
Primakov, addressing the UN General Assembly (23 September 1997) 'criticised 
NATO expansion, which "does not proceed from existing reality" and creates "ne\\" 
division lines". He repeated Russia's promise to guarantee the security of the Baltic 
States'. The 1997 National Security blueprint stated that 'The Russian Federation's 
national interests in the foreign-policy sphere require the implementation of an 
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active foreign policy aimed at consolidating Russia's position as a great power and 
as one of the emergent multi-polar world's influential centres.' All this was 
'intended to serve up an image of Russia as a law-abiding member of the 
international community at a time when many countries viewed the US in just the 
opposite way' (Lo, 2002: 92). 
Following bombings in Iraq in December 1999, the Duma adopted a 
statement by a massive majority (394 votes in favour, one against and two 
abstentions), supported by Ivanov, then Foreign Minister, that the Duma 'resolutely 
condemns "the barbaric bombing of the Republic of Iraq, carried out by the USA 
and Great Britain without the authorization of the UN Security Council" ... 
Primakov rejected [AI Gore's]. .. arguments for airstrikes telling him that "'Russia 
unequivocally condemns the American and British military action and regards it as 
a crude violation of the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council, the UN 
Charter and the universally recognized principles of international law' ... 
According to Primakov, the Anglo-American action against Iraq "infringes the 
whole of the world legal order that has been established since the Second World 
War and undermines the efforts and authority of the UN Security Council" 
(Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 December 1998). On 6 March 1999, Ivanov 
accused the US of seeking "to impose a unipolar order on the world". Thus "the 
democratic, multipolar world order" sought by Russia required that "there be no 
diktat on the part of anyone state".126 In June 1999, Russia and China issued ajoint 
communique condemning the 'barbarous' bombing of Yugoslavia. There were 
signs that Russia made attempts to firm an axis with itself, China and India to 
balance against NATO. 
This was an ultimately futile strategy, which did not bear any fruit. It was 
also part of Russia's attempts to weaken the ties binding NATO countries. In this 
case, as Light et al. (2000a: 11) point out, it was entirely normal and logical for 
Russia to try to accelerate any process of disintegration that NATO might be going 
through following the disappearance of the Soviet threat. Yeltsin moved to develop 
a differentiated relationship with the countries of Europe as well as suggesting that 
the US and Europe had different interests and that Europe should not go along with 
the goal of enlargement; or that European countries should aim to join Russia 
126 Cited by Lo (2002: 92). 
90 
within the CSCE/OSCE (or even the WEU) to form an alliance to rival :\ATO. 
Annual summits were planned between the presidents of Russia, Germany, and 
France, independently of those between Russia and the US. There were differences 
of opinion within NATO which were suitable for exploitation. These revolved 
around the desire of some European countries, notably Germany and France, to 
increase the weight they held within the European security structures. They sought 
to strengthen the EU's military power (see Chapter 6), and weaken Washington's 
influence in European affairs. 
The Founding Act and the PJC: hard bargaining and more failure 
The history of the signing of the Founding Act shows clearly the workings of 
Russia's foreign policy in regard to NATO. Early in 1997 President Clinton 
announced that a new Founding Act with Russia would be signed at around the 
time of the Madrid Summit scheduled for July, in which issues of enlargement 
were to be decided. Russia and NATO had worked together on the ground in 
Bosnia after a shaky start, and this was said to have contributed to the successful 
negotiations over the Founding Act (NATO Madrid Summit Press Information, 
1997). NATO's official line was that 'the transformation Russia is undergoing, its 
force reductions - which will continue - the withdrawal of Russian forces from 
Central and Eastern Europe, the revision of Russia's military doctrine, and its 
participation in ... Bosnia-Herzegovina' have led to the possibility of Russia 
cooperating with a 'profoundly transformed' NATO. This too involved 'reductions 
in conventional and nuclear forces ... a revision of its strategic concept. .. new 
missions such as peacekeeping and through its support for security cooperation 
throughout Europe' (NATO Madrid Summit Press Information, 1997). By March 
1997, after a series of discussions, Moscow had accepted that the NATO-Russia 
Charter would not be a legally binding treaty, as had been Moscow's insistence, but 
merely an 'executive agreement'. 
On May 27, Boris Yeltsin, Javier Solana and NATO heads of state signed 
the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO 
and the Russian Federation. This created at the same time the NATO-Russian 
Council, which would meet periodically to consider security problems in Europe. 
Crucially, NATO remained free to act without the Council's approval. Yet NATO 
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stated that it had 'no intention, no plan, no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the 
territories of new members' or 'by additional permanent stationing of substantial 
combat forces' .127 In the latter case, several situations in which this might actually 
occur were listed. Possible alterations to the CFE Treaty were mentioned, taking 
into account 'the legitimate security interests of all OSCE participating states' 
though in the context of further reductions in equipment. 
Thus, by the standards of Russia's statements III prevIOUS years, the 
Founding Act represented a failure. Primakov was quick to call it a 'big victory for 
Russia' , 'but in a television interview on the night of the signing, Yeltsin 
acknowledged that Russia was "playing a weak hand'" (Donaldson & Nogee, 
2000: 246). Indeed, there was an element of humiliation for the Russian leadership; 
but at the same time a pragmatic acceptance of their fate. The Founding Act was 
signed only two months before the Madrid summit at which NATO decided to 
admit three new members from central Europe and declared an 'open door' for 
other countries to join. The Founding Act, NATO explicitly stated, 'does not delay, 
limit or dilute NATO's opening for the accession of new members, and it will not 
relegate any new NATO member to second class status'. 
In Russia, reactions were mixed. Rodionov cautiously noted that not all 
problems within the pact had been ironed out. The Duma's Security Committee 
secretary, Viktor Iliukhin,128 denounced the agreement as 'another example of the 
betrayal of Russia's interests'. Duma Speaker Seleznev, however, welcomed it, 
saying that NATO was taking Russia's desires into account. The Foreign Affairs 
Committee chairman, Lukin, praised it for its ban on the stationing of nuclear 
weapons on the territory of new members - which the pact did not in fact contain. 
As mentioned above, the NATO communique only stated that there were no plans 
to do so. 
Similarly, Rogov (1999: 5-7) argued that 'Russian diplomacy achieved 
some major successes in 1997. First of all, it became possible to avoid a new 
confrontation between Moscow and the West that Russia could not win. Russia's 
127 NATO (2000), Online Library. Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security 
Between NATO and the Russian Federation, Paris, 27 May 1997. Online at: 
www.nato.intldocwbasictxtlfndact-a.htm. 
128 A Communist member of the Duma, and from 1998 Chairman of the Movement for Army and 
Defense Industry Support. 
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diplomacy managed despite the odds to avoid a crushing defeat, which would 
have ... strengthened Russian isolation in the international arena ... Moscow and the 
West agreed upon measures to prevent a large increase in the military threat to 
Russia during NATO expansion, including the non-deployment of Western nuclear 
weapons and combat forces in Eastern Europe'. This was an interesting argument, 
a redefinition of Russia's goals after the event, and a misrepresentation of the 
Founding Act. As Rogov himself had argued two years earlier, 'a common 
European home is being built now, but without Russia. When Russia lost power 
and its military capabilities were reduced, it could be ignored. The European Union 
and NATO are becoming the backbones of the new post-Cold War European 
system, economically, politically, and militarily. And Russia, as a non-member of 
those two bodies, is out' (Rogov, 1997: 3). It was wrong to suggest that the PJC 
had changed the situation in any great way, except perhaps as a means of cooling 
the situation. 
The PJC, established by the Founding Act, held its first meeting on 26 
September when Primakov met his counterparts in New York. It became an arena 
for renewed clashes over NATO's enlargement. NATO and Russia had different, 
and sometimes opposing, goals for the body. The PJC became 'bogged down in 
power struggles over procedure, agenda items and other minutiae' (Tigner, 1998). 
Primakov complained in December 1997 of 'a tendency to tum the Russia-NATO 
Council into a debating club'. Russia did 'gain some access to NATO deliberations 
through creation of the PJC - though without any role in deciding NATO policy 
outside of the specific subj ects to be agreed by the Council: consultation, 
cooperation and even potential common action in areas to be agreed' (Hunter, 
2000: 126). 
Kosovo: symbol of Russia-NATO relations 
The actions by NATO in Kosovo brought about perhaps the low point in Russia-
NATO relations - but only temporarily. Only three years later, in Rome in May 
2002, Russia (under Putin) and NATO established the NATO-Russia Council. 129 
129 'The establishment of the NATO-Russia Council ... opened a new chapter in 0:ATO-Russia 
relations ... A previous accord providing for regular consultations, the 1997 ... Founding Act, 
foundered due to disagreements over NATO military action in the former Yugoslavia and other 
issues' (RFE/RL Special Report: The NATO Summit, 19 November 2002). 
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As the preparations for war heated up, Russia was vociferous in its 
opposition. Yeltsin said that Russia 'would take unexplained military measures to 
"defend itself and the overall security of Europe'" (RFEIRL, 15 March 1999). In an 
illuminating aside, however, izvestiia reported on 10 March 1999 that Russia was 
already participating in NATO's operations in the Balkans, 'as a carrier of military 
loads. Although Moscow is categorically opposed to a military response to the 
crisis in Kosovo, the Russian side is participating for its own benefit in NATO's 
preparations for the operation in Kosovo' . 
The attack began on 24 March. Primakov famously turned his plane (en 
route to the US) in mid-flight and returned to Moscow, an act that became 
symbolic. On 24 March 1999, Russia pulled out of the PtP and military cooperation 
programmes 'following a last-minute appeal by Yeltsin on TV to Chirac, Shroeder 
and Clinton' (RFE/RL, 25 March 1999) to prevent NATO's attack. The Kosovo 
conflict meant that one of Russia's trump cards - permanent membership of the 
UN Security Council - had proved to be worthless. The PJC had also not fulfilled 
its hoped-for role. 
The actions in Kosovo caused an immediate flurry of activity that looked as 
though Russia was changing its policy towards one of balancing, in reaction to a 
suddenly increased threat. In April, Minister of Defence Sergeev announced that 
his ministry intended to revise plans for reducing the size of Russia's armed forces. 
'The current number - 1.2 million soldiers - could not be lowered, he said. He 
linked this revision of policy to NATO's new strategic concept adding that "the 
steps which NATO has taken against Yugoslavia increase our anxiety". Duma 
legislators were reported... to have rediscovered their commitment to military 
spending and that the military is already spending more money, roughly $2 million 
extra since NATO bombing began ... and the de-mothballing of one S-300 anti-
aircraft missile system' (RFEIRL, 8 April 1999). Yeltsin himself said that 'the 
Russian president warns NATO not to "push [Russia] towards military action. 
Otherwise there will be a minimum of a European or maybe even a world war, 
which must not be permitted'" (RFEIRL, 12 April 1999).130 
130 As part of the PfP programme, Russia maintained delegates at NATO HQ and at Supreme Allied 
Headquarters Europe (SACEUR) in Mons. As a protest at the bombing of Serbia during the KosO\o 
conflict, these delegates were briefly withdrawn. 
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Russian actions also included 'freezing' vanous treaties that had been 
signed or planned but not yet ratified (Arbatov, 2000). These included START-3 
, 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, and adaptation of the 
CFE treaty. In July, 'experts of the Russian Defence Ministry' were reported to be 
doubting 'that Russia's military relations with NATO will be fully restored by the 
end of 1999 ... they also said that military relations will remain "frozen" not only 
with the alliance itself but also with its member states that directly participated in 
the aggression against Yugoslavia'. Indeed, in Brussels on 20 July, 'the first 
meeting of the Russian-NATO PJC to be held since the bombardment of 
Yugoslavia, which was scheduled for today, has been postponed indefinitely' 
(RFEIRL, 22 July 1999). The Prime Minister, Chernomyrdin, said that Russia and 
NATO were close to nuclear war (Shlapentokh, 2000: 186), and Sergeev stated that 
he was considering redeploying nuclear weapons in Belarus. 
It was quite soon after the start of the Kosovo conflict that Russia renewed 
its offensive in Chechnya, for a variety of reasons. Arbatov (2000) argued that it 
was partly a result of the fact that the 'taboo' against using force to solve political 
problems had been removed, and that it would demonstrate to the West that Russia 
would accept no meddling in its domestic affairs. The Kosovo conflict upset the 
'liberal-statist balance of political elite interests' in Moscow (Wallander, 2000a: 
paragraph 8). 
The new National Security Concept and new Military Doctrine were 
approved by the Security Council in early 2000. Arbatov credits the Kosovo action 
with causing 'for the first time since the mid-1980s within operational departments 
of the General Staff and Armed Forces, the Security Council and Foreign Ministry 
crisis management groups, and in closed sessions of the Duma, serious discussions 
[to take] place concerning military conflict with NATO' (Arbatov, 2000: paragraph 
34). The Military Doctrine of 2000 made very obvious reference to Kosovo in its 
outline of the threats facing Russia: 'a destabilizing impact on the military-political 
situation is exerted by... the utilization of military force as a means of 
"humanitarian intervention'''. Threats also came from 'the creation (build up) of 
groups of troops leading to the violation of the existing balance of forces, close to 
the Russian Federation's state border and the borders of its allies or on the seas 
adjoining their territories, the introduction of foreign troops in violation of the U1\ 
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Charter on the territory of friendly states adjoining the Russian Federation' and so 
on. The National Security Doctrine of 2000, like the Military Doctrine, emphasised 
the multilateral world order and attempts to weaken Russia's international 
influence: 'The level and scope of military threats are growing. Elevated to the 
rank of strategic doctrine, NATO's transition to the practice of using military force 
outside its zone of responsibility and without UN Security Council sanction could 
destabilize the entire global strategic situation'. 
Given the nature of NATO's actions in the Balkans, there was a 'new 
emphasis on building up and modernizing Russia's conventional air defense, air 
force and naval assets' (Arbatov, 2000: paragraph 65). This was because the 
Balkan scenario could involve selective air strikes against Russia against which the 
nuclear reaction would not be effective or proportional. General Aleksandr Lebed 
proposed at the Federation Council to declare Yugoslavia a zone of Russia's 
geopolitical interests. Russia was to oppose NATO aggression and provide military 
assistance. 'According to Lebed, Russia in the role of a fighter would consolidate 
its dignity and unify the nation. This option in other terms implied confrontation 
with the West for the sake of domestic spiritual revival and a claim to Great Power 
status abroad' (Brovkin: 16). As Brovkin argued, Yeltsin was manoeuvring 
between 'contradictory policies ... Russia would not quarrel with NATO too much 
but would not be too friendly either'. 
Some in the Russian elite were quickly cautioning against over-reaction to 
Kosovo. The interior minister, Sergei Stepashin, for example, said that 'Russia 
should assume that it will live and work in Europe' (RFEIRL, 19 March 1999). 
Izvestiia too cautioned against a break with the West. The very speed with which 
relations reverted back to the position of pragmatism, and lost their vitriol is 
instructive. 
General Boris Gromov, a veteran of resistance to Yeltsin in 1993, voiced 
the opinion that "'The policy of Russia must be principled and firm. We will not 
accept NATO in the role of the World's policeman." However, Gromov continued, 
providing military assistance to Yugoslavia would imply a return to the Cold War, 
which was unacceptable. This political stance was hardly distinguishable from that 
of Yeltsin's tough rhetoric and no action' (Brovkin: 16). One reason for this \\'as 
the harsh economic reality. I::vcsriia (26 March 1999) argued that . Russia cannot 
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forget about its economy. While politicians such as Yeltsin, Primakov, Lushkov 
and Iavlinskii say that they are against NATO bombings in Kosovo, they have to 
remain on good terms with NATO and the IMF'. In mid-September 1999, the US 
Secretary of State, after meeting Russia's Minister of Defence, said that agreement 
on rewriting the ABM treaty was possible. 'Sergeev was more reticent but said 
Moscow wants to improve military relations with the US even though he was still 
critical of NATO actions in Kosova' (RFEIRL, 14 September 1999). 
Russia clearly reacted to NATO's military actions with a shift in policy, 
apparently towards rearming and breaking off friendly contact with the Alliance. 
This might have spelt a major move towards balancing rather than bandwagoning, 
were it not so short-lived: the pragmatic strategy was set to continue after an initial 
flurry of activity. And again, this was a result of Russian economic, military and 
diplomatic weakness. l31 The Kosovo conflict was the low point in Russia NATO 
relations, and yet, only a year later, was of greatly diminished importance. It shows 
how realities of the distribution of power remained unaltered, and hence Russia's 
policies also remained more or less unaltered. While the conflict 'exposed the 
limits of Moscow's influence in the Russia-NATO consultative mechanisms like 
the PJC' (Lo, 2002: 106), it also demonstrated that Russia-NATO relations were 
built on foundations of realistic perceptions that not even this seemingly 
exceptional event could disturb fundamentally. 
The power imbalance allowed NATO to proceed with its plans, while 
making minor concessions to Russia. Russia was impotent to stop these plans 
becoming reality. Relations were built on Russia's need to retain contact with the 
West, to keep the flows of credit coming and to avoid diplomatic isolation, from a 
position of severe weakness. The prospect of the huge power of NATO increasing 
and moving ever further eastwards was one that plainly exposed Russia's 
contemporary weakness. After almost a decade of retreat and of increasing 
131 A typical example of this had come just before the bombing began, in the counsel of Sergei 
Markov (Director of the Political Studies Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences) and 
Vladimir Volkov (Director of the Slavic and Balkan Studies Institute of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences) to the 'Russian government to exploit the Kosovo crisis as an opportunity to instigate 
anti-American sentiment in Western Europe ... a weakened Russia should try to coalesce ... 
particularly with "those West European countries which are not inclined to accept unconditionally 
the American rules of the game ... play, to the full extent, on differences between the European 
Union and the United States over the issue of the Europeanization ofKATO"'. However they 
cautioned against providing the Serbian forces with S-300 anti-aircraft missiles which would 'result 
in a cutoff of Western credits to Russia and even in economic sanctions' (~TPI, :5 February 1999). 
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economic and military decline, both the regional and global balance of power had 
if anything worsened since the fall of the Soviet Union, primarily as a result of 
NATO's continuing existence, but also because of China's economic resurgence, 
the failure of the CIS and the catastrophic performance of the military in Chechnya. 
Russia was therefore forced to retain relations with NATO, as Primakov, Arbatov 
and others pointed out, in order not to be plunged into an even worse situation of 
isolation. 
A survey undertaken among the Russian foreign policy elite in 2000 found 
a strongly 'realistic' attitude to NATO enlargement. "'Fundamentalist nationalists" 
and some "pragmatic nationalists" predicted a strong Russian response, suggesting 
variously that military spending would rise, there would be a new arms race, the 
"nuclear factor" would be "reconsidered", and new allies would be found. For the 
most part, however, interviewees understood that economic weakness limits 
Russia's ability to respond' (Light et aI., 2000: 6). 
The Russian elite throughout the 1990s constantly tested the limits of the 
diplomatic means at its disposal, yet was frustrated time and again. 'Russia failed 
to achieve the strategic goals defined in the late 1990s in the international arena. It 
was unable to prevent NATO's enlargement, or NATO's anti-Belgrade operation, 
or the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Nor was Russia able to integrate the 
post-Soviet space and consolidate its position as a leading force across the former 
Soviet Union. Russia's persistent support of [Milosevic] everywhere, including the 
United Nations, led to the eventual loss of Russia's influence in the Balkans, as 
well as undermining the role of the UN Security Council and, consequently, the 
role of Russia as its permanent member' (Fedorov, 2002: 4). 
According to Pikayev (2000: 1-2), both the Atlanticist and the later 
consensus foreign policies failed. 'The chain of geopolitical defeats in the 1990s, as 
they are perceived in Moscow, marked the failure of [the] two major foreign policy 
strategies that Russia desperately attempted to pursue at the end of the 20th 
century ... in 1996-98 the new strategy [associated with Primakov, the use of 
bargaining chips to seek concessions from the West] brought certain gains. 
International assistance... finally began to arrive, though not in the quantity 
required by the tremendous mission of transforming the Russian economy. 
Although NATO expanded eastward, it had to provide Moscow with some 
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important albeit non-binding security assurances in exchange. The unfair START-
II was slightly corrected. The doors of some Western institutions were finally 
opened. Russia adhered to G-7, the Council of Europe, and the Paris Club'. Yet it 
was also true that 'Since the end of the USSR Moscow has lost its old clients and 
allies without acquiring any real new allies and partners in the international arena' 
(Rogov 1999: 2). By the end of the decade the assertiveness that arose as a result of 
the failure of the concessionary policies of 1991-1992 was tempered by a very 
powerful realisation of Russia's weakness. Thus a form of stability had been 
created, unhappy though many in the elite were, demonstrating how the simple 
imbalance of power had shaped Russian foreign policy. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RUSSIA AND THE EU: 
THE NEOCLASSICAL REALIST EXPLANATIO~ 
While NATO was a high-profile foreign policy priority for Russia in the 1990s, 
there was little interest shown in the EU by the great majority of the Russian elite 
for much of the decade. Relations between Russia and the EU were generally 
smooth and low-key. 
This was partly because there was often a genuine coincidence of interest 
and partly because the EU was a political-economic organization, rather than a 
military alliance (although attempts were made to boost the EU's military 
capabilities) - which did not threaten Russia's physical security. The EU's lack of 
military muscle did not make the EU unimportant - in economic terms it was of 
crucial importance - but it does help explain why it was not as high on the list of 
priorities for the Russian elite as NATO. In fact, the EU's importance to Russia 
economically did belatedly lead to some discord. There were some obstacles to 
smooth relations but they tended to be dealt with in a fairly discreet manner. 
Russia's changing perception of the EU 
The unthreatening expansion 
Unlike Russia's relations with NATO, those with the EU did not undergo a major 
shift as the Atlanticist period ended and the leadership moved to a more hardline, 
'independent' foreign policy. Nor did the EU playa major role in causing that shift. 
In fact, the EU's plans for expansion were contrasted positively with those of 
NATO. In May 1996, for example, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei 
Krilov, stated that Russia's policy was to object to eastern European states joining 
NATO's military structures, and 'urged those countries to consider joining Ireland 
which belongs to the EU but not NATO' (RFEIRL, 22 May, 1996). In February 
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1997, Primakov, on a visit to Denmark, stated that the accession of the Baltic States 
to NATO would be 'unacceptable' but added that he would see their entry to the 
EU as a 'positive development' (RFEIRL, 27 February, 1997). In December 1997, 
'Russia's Foreign Ministry reacted positively ... to the EU's decision ... to invite 
five former Communist countries (along with Cyprus) to become candidates for 
membership... spokesman Sergei Nesterushkin welcomed the EU actions, 
depicting them as part of an objective tendency toward economic integration on the 
European continent. He was also careful to place them in the context of Russia's 
own improving relations with the EU, which, Nesterushkin said, were reflected in 
an EU-Russian partnership agreement that came into force on December l' (NUPI, 
16 December 1997).132 
The EU was therefore viewed, unlike NATO, as an ally in international 
affairs. This was because the EU was a vital trade partner, rather than a military 
rival. The EU was also seen as a counterweight to the influence of the US in global 
and European affairs. The relationship was often characterised with the word 
'partnership'. In December 1993, for example, Yeltsin hailed the signing of an 
agreement with the EU on trade relations as an unprecedented event. 'The East and 
the West of Europe took a big step toward one another... The declaration we have 
signed guarantees that henceforth we will... get closer. .. Weare all Europeans'. He 
also said that Russia was ready to "become a real partner of Western Europe'" 
(RFE/RL, 10 December 1993). This tone remained consistent into the mid-1990s, 
as when Yeltsin and the EU leaders Wim Kok (President of the Council) and 
Jacques Santer (President of the Commission) met in March 1997 to discuss trade 
matters, for example. 'Yeltsin said afterwards that the "partnership" between 
Russia and the EU is the "key to strengthening security and stability on the 
continent" ... Kok noted that, while Yeltsin reiterated Russia's opposition to NATO 
expansion, he did not oppose the EU's parallel plans to expand into eastern Europe 
(RFEIRL, 4 March 1997). In January 1999, Vasilii Likachev, Russia's permanent 
representative to the European Communities, argued that 'Strategic partnership 
with EU is needed [for the 21 st century] ... both sides have moved from building 
legal and organizational foundations to the practice of systematic cooperation 
132 This was the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), one of the foundations of Russia-
EU relations of the 1990s, and discussed in detail below. 
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between them ... awareness by the EU and the Russian Federation of the objective 
nature of their relations, their strategic functions, the active role in creating a 
multidimensional and multipolar world' (Summary of World Broadcasts, 4 January 
1999). 
Despite these positive sentiments, Russia's leaders generally saw the EU as 
a low priority. Eggert (1997: paragraphs 4-6) suggested that 'it sometimes seems 
that decision-makers in Moscow still think about the EU in 1970s terms. For them 
it is still the European Economic Community, a dull entity designed to solve 
problems which are barely of any importance to Russia. It is impossible otherwise 
to explain why nobody in the Kremlin cares to appoint a new ambassador to the EU 
for a third consecutive year'. The EU barely registered on the political seismograph 
(Eggert, 2002133). 
Economic promise and threat 
The EU's importance to Russia was primarily economic. Its vast economic power 
was in stark contrast to that of Russia, but also held the promise of almost 400 
million wealthy EU citizens: a huge potential market for Russian goods. 134 The EU 
states were also thirsty for Russian oil and gas. The EU was dependent on Russia's 
supplies of natural gas. Russia 'provides 36% of the Union's gas consumption and 
about 10% of its oil imports' (Aalto, 2001: 12, footnote 13). Close economic 
relations with (as well as credits from) the EU were vital for Russian economic 
prospects.135 While 'exports to CIS states between 1992 and 1994 remained 
relatively steady at around US$ 14 billion... exports to Europe rose in the same 
period from US$ 31 billion to US$ 42 billion' (World Bank, 1996). The EU was 
'the world's largest trading bloc and Russia's most important trading partner, 
accounting for 40 percent of Russia's external trade in 1995' (Moscow Times, 1 
March 1997). Trade in general rapidly increased as a share of Russia's gross 
133 Interviewed in London by the author (5 and 6 December 2002), Eggert said that 'Ignoring the Ee 
meant Russia was not interested in the real big issue. The pragmatists were in the end the romantics, 
because NATO enlargement implications are very few. While EU enlargement has negative 
implications. ' This fact was belatedly realised by the Russian leadership. 
134 As described in Chapter 4, gross domestic product in the 15 EU states (US$ at PPP) in 1991 was 
US$ 6,404 billion (when Russia's was US$ 1,148) and US$ 8,780 in 1999 (when Russia's was USS 
856). 
135 Apart from its own economic importance as a trade partner, the EU played an important role in 
helping Russia along the path to membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
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national product; Russia's trade balance with the EU was 4001.8 million ECU in 
1993, 6231.9 in 1994 and 6396.1 in 1995, dropping a little to 3800 million in 1996. 
By the last year of the 1990s, Russian exports to the EU totalled 21.2 billion euros, 
and imports 11.5 billion euros.136 Oil and gas exports at this time formed 
approximately 45% of Russia's exports to the EU, equivalent to 20% of the total 
world Russian exports (Jensen, 2001: 14). In 1998, while Russia was 'the EU's 
sixth most important trading partner,' the EU was in tum 'substantially dependent 
on supplies of energy from Russia' (Danilov & de Spiegeleire, 1998: 8). 
Thus within a few years the EU was easily Russia's biggest trading partner. 
This was still true 'despite the steep fall in EU exports to Russia after the 1998 
financial crisis. In 1999, the EU still accounted for 33% of Russia's trade, and 
Russia today enjoys a trade surplus of well over 10 billion Euro with the EU' 
(Prodi, 2000). Such a relationship created 'the most durable foundation for further 
deepening the cooperation between the two parties ... It is with Europe that Russia 
can establish the most effective forms of economic interaction: deepening 
specialization and large-scale cooperation, which would mean interdependence and 
the intertwining of economies. At the same time, the European model best 
guarantees the efficient modernization of Russia's economic system' (Gutnik, 
2003).137 
However, trade was imbalanced: while Russia supplied the EU with 
hydrocarbons and other raw materials it imported in tum manufactured goods. This 
was grist to the mill of those who argued that the West wanted to keep Russia as a 
backward supplier of raw materials. Russia was more interested in developing 
cooperation in high-tech sectors. It was recognised even by the EU that 'the 
structure of bilateral trade continues to display a marked imbalance, with fuel and 
primary products representing the bulk of Russian exports ... as opposed to the 
136 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Information and Press Department 
(October 2000), Fact Sheet. Russia - the European Union. Online at: 
http://www.ln.mid.rulbrp 4.nsf/e7 8a48070f128a 7b4325 6999005bcbb317 63cda418e9868dd43 25 699 
c00260c21 ?OpenDocument. 
\37 The EU was the largest provider of aid to Russia. Russia received € 2.281 billion in EU 
assistance between 1991 and 2000 (European Commission, 2003). The country 'also benefited from 
a number of other programmes, such as the Nuclear Safety programme, various Inter-State 
programmes, the Democracy Programme and small projects programmes. The EU ~ember States 
have provided substantial assistance to Russia' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 1999: 2). 
EU countries accounted for 60 per cent of the total economic assistance provided to Russia by the 
West in 1990-1994' (Zagorski, 1997: 527). 
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predominance of finished industrial goods in imports from the ED' (European 
C .. 2002) l38 . ommISSlOn, . It was never clear how exactly RUSSIa was to compete with 
the western European countries on equal terms. The most frequently heard call was 
for the ED to remove tariff barriers from Russian imports; this would not 
necessarily remove the problem of imbalanced terms of trade, but it would open the 
market for Russian goods such as steel and textiles. The right to export these 
without burdensome duties would at least provide Russia with hard cash. 
Protective tariffs and the potential for anti-dumping legislation against 
Russian exports to the ED were a threat to Russia's effort to rejuvenate its 
economy and hence rebuild its power. 'Russian officials complained in 1997 that 
ED trade barriers, which affect 40 percent of Russian exports, along with 
subsidized European exports, cost the country $1 billion a year in lost trade' 
(NUPI, 22 July 1997). The official foreign policy and national security documents 
made clear that this was regarded as a threat to Russian national security. 
Economic relations and national security 
Effective economic development, relying in part on favourable terms of trade, was 
explicitly recognised as fundamental to the assurance of national security, linked to 
military and technological potential. The 1993 Military Doctrine did indeed argue 
that the methods of achieving the economic foundations necessary to support a 
sufficient military capability were 'the creation of the best possible system of 
weapons, military and special hardware, and other equipment ensuring the 
enhancement of combat efficiency by means of qualitative indicators and based on 
plans for the organizational development and operational use of the Russian 
Federation Armed Forces and other troops... the anticipatory operational, 
scientific, technical, and economic justification of the requirements for weapons, 
military and special hardware, and other equipment, and also the overall 
requirements of these, taking into consideration the long-term financing of 
research, development, and production'. 
138 The relatively low quality of Russian manufactures meant that they were unable to compete with 
their Western counterparts. On the contrary, 'emerging and fast growing Asian markets are located 
to the south of Russia. They will need Russian energy resources and may accept relatively cheap ... 
Russian machinery and missile, space and nuclear equipment and technologies' (Pikayev, 2000: 3). 
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Economic growth was important not only for the crude maintenance of the 
military machine, but also because it would enable the country to develop more 
broadly as a member of the advanced nations, with an educated, technologically 
proficient and healthy popUlation. The five foreign policy priorities outlined by 
Primakov in March 1998 in a speech to the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy 
included Russia's 'smooth integration into the world economy as an equal 
member ... promoting industrial restructuring, which would be financed primarily 
by increased arms exports; and expanding the amount of Russian capital invested 
abroad' (Hoffman, 2000: 82-83). As Primakov's successor, Ivanov, stated at the 
end of the decade, 'Despite Russia's limited resource base for its foreign policy ... 
we remain fully convinced that Russia still has sufficient grounds on which to build 
itself a dignified place in the world. To achieve this, it is essential that we continue 
to strengthen the Russian state, consolidate Russian society and enter a period of 
sustainable economic growth as soon as possible' (Ivanov, 2000: paragraph 6). Yet 
this was not achieved in the 1990s (hence Ivanov's words), but was in the event an 
uphill and unsuccessful struggle. 
The 2000 Military Doctrine explicitly noted the role of foreign trade in 
reversing the unfavourable situation, stating plainly that 'The main priority in the 
foreign policy of the Russian Federation in international economic relations is to 
promote the· development of the national economy, which, in conditions of 
globalization, is unthinkable without broad integration of Russia in the system of 
world economic ties. In order to achieve these objectives, it is necessary: to ensure 
favourable external conditions for forming a market-oriented economy in our 
country ... Russia shall promote the formation of a fair international trade system 
with a full-fledged participation of the Russian Federation in international 
economic organizations that ensure protection of the national interests of our 
country in those organizations ... Russia shall ... uphold its interests in foreign 
markets and oppose discrimination of domestic manufacturers and exporters' .139 
Given the huge importance of trade with the EU, and the recognized link 
between economic revival and national security, it was logical that Russia's 
relations with the EU were sensitive to the issue of tariff barriers. When they were 
139 The EU is not mentioned in the Military Doctrine adopted in 2000 (Light et aI., 2000b: 501), 
although it is mentioned in the National Security Doctrine of 2000 (see pp.107-108). 
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perceived to be harming Russian economic interests, the Russian elite did belatedly 
come to recognise the potential and threat contained therein. 
Enlargement and the eastward movement of tariff barriers: a rising sense of threat 
In the mid-1990s there was an increasing recognition in Russia of the importance 
of the EU, as expansion became official policy and a timetable was developed. 14o 
Some difficulties in relations did surface. By 1995 there were EU (and Council of 
Europe) criticisms of Russian actions in Chechnya, indignation in Russia over tariff 
barriers and anti-dumping legislation, and later, the issue of Kaliningrad. Belated 
recognition of the promise - and potential harm - of EU enlargement came in 1997 
when the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) was ratified and came 
into effect after three years of delay. The delay between signing and ratification of 
the PCA was mainly a result of the Chechen conflict. 
Some members of the elite (those whose work was related to economics) 
raised the issues that could have a negative impact on Russia's economy. From 
1997 onwards, the issue of trading rights caused increasing resentment in Russia 
(although Russia was given Most Favoured Nation trading status by the EU, some 
anti-dumping legislation remained in place). But as with NATO there was a 
mixture of positive and negative perceptions of the ED among the Russian elite, 
though the balance in this case was finnly towards the positive. Prime Minister 
Chemomyrdin, in July 1997 for example, while calling for Russia to join the EU 
(saying Russia ought to become an EU member in the 'not-too-distant future') and 
stating that Russia and the EU had increasing common interests, added that anti-
dumping measures were extremely unfair to Russia and harmful to Russia's trade. 
In January 1998, Primakov spoke in Brussels at the first session of the EU-
Russia Cooperation Council to discuss trade. He complained of EU discrimination 
140 In 1993 the Copenhagen European Council decided in principle to enlarge the Union to include 
the countries of central and eastern Europe. The Luxembourg European Council 'announced the 
forthcoming accession negotiations in December 1997, and in March 1998 talks began with an 
initial group of six countries: Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia 
(formerly known as the Luxembourg group). Malta, which had withdrawn its original application 
for membership in 1996, resubmitted it in September 1998. The Cardiff European Council of June 
1998 welcomed the European strategy to prepare Turkey for membership. In March 1999 the Berlin 
European Council agreed on the financial instruments to be used as part of the pre-accession 
strategy ... In December 1999 the Helsinki European Council confirmed the importance of the 
enlargement process, in which 13 candidate countries including Turkey would have equal rights' 
(Integration Office Switzerland-Europe. 2003). 
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against Russian goods, and 'told ED foreign ministers that Russia will not meet ED 
demands on cutting import tariffs. The ED has applied anti-dumping duties to more 
than a dozen Russian goods ... [that] Russians estimate costs the country about Sl 
billion annually' (RFEIRL, 28 January 1998). 
Chernomyrdin addressed the Consultative Council on Foreign Investment in 
March 1998. By now the charge was that "'discrimination" against Russia in trade 
policies costs Russia at least $1. 7 billion each year. .. the government considers 
membership in the W orId Trade Organization to be of "vital importance" for the 
economy. However, he said WTO membership will make sense only if the 
"international trade regime" with respect to Russia improves, adding that "our 
obligation to open up our markets will be subj ect to such improvement" ... The ED 
Council of Ministers has postponed indefinitely consideration of whether to 
recognize Russia as a market economy' (NUPI, 16 March 1998). Expansion would 
mean that any protective ED barriers would be moved eastwards, covering the 
newly admitted member states which were of great importance to Russian industry 
in the very recent past, resulting in 'a discriminatory situation for the Russian 
products ... in the Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states as well' 
(Pichugin, 1996: 93).141 In April 1998, Russia (and China) gained concessions from 
the ED in tenns of their market status. 
The major foreign policy documents show how in the official view the ED 
grew in significance over the decade. The potential negative aspects of the 
relationship were clearly expressed in the 1997 and 2000 documents, and a sense of 
increasing economic threat is apparent. The 1997 National Security document 
explicitly noted that 'The share of foreign trade in Russia's GNP has soared 
unprecedentedly; nonetheless, Russia's integration into the global market often 
takes place on unfavourable tenns'. The second item in the section on Russia's 
national security threats states that: 'The current economic crisis is seen as the main 
threat to the Russian Federation's national security'. 
141 The European Commission argued, however, that enlargement of the Union, far from pressing 
the Schengen curtain further east, would in fact be to Russia's economic benefit: 'Different macro-
economic studies have invariably concluded that the effects of enlargement will be positive for the 
Russian economy ... for Russia EU enlargement will simplify and enhance access to the markets of 
current candidate countries as well as to the EU as a whole. Russian companies established in the 
new member states will also be able to open branches in other EG Member States. For investors, 
high standards of protection will be applicable' (European Commission, 2004a). 
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The 2000 National Security Concept again states that Russia's national 
interests may be assured only on the basis of sustainable economic development. 
Therefore 'Russia's national interests in economics are of key importance.' The 
trade issue was seen as fundamental to national security. Threats to the national 
security included 'domination of exports by fuel, raw materials and energy 
components of imports by food and consumer items, including consumer 
essentials .... Of key importance are relations with the European Union (EU). The 
ongoing processes within the EU are having a growing impact on the dynamic of 
the situation in Europe. These are the EU expansion, transition to a common 
currency, the institutional reform, and emergence of a joint foreign policy and a 
policy in the area of security, as well as a defence identity. Russia will seek due 
respect for its interests ... The Russian Federation views the EU as one of its main 
political and economic partners and will strive to develop with it an intensive, 
stable and long-term cooperation devoid of expediency fluctuations ... Concrete 
problems, primarily the problem of an adequate respect for the interests of the 
Russian side in the process of the EU expansion and reform, will be dealt with on 
the basis of the Strategy for the Development of Relations between the Russian 
Federation and the European Union, approved in 1999'. 
The EU's lack of military threat 
One important reason for the generally positive, low-key relationship, in the realist 
perspective, was that the EU was a political and economic union rather than a 
military alliance; and though efforts were made to increase its military clout, these 
came to little, and were perceived in Moscow as amounting to very little. However, 
by the end of the decade it had become clear that the EU's lack of military 
development was closely connected to NATO's continuing presence in Europe, and 
hence that NATO and EU enlargement were intimately connected. EU states spent 
little on defence, apparently assured (despite public rhetoric) that their security was 
guaranteed by NATO. The benefits, as the Russian side saw it, of the EU's lack of 
military threat were nullified by this fact. 
The EU did, however, raise the possibility from time to time in the 1990s of 
creating a purely European army. One way of doing so was through the 
reinvigoration of the nine-nation Western European Union (WEU). In 1991-92, the 
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WEU began increasing its military capabilities in order to be able to undertake 
military missions on behalf of the EU, with a 'defence planning cell, satellite-
interpretation centre and situation centre' (Gordon, 1997b: 257-258). NATO's 
January 1994 declaration that it supported the development of a European Security 
and defence Identity (ESDI), and its June 1996 agreement to create the possibility 
ofWEU-led Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), 'were both important steps in the 
direction of European visibility in international security' (Gordon, 1997b: 259). 
Yet the WEU was and remained an ineffective tool and was incapable of carrying 
out any meaningful operations. The ESDI was seen as a means of increasing 
European countries' independence from the US - both in some European countries 
and in Russia (Khalosha, 2002).142 
The official position, reached after delicate negotiations among European 
countries and between them and Washington, was that 'The Europeans in the 
European Union Treaty concluded in Maastricht have reaffinned their goal of a 
"European Security and Defence Identity" (ESDI) [part of but apart from NATO], 
and at its Summit in April 1999 NATO and the US endorsed that goal. ESDI would 
give strength to another European aspiration: the search for a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (European Security, 2000: paragraph 1). In December 1999, at the 
Helsinki European Council, the EU's planned military capacity acquired the name 
of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). At the Cologne 
European Council in June of that year, EU leaders agreed that 'the Union must 
have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the 
means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO'. 
There is no evidence that the Russian elite saw the development of an EU 
military force as anything other than vaguely positive, because it was a potential 
counterweight to NATO. It was clear to all that the EU did not have the capacity to 
act independently of NATO in any meaningful way. 
142 Interviewed by the author in Moscow on 17 July 2002, Boris Khalosha of the Institute of World 
Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO), suggested that, 
'judging from the documents, many Europeans think that Europe should be independent from the 
US. That's why our government has over recent years conducted negotiations with the Ee.' 
109 
Kaliningrad 
The Kaliningrad exclave became an important issue in Russia-EU relations once it 
became clear that the EU's enlargement, set for early in the 21 st century, would 
mean that this part of the Russian Federation would be completely surrounded by 
EU states; this raised the possibility that Kaliningrad would be physically cut off 
from the rest of the Russian Federation. 
The unique importance of the Kaliningrad region arose as a result of 'its 
history and geopolitical location. During the Cold War it was considered an 
important Soviet military outpost in the confrontation with NATO, and it was one 
of the most highly militarized areas in Europe. The headquarters of the Baltic Sea 
Fleet was (and is) located there); the 11th Guards Army ... was deployed [there], 
(Sergounin, 2000: 1 ). Yet 'the military significance of Kaliningrad has dramatically 
declined in the 1990s. In late 1997 the Kaliningrad Special Defense District (the 
only remnant of the former Baltic Military District) was abolished (including the 
11 th Army). The residual land units were subordinated to the commander of the 
Baltic Sea Fleet, which was radically reduced' (Sergounin, 2000: 1). 
Some nationalists in the Russian elite did perceive a threat in this situation. 
Yet it was equally possible to see positives in the Kaliningrad situation. Trenin's 
call, for example, for Russia to seek to be a part of the new Europe led him to see 
the Kaliningrad issue in a positive light. 'The entry of even one of the Baltic 
countries in the EU ... Would create a situation in which everyone would stand to 
gain ... Russia itself would have one foot in the union. Russian capital occupies a 
solid position in Latvia and Estonia. Russian banks and enterprises are growing 
stronger there. The hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians who would 
undoubtedly be quickly integrated in the new supernational organization could 
become, in the words of a Scandinavian diplomat, the first "Eurorussians". Not 
only Kaliningrad, but the entire Russian north-west, including St Petersburg, would 
get the chance to speed up its development' (Trenin in Moscow Times, July 16 
1997). Such a perception was possible owing to the positive relationship between 
Russia and the EU. It was a good example of the manner in which the EU might 
have been considered a geopolitical threat - and was seen as such by some in 
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Russia - but oWIng to the ED's lack of military capabilities, the issue was 
predominantly viewed (after some negotiations) as one that could be dealt with 
fairly easily. 
The ED was in the main seen to be a worthwhile partner for Russia. Russia 
was sympathetic to the ED's expansion plans because they were not perceived as a 
threat to Russia's national security, and the potential problems over trade and 
Kaliningrad were considered to be surmountable. 
A steadily developing relationship 
Russia and the ED signed a series of important bilateral agreements, which dealt 
with issues of trade, the environment and general political relations. These were a 
product of the generally close and effective interaction that had developed, but 
were subject to a series of delays as Chechnya and other human rights issues, and 
questions of tariff barriers, were raised. Nevertheless, Russian policy moved in a 
fairly untroubled way towards forging a deeper and closer relationship with the EU 
by the end of the decade, in keeping with the manner in which the elite in Russia 
perceived the organisation. 
The early development of formal links: the EU makes the running 
The Russian elite were not particularly interested in the EU, at least in the early 
1990s, and it was Brussels that was 'the real initiator' of relations between Russia 
and the EU. 'Its TACIS Programme, for instance, was the instrument (and the only 
one between 1992-1994) for introducing the EU to Russia's central and provincial 
bureaucrats and businessmen' (Malgin, 2001: paragraph 23). As mentioned, the 
EU was the largest provider of economic and technical assistance to Russia. 'The 
bulk comes from the T ACIS programme in support of the economic and 
democratic reform process in Russia. The focus is on institutional, legal and 
administrative reform, including the development of independent media and civil 
society; fiscal and banking sector reform and social reform ... as well as Russia's 
eventual accession to the [World Trade Organization]' (European Commission, 
2003). 
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Kozyrev made clear his intention of joining at least one European institution 
very early in his tenure as Foreign Minister - not the EU, but the Council of 
Europe: he stated in 1992 that, 'the task of reintegration into the family of 
European civilization and developing a state based on the rule of law mandates that 
Russia join the Council of Europe' (Kozyrev, 1992: 290). Though the Council is 
not an EU institution, it was often seen as being so (confused perhaps with the 
Council of the European Union). Membership of the Council could, however, be 
seen as a positive step towards integration with Europe and to closer relations with 
the Union, and was perhaps used by the EU as a means of reaching out beyond 
formal membership towards the development of closer ties. 143 Membership could 
also be seen as a sop to states that would not be accepted in the near future into the 
EU itself. Russia did manage to join the Council, but only after a stop-start 
sequence of events that snagged on human rights violations perpetrated by the 
Russian side in the Chechen War. 144 
Russian attempts to remove trade barriers 
As noted above, Russia gradually came to understand the importance of trade with 
the EU and the damage that trade barriers could do to Russia's national interests. 
There was therefore powerful motivation to attempt to have these barriers removed. 
Fortunately the EU was keen, for a variety of reasons, to work closely and make 
compromises: the EU was strongly in favour, in fact, of working closely with all of 
the former Soviet countries for political and economic reasons but Russia's 
geopolitical and economic importance made it a priority. 
Russian leaders made public and vociferous arguments against the EU's 
trade restrictions from the mid-1990s onwards, and while Russia was never 
considered for membership of the EU (in which such barriers would be completely 
143 Many eastern European states 'came to regard the Council as the essential "gateway" 
organization for integration with the EU and NATO' (Blocker, 1997: 1-2). 
144 Russia applied for membership of the Council in May 1992 and was accepted in early 1996. An 
official invitation was issued in February of that year. The Russian Duma approved membership on 
21 February, and the Federation Council the next day. Igor Ivanov (then First Deputy Foreign 
Minister) said it was in Russia's national interest to join. Vladimir Lukin (Chairman of the Duma's 
Foreign Affairs Committee) assured colleagues that it would be to Russia's benefit despite the US$ 
25 million annual dues. In Strasbourg a week or so later Russia officially joined. 'From the political 
perspective, the Russian authorities, while recognizing the general importance of joining the 
Council of Europe, were aware that this was not a main priority in the context of ensuring Russia an 
adequate place in the new European architecture' (Zagorski, 1997: 537-538). 
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and automatically removed), the ED did show willingness to make concessions in 
the face of Russian hostility. During talks in Brussels in July 1997, Jacques Santer 
offered to initiate a policy review of restrictions on Russian imports, 'but the 
proposal was dismissed by the Russian side as a "delaying tactic'" (NUPI, 22 July 
1997), although a deal was signed by Chernomyrdin with Distrigas to deliver 500 
million m3 of gas the following year. 'Russia wants the ED to classify it as a 
"market economy" rather than a transition economy, a move that would make it 
more difficult for European producers to bring anti-dumping suits against Russia 
exporters' (NUPI, 22 July 1997). Yeltsin had made the same point a few days 
earlier, and in June 1997 First Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov had refused 
to meet Leon Brittan (European Commission Vice President). There was also a 
continuing row over quotas in the textile trade. 
In April 1998, however, perhaps as a result of these very public complaints, 
and the coming into force of the PCA, 'the foreign ministers of the ED member 
states agreed during a 27 April meeting in Luxembourg to stop classifying Russia 
as a non-market economy ... the change will allow Russian industries to be 
considered on a case-by-case basis when the EU is weighing whether anti-dumping 
penalties are justified' (NUPI, 27 March 1998). The ED supported Russia's 
accession to the WTO, 'which would lead to a further liberalisation of trade, 
lowering of tariffs and adjustments of competition and state aid practices' (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 1999: 1).145 
Finally, in August 1999, the Russian official responsible for working with 
the G8 (Aleksandr Livshits) said that Moscow did not oppose the eastward 
expansion of the EU but wanted 'a voice' in the process so that nothing would be 
done that would 'make anything worse for Russia'. Livshits said that expansion 
'could mean the inclusion of countries which "have historically served as major 
markets for Russia" and that the West acknowledges that "there is a problem" if 
expansion proceeds in ways that fail to take Moscow's concerns into account' 
(RFEIRL, 24 August 1999). The issue had not gone away, and was never resolved, 
145 It should be noted that Russia's often asserted desire to join the WTO was also not helped by the 
following, from the Concept of National Security of 1997: 'The Russian economy must switch oYer 
to the sustainable-development model featuring state regulation of economic processes ... that would 
ensure a well-balanced solution of socio-economic tasks and environmental-protection problems 
with a view to satisfying the requirements of present-day and future generations'. 
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but its impact was lessened by the PCA. The process which led to its eventually 
being signed showed how Russia was prepared to negotiate hard on the issue, 
though it never came anywhere near the importance for the Russian elite of the PtP 
or Founding Act. 
The PCA came into the picture in 1994 after the initial role played by 
TACIS in providing a positive start to Russia-EU relations and the rapid 
development of trade relations. It was the major treaty between Russia and the EU 
of the decade, laying the groundwork for the numerous and 'constant' contacts that 
were to follow. However after the document was signed, the first Chechen 
campaign, which began in December 1994, led to suspension of the ratification 
process of the PCA in EU countries, with only the earlier Interim Agreement 
serving as the basis for future relations. 146 The European Parliament voted on 19 
January 1995 to put the partnership agreement on hold, and the Interim Agreement 
on Trade and Trade-related Matters was to operate until the PCA came into force in 
December 1997. 147 
Chechnya - a temporary problem for EU-Russia relations 
The EU made several statements on Chechnya in early 1995, as the brutal Russian 
campaign led to well-documented human rights abuses. In January, the 
Commission of the EU 'declared it would not forward the Interim Agreement [on 
trade and commercial aspects of the PCA] ... Instead, the commission first wanted 
to discuss freezing the whole matter among EU countries as a protest against 
Russian actions in Chechnya' (Pursiainen, 1999: 149). On 10 January, the Council 
of Europe made the announcement that it was putting Russia's membership 
application on hold. The EU also raised issues of human rights clauses within the 
PCA. On January 17 and January 23 1995, for example, the EU referred to Article 
2: 'Respect for the democratic principles and human rights as defined in particular 
in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe underpin the 
internal and external policies of the Parties ... the Partnership Agreement itself was 
146 Up to that point relations were regulated by the Interim Trade Agreement, which 'provided 
WTO-based treatment for EU-Russia trade, removing many restrictions previously imposed on 
exports to the EU' (European Commission, 2000). 
147 The PCA, it was hoped, would lead to improvements in this field. In fact, after the PCA came 
into effect trade remained consistent \\ith its pre-PCA levels, both in terms of imports to and exports 
from Russia. 
114 
not in force, however. .. and "sources" from the Commission infonned journalists 
in December 1994 that because of this, appeal could not be made to the articles of 
the agreement referring to human and minority rights' (Pursiainen, 1999: 135, 
footnote 96). 
At the Istanbul OSCE summit in November 1999, there were criticisms of 
Russian actions in Chechnya that led to an angry response from Yeltsin. As 
Izvestiia reported (19 November 1999), 'Yeltsin left Istanbul and the OSCE 
summit with a smile on his face but he was angry. He listened to what Chirac and 
Schroeder had to say about Chechnya and then he got up and left'. In December 
Izvestiia reported that Chechnya and ED were the main themes in Helsinki. 'On the 
eve of the summit, two positions were being expressed about the Chechen conflict. 
One was to put the harshest pressure possible on Russia, and imposing sanctions 
and to recall all ED ambassadors from Russia. The second was to condemn that 
war in Chechnya and leave the sanctions for later. The second position won ... 
Sergei Shoigu 148 has offered to enter negotiations with Maskhadov149 and Russia is 
willing to accept criticism from the West which means that there is no need for 
confrontation'. The two sides had made concessions, and in the end a joint 
communique was issued that included the bland comment: 'The European Dnion 
and the Russian Federation exchanged views on the situation in the Northern 
Caucasus.' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 1999). The rest of the 
communique dealt with general matters. In other words, Chechnya had ceased to be 
an important issue, and it was merely on the level of the faintest of rhetorical 
criticisms that any reproach was to be made from then on. 
Towards the end of Yeltsin's period as President, in October 1999, the 
Finnish Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen 'warned Moscow that its ongoing 
offensive against Chechen rebels and its failure to meet human rights obligations 
more generally could impede the building of stronger Russian-ED ties' (NUPI, 12 
October 1999). Yet again it was clear that 'the most important aspect of the crisis 
may have been that the ED and Russia confinned their willingness and ability to 
follow a course of cooperation in spite of deep disagreement in a sensitive area 
148 Minister of Civil Defence, State Emergencies and Natural Disasters. 
149 Leader of the Chechen forces, and winner of presidential elections in the republic in 1997. 
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which is and will in the near future be much more vulnerable than trade and 
economic matters' (Borko, 1997: 482). 
Ratification of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
Prior to the signing of the PCA in 1994, the President of Russia, the European 
Council and the European Commission had (in November 1993) signed a Political 
Declaration that provided a basis for 'permanent political dialogue and a system of 
regular consultations at different levels on the whole spectrum of political, 
economic and other issues of mutual interest' (Danilov & de Spiegeleire, 1998: 9). 
With the start of peace negotiations in the Chechen republic, the ratification 
process resumed: in October-November 1996 the PCA was ratified by the State 
Duma and the Federation Council, in October 1997 its ratification was completed 
by the EU member-states' (Delegation of the European Commission's to Russia, 
2004). When the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation with the EU was 
finally ratified by the Duma in October 1996, Vladimir Lukin declared that it 'was 
no less important than START II' (Donaldson & Nogee, 2000: 254). This view is 
justified on two counts. 
First, the PCA paved the way for Russia's accession to the World Trade 
Organization and led to improved trading rights for Russia with the EU, which 
would be even more important once expansion got under way. The Agreement 
stated, in its preamble, that 'Considering the commitment of the Parties to 
liberalize trade, based on the principles contained in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade ... and taking into account the establishment of the [World Trade 
Organization]. .. Recognizing that Russia is no longer a state trading country ... 
[but] a country with an economy in transition and that continued progress towards a 
market economy will be fostered by cooperation between the Parties in the forms 
set out in this Agreement ... have agreed [in Article 1] to promote trade and 
investment and harmonious economic relations between the Parties based on the 
principles of market economy and so to foster sustainable development in the 
Parties' (The European Commission, 2004b). Under the terms of the PCA, 'Russia 
receives far better treatment from the EU than from its other major trading partners, 
as it has Most-Favoured Nation status, whereby no quantitative limitations are 
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applied except on exports of certain steel products (which represent only 4% of 
bilateral trade)' (European Commission's Delegation to Russia, 2004). 
Second, improved economic relations would lead to stronger political ties 
(Borko, 1997: 481). The PCA drew Russia more closely into the European political 
framework and hence gave it a formal place in Europe. I50 It went into great detail 
on the political aspects of the relationship, establishing, 'an institutional, political 
and administrative framework to facilitate all forms of bilateral cooperation 
between Russia and the EU ... [and aiming] to develop close political relations by 
starting regular dialogue on political issues' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Finland, 1999: 1). The whole process therefore represented something of a victory 
for Russian diplomacy. 
The signing of the PCA took place at the same time as the PiP (Jensen, 
2001: 8). It was complemented by two 'unilaterally adopted "strategies" addressed 
by each side to the other. Russia's attitude towards the EU's forthcoming 
enlargement, unlike that of NATO, was illustrated by the fact that 'paradoxically, 
for a time Moscow seemed to welcome this prospect even more enthusiastically 
than the EU's participants did - apparently, as a preferable alternative to the 
enlargement of NATO' (Baranovsky, 2000: 452). 
The EU Common Strategy and Russia's Medium-Term Strategy 
Russia was selected as the EU's first partner for a Common Strategy, adopted by 
the Union in areas where members have important common interests. The EU-
Russia Strategy came into existence in June 1999 at the Cologne Summit, and 
formed, along with the PCA, the political basis for EU-Russia relations. The 
Common Strategy 'uses the PCA channels and is meant to reinvigorate the PCA. It 
also properly reformulates the overall economic objective of the PCA by calling for 
the creation of a "common economic and social space" in Europe' (Prodi, 2000). 
150 In May 1996 'the EU Council of Ministers approved an Action Plan for Russia ... In the area of 
security in Europe, a provision was made for "security working group" troika meetings wi~ Russia, 
the fIrst of which took place on 10 October 1996 and focused on cooperation in the elaborahon of a 
"Security Model for the twenty-fIrst century" within the OSCE framework, where the EU . 
underlined its interest in the "full involvement of Russia in the development of a comprehenSIve 
security architecture in which Russia has its due place". These ... meetings with Russia have taken. 
place at regular intervals [and] at no point did the turbulent negotiations between ~ A TO and RUSSIa 
in the period 1995-1997 affect this EU-Russia dialogue' (Danilov & de Spiegeleire, 1998: 9). 
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The Russian response to the EU was made in its 'Medium-Term Strategy 
for the Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the 
European Union (2000-2010) - overall the Russian response in this document was 
positive, but did contain tough language in keeping with the 'independent' 
'consensus' style of foreign policy and the usual areas of contention with the EU. 
Indeed, 'compared to the EU strategy, the Russian declaration contains important 
differences ... Whereas the EU Strategy sees the intensification of EU-Russian 
relations as a means for the strengthening of a liberal and democratic world order, 
the Russian Strategy underlines the goals of creation of a "multipolar world" and 
improvement of "economic security"... In more concrete terms, the Russian 
declaration also contains considerations, which are not in accordance with the 
views of the EU, for example that the EU-Russia cooperation should contribute to 
the consolidation of the Russian role as leading force in the creation of a new 
system for intergovernmental relations inside the CIS area'" (Jensen, 2001: 10). 
The history of the two strategic documents that appeared at the end of the 
1990s shows to what extent there were common views on important areas, and 
where lines of disagreement between the EU and Russia remained. The Medium-
Term Strategy demonstrates that Russia saw its relations with the EU as a 
reasonably important part of its foreign policy goals. It did not set down any hopes 
of joining the EU, but discussed 'the objective need to establish a multipolar world, 
common histories of nations and responsibility of Europe states for the future of the 
continent, and complementarity of their economies. It is also directly coordinated 
with the concept of economic security of Russia' .151 The Strategy was 'primarily 
aimed at insuring national interests and enhancing the role and image of Russia in 
Europe and the world through establishing the reliable pan-European system of 
collective security, and at mobilizing the economic potential and managerial 
experience of the European Union to promote the development of a socially 
oriented market economy of Russia based on the fair competition principles and 
further construction of a democratic rule-of law state'. This line of thinking was 
also seen in the 1997 and 2000 foreign policy and national security documents -
the Medium-Tenn Strategy claimed to be 'a consistent evolution of the general 
151 These and the following quotations taken from the European Commission·s translation of the 
Medium-Term Strategy at: 
http://www.europa.eu.inticommJextemalrelations/russianmediumtermstrategyindex.htm. 
118 
foreign policy concept of Russia in the European area' - and is therefore a very 
clear expression of the Russian official viewpoint in this area. 
Section 1 discussed in detail the strategic character of the Russia-ED 
partnership. 'As a world power situated on two continents, Russia should retain its 
freedom to determine and implement its domestic and foreign policies, its status 
and advantages of a Euro-Asian state and the largest country of the CIS. 
independence of its position and activities at international organizations. From this 
point of view, partnership with the EU can manifest itself in joint efforts to 
establish an effective system of collective security in Europe on the basis of 
equality without dividing lines, including through the development and 
implementation of the Charter on European Security'. The Strategy maintained that 
'Efforts will continue to be made for further opening of the EU's market to Russian 
exports, elimination of the remaining discrimination in trade ... protection of 
Russia's legitimate interests ... opposing possible attempts to hamper economic 
integration in the CIS ... to the detriment of Russia's interests'. It also suggested 
that 'the development of partnership with the EU should continue consolidating 
Russia's role as a leading power in shaping a new system of. .. political and 
economic relations in the CIS area', and thus made reference to the touchy subject 
of Russia's right to dominate the former Soviet space. The general tone of no-
nonsense defence of Russian interests was repeatedly made in phrases such as 
'Russia asserts its keenness to act in partnership with and support efforts made by 
the EU in the areas that are important for it where interests of the parties 
objectively concur'. 
Mention was made of NATO, in both a positive and negative manner. In 
section 1.5 it is asserted that 'the following steps [should] be made in the 
forthcoming decade: to ensure pan-European security by the Europeans themselves 
without both isolation of the United States and NATO and their dominance on the 
continent; to work out Russia's position on the "defence identity" of the European 
Union with the Western European Union to be included in it. .. to promote practical 
cooperation in the area of security (peacemaking, crisis settlement, various aspects 
of arms limitation and reduction, etc.) which could counterbalance, inter alia, the 
NATO-centrism in Europe'. 
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Section 5 dealt with 'Securing the Russian interests in an expanded 
European Union', and in this regard discussed 'Taking into account the ambivalent 
impact of the European Union's expansion on the terms of its cooperation with 
Russia and on Russian interests, to strive for achieving the best advantages of such 
expansion (lower customs protectionism, civilized transit standards, etc) while 
preventing, eliminating or setting off possible negative consequences'. 
The EU's response to this document was to welcome it, declaring that it 
highlighted 'the significance both sides attach to a close political and economic 
partnership and its further development within the framework of the PCA. They are 
based on common values such as respect of the principles of democracy and human 
rights, the rule of law and the market economy and share the common objectives of 
enhancing political stability and economic prosperity in Europe' . 
The CIS 
Russia made an effort, at least for a few years, to retain its economic interests in the 
CIS (as well as for geostrategic and geopolitical reasons outlined in Chapter 5). As 
the Medium-Term Strategy repeatedly asserted, Russia saw its economic rights in 
this region as an important part of its foreign policy. Russia was not reacting to a 
military threat from the EU. But, as noted in Chapter 2, a state will be sensitive to 
efforts by outside parties to undermine its economic influence. Thus Russia might 
have been expected to aim for closer economic control of the CIS if it felt that the 
EU was infringing on Russian interests in this area. It might have attempted to 
establish some kind of economic union to balance against the EU, and in which it 
would have the trading rights denied it in the West. In fact, as noted in Chapter 5, 
Russia's commitment to the CIS was uneven and half-hearted in the economic field 
as well as in security. 
Economically, the fall of the Soviet Empire left in place the unique ties that 
had been formed over 70 years of a centralised command economy. The Central 
Asian states had become in general terms raw material providers to the Slavic 
states and providers of a market for the manufactured goods of the Slavs. As these 
goods were not welcome to consumers in the EU, there was a rationale for 
maintaining links to the CIS. The key factors were oil and gas. Russia was '."ery 
keen to prevent Western and other companies obtaining e\:clusiye rights to the 
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gigantic hydrocarbon supplies of the Caspian basin. Economic pressure was 
immediately placed on the CIS states to comply with Russia's demands for 
increased economic cooperation after the shattering of the Union itself. 152 
The links between the republics and Russia were often tighter than those 
among the republics themselves or even those within individual republics. For 
example, Kazakhstan, with its northern regions dominated by industry and a Slavic, 
mainly Russian population, exported some of the oil drilled in the West of the 
country to refineries in Russia while receiving unrefined oil from the Russian Far 
East. The economic structure of individual republics had also been designed to slot 
into a Union system centred on European Russia in terms of goods produced. 
Uzbekistan, converted into a purely cotton-growing region under the Soviets, was 
reliant on the market of Russia to sell its cotton. And indeed, it still was in the 
1990s. 'All states depend upon Russia for imports of industrial products, consumer 
goods and food. Russia is also the largest export market, and overall accounts for 
over half of the trade of each Central Asian state' (Kubicek, 1997: 640). The 
Caucasian states were in a similar position. For Russia too, the sudden shattering of 
economic ties, as well as unconstrained printing of the rouble by other CIS states, 
was seen as exacerbating Russia's economic problems and thus to many required 
the reassertion of some form of control. 
Russia used its economic power to bring the CIS states into line. In early 
1994 Moscow cut off Turkmenistan's gas supplies to Europe, which was part of the 
reason why in February 1996 the 'Russian company Gazprom and the 
Turkmenistan Ministry of Oil and Gas established Turkmenrosgaz which not only 
obtained the sole right to prospect for and extract hydrocarbon deposits but has also 
acquired the right to make agreements with CIS countries for the delivery of 
Turkmen natural gas' (Bolukbasi, 1998: 407). By the beginning of 1993, 'many 
CIS states shared with Yeltsin the view that the recession all had experienced 
enforced the need for economic cooperation, a view consolidated in the Economic 
Union Treaty signed by nine states' (Sakwa & Webber, 1999: 386). 
The 1991 Alma-Ata declaration of the goal of a 'single economic space' 
appeared promising because of the 'high levels of mutual interdependence' and the 
152 As noted, the EU very quickly came to dominate Russian trade at the expense of the CIS. In 
1997 only 21.5% of Russia's total trade turnover was conducted \\ith other CIS states (the 
equivalent figure in 1990 was 63%). 
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'objective necessity for cooperation' (Sakwa & Webber, 1999: 386). The first two 
years of the existence of the CIS, however, illustrated just how weak these factors 
were when placed against the equally pressing imperatives of asserting national 
economic sovereignty and giving priority to tackling domestic economic crises. 
During 1992 'the CIS economic area crumbled as countries moved to the market at 
different, uncoordinated speeds, [and] severed trade and production links in pursuit 
of autarchic economic strategies' (Sakwa & Webber, 1999: 386). By 1997 the 
Economic Union had withered and trade had been subject to continuous decline. 
No stable common tariff on mutual trade was ever established. 153 
If Russia saw the CIS as some sort of rival or counterweight to the EU, then 
it was mistaken. Economic union failed owing to mutual lack of interest as all 
parties sought to increase links abroad where they might be more profitable. 
Russian enthusiasm for economic union had quickly worn off and been replaced by 
the simple desire to have a piece of the hydrocarbon pie. The EU did not play a 
major role in influencing this process. 
The military realm 
Russia manifested little interest in the EU's efforts to boost its military power 
independently of NATO. What interest it did show was aimed at increasing EU-
Russia cooperation as a way of diminishing NATO's influence. To Russia, 
establishing a closer security relationship with Western Europe was an important 
element in stimulating multipolarity in world politics. While the EU or WEU was 
'not seen as presenting a security threat to Russia' (Danilov & de Spiegeleire, 
1998: 3-4), it did mean that the EU received some attention from Russia for this 
reason, 'stimulating tendencies to play Western states off against one another. By 
the end of 1997, Yeltsin was talking openly in European capitals about the need to 
reduce US influence in "our Europe'" (Donaldson & Nogee, 2000: 248). 
When the countries of central and eastern Europe 'including the three Baltic 
countries, were offered Associate partner status in the WEU in May 1994 ... 
153 Examples of intra-regional co-operation did come into being, but many focused on bilateral 
treaties or small groups of states within the CIS. These include the 1994 agreement between 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to create a common economic space (in 1995 they created 
the Interstate Council and a Central Asian Bank of Co-operation). Recent years have also seen the 
economic treaty between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan gaining ground. 
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Kozyrev stated that Russia had no objections to this move' (Danilov & de 
Spiegeleire, 1998: 6). In October 1995 Kozyrev also wrote a letter to Javier Solana 
, 
Chairman-in-Office of the WED Council of Ministers, saying that 'Russia sees ""in 
the strengthening of contacts with WED, one of the promising ways of establishing 
a genuine partnership in European affairs'" (Danilov & de Spiegeleire, 1998: 11). 
Kozyrev also suggested creating a Russia-WED Consultative Council and offered 
to provide Russian satellite intelligence to the WED ... [which was] entirely 
dependent on DS satellite data provided through NATO' (Moscow Times, 2 
December 1994). 
In September 1997, Yeltsin stated that 'he would like to see US 
involvement in European security issues curbed. He said NATO is the means by 
which the DS exercised its influence on European security. He again expressed his 
opposition to NATO's eastward expansion, noting that "Russia advocates a multi-
polar world" ... [and] warned he will stress at the upcoming Council of Europe 
summit in Strasbourg that Europeans should take responsibility for their own 
security' (NUPI, 18 September 1997). Izvestiia commented (16 November 1999) 
that the creation of a European army would be 'a good thing' because it would 
'create an independent defence structure independent from the US. If it was to be 
pan-European then Russia could not be ignored' . 
Yet apart from comments such as these, no major interest was manifested in 
Russia. This was partly the consequence of Russia focusing its foreign policy on 
other aspects of security relations with the West that were considered essential 
(NATO, the role of the UN and the OSCE chief among them). To some extent it 
can also be explained by Russia's 'scepticism about the ED's stated intention to 
become a more independent actor in the European security arena, especially in the 
area of defense policy ... This component of the Western military structure simply 
was not taken into account by the Russian military planning bodies' (Danilov, 
2001: 1). 
As surveys have shown, the Cologne European Council meeting made little 
impression in Russia. 'Even when asked directly in September about what the 
implications would be for Russia, the foreign policy elite revealed little awareness 
of the EU's intention to develop a military capacity. No alarm was expressed. 
Foreign ministry officials directly concerned with the EU were better informed, but 
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in September 1999 they seemed preoccupied with the consequences of exclusion to 
Russia's economic security, and relatively unconcerned about more traditional 
forms of security, particularly in relation to the ED' (Light et aI., 2000: 8). 
However, 'The authors of Russia's Medium-Term Strategy were clearly well-
informed on the subject ... [yet] took a positive view of the prospect of the CFSP 
acquiring a defence aspect.' The preamble to the Medium-Term strategy, as noted 
above, maintains that a 'strategic partnership' between Russia and the EU can 
achieve a 'pan-European system of collective security based on "equality without 
dividing lines"' ... The Medium-Term Strategy also calls, in section 1.5.2, for 
practical cooperation with the WED in the area of security "which could 
counterbalance ... the NATO-ism in Europe". In other words, a military aspect to 
the CFSP was perceived to offer an alternative European security structure, which 
would diminish NATO's importance in Europe' (Light et aI., 2000: 8-9). 
It was only in December 1999, at the Helsinki European Council, after 
delicate negotiations with Washington, that the ED decided to upgrade the Union's 
military capability by means of the Common European Security and Defence 
Policy (CESDP). It aimed 'to provide the European union with the civilian and 
military capabilities necessary for the conduct of a wide range of humanitarian, 
peace-keeping and peace-enforcement operations ... open to the participation of 
like-minded partners of the EU (international organisations, non-EU NATO 
members and EU candidate countries, as well as key partners like Russia)' 
(European Commission's Delegation to Russia, 2004). Helsinki established the 
'headline goal' that the EU would have the capacity to deploy, within 60 days, and 
sustain for at least one year, a force of up to 60,000 personnel, the European rapid 
reaction capability (to be established by 2003). 
The ESDP did seem to offer 'the hope of a counter to "NATO-centrism" 
and participation was seen as a way of obtaining a voice in EU structures and even 
of transforming it into a sort of semi-formal pan-European security arrangement' 
(Kalland, 2004: 7). But the Russians 'were deceiving themselves in thinking that 
the Western system was a kind of balance in which "increasing the 'European' 
weight would automatically weaken the American side of the balance". In fact, 
increasing the European weight was only possible because it would not undermine 
the Transatlantic link' (Light et al. 2000: 9). It was soon to become clear that the 
12-+ 
EU did not intend the CESDP to be an addition to NATO. Javier Solana, for 
example, was appointed EU High Representative for Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (Danilov, 2001: 5). Officially, the line was that 'The success of 
crisis management, which will comply with the United Nations Charter, depends 
on the collaboration with ... NATO, since the EU will have to use NATO resources 
, 
including military capabilities, operation planning capabilities and so on' 
(European Union, 2002b). Thus Russia's hopes of using the EU's developing 
military potential as a means of weakening NATO were, at least in the 1990s, ill-
founded. 
Kaliningrad: symbol of Russia-EU relations 
The Kaliningrad exclave became an important issue in Russia-EU relations once it 
became clear that the EU's expansion, set for early in the 21 st century, would mean 
that this part of the Russian Federation would be completely surrounded by EU 
states. The issue became a thorny one. Official Russian reaction to the situation in 
Kaliningrad came in the Medium-term Strategy, where 'Kaliningrad is mentioned 
as a test-case for future cooperation with the EU. Yet the fear of potential 
Kaliningrad separatism, which could result from the oblast's closer relationship 
with the EU, is still strong in Moscow, and prevents the central government from 
implementing bolder initiatives' (Sergounin, 2000: 6). 
The Strategy states that 'In contacts with the EU [Russia will] pay special 
attention to securing protection, including under the international law, of the 
interests of the Kaliningrad region as an entity of the Russian Federation and of the 
territorial integrity of Russia'. Section 6.6 suggests that the two sides need to 
'continue developing the pan-European transport corridors, first of all corridor No. 
1 (in particular, its laterals to Riga- Kaliningrad- Gdansk) ... To try to ensure that 
these and other infrastructure projects are funded by the European Investment 
Bank'. Section 8.3 devotes itself specifically to Kaliningrad: 'Given [the] special 
geographical and economic situation of the Kaliningrad region, to create the 
necessary external conditions for its functioning and development as an integral 
part of the Russian Federation and an active participant in the transboundary and 
interregional co-operation ... To pursue a line to the conclusion, if appropriate, of a 
special agreement with the EU in safeguarding the interests of the Kaliningrad 
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region as an entity of the Russian Federation in the process of the Ee expansion as 
well as to its transformation into a Russian pilot region within the framework of the 
Euro-Russian cooperation in the 21 st century.' The language of the Medium-Term 
Strategy is therefore positive with regards to the Kaliningrad issue: the suggestion 
is that there would be little problem in securing the interests of Russia in this area 
with the agreement of the Union. 
Kaliningrad is a perfect example of how, by the end of the decade, Russia-
EU relations had developed. Russia saw the EU in positive terms, even though, by 
1999, the potential pitfalls in the relationship were evident. Such pitfalls were dealt 
with in a practical manner. The Russia-EU relationship in general developed along 
lines that roughly fit the realist analysis. Despite the fact that realism is not explicit 
in its predictions of the influence of economics on foreign policy, Russia's policy 
towards the EU could be seen as a form of economic bandwagoning. The Russian 
leadership gradually increased its focus on the EU as it became clear that without 
close economic ties with the EU the Russian economy would never be rebuilt. 
Unlike NATO, however, and owing to its military weakness, the EU was never 
perceived as a threat, was never seen as part of the imbalance of power, and hence 
was relegated to a lower position on the list of priorities. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE SEARCH FOR THE RUSSIAN IDEA AND POST-SOVIET 
FOREIGN POLICY 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 used the realist framework to attempt an explanation of the 
research questions. The following three chapters do so using the constructivist 
framework outlined in Chapter 3. 
National identity has a powerful influence on foreign policy because it 
frames the way foreign policy-makers see the world and what they regard as the 
required foreign policy. It forms the basis for what are considered to be national 
interests. Although it is constantly in a state of reproduction and evolution, and 
there can never be a homogeneous vision of the national identity, there are always 
stable aspects to it - it is made up of a relatively stable set of shared understandings 
on the subj ect of 'us' and 'them'. Moreover, some members of society have more 
influence over national identity than others: the cultural and policy-making elite, 
who promote a favoured interpretation of that identity over others. 
In the Russia of 1991 many of the issues relating to national identity were 
more contested than is often the case in settled societies. With the sudden change in 
the international and domestic situation, and the lack of stable institutions of 
authority, these issues were subject to a great deal of conflict. 
Russian national identity in the post-Cold War world - resurrecting the past 
The end of the Soviet Union: raising crucial issues of identity 
On 31 December 1991 Russia lost its position as the heartland of a huge system 
controlled from Moscow - the Soviet Union plus, to a lesser but nevertheless 
important degree, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation states. 154 This rupture left 25 
154 Sometimes called the 'inner' and 'outer' empires. 
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million or so Russians155 living outside the new country's borders. However, a 
'fundamental ambiguity over the definition and status of Russians abroad ... 
reflects ambiguity over the identity of Russia itself (Sakwa, 1996: 36). Russians 
living outside the Federation's borders were quickly to become a cause celi~bre for 
those lamenting the loss of Russia's prestige and status in the world. 'The largest 
European nation, with a long record of imperial domination, suddenly became a 
divided people with vulnerable peripheral groups. It is only natural that such a 
historical development would be extremely painful for Russian national identity' 
(Rudensky, 1994: 58). The borders themselves were seen by many as artificial. 156 
They were also glaring evidence of Russia's fall from grace as the centre of a vast 
empire and core of one of the world's superpower states. Russians often referred to 
the former Soviet Union as the 'near abroad', thus marking the area out as a 
separate arena for foreign policy from the rest of the world. The Soviet empire had 
been destroyed and Russia found itself facing its future with the dimensions of the 
pre-Romanov state. 
Very quickly, matters of borders and irredentism 'rose to the top of the 
national interest debate' (Tuminez, 1996: 57). Russia's borders required urgent 
clarification, because despite the fact that 'borders are superficial by definition ... 
for a post-imperial country such as Russia, the issue of borders is intimately linked 
to the nature of the political regime, the structure of the state, and the pattern of 
foreign relations' (Trenin, 2001: 28). Russia had lost the 'landmarks that helped the 
nation to find its way' (Rubanov, 1999: 72). The result was 'a picture of a deep 
identity crisis, a crisis of the nation, its spirit and self-consciousness' (Lebedenko, 
2004: 72).157 
While in many former Soviet republics nationalism had become a powerful 
force and had been one of the catalysts for the very destruction of the Soviet 
155 The usual number given is 25 million; see for example, figures given in Kommersant (31 \1arch 
1993) for each former Soviet republic, which add up to just over 25 million; also de Tinguy (200·+: 
365). See also Szporluk (1994:12), and Luzhkov (Argumenti i Fakti, No. 11, March 1993). 
Roshchin (Komsomolskaia Pravda, 4 February 1993) used the number 29 million. According to 
Goskomstat figures (cited in de Tunguy [2004: 370]), the total immigration to the Russian 
Federation from former Soviet republics totalled 4.8 million between 1990 and 2002. 
156 Notably Crimea, 'given' to Ukraine by Khrushchev. In July 1993 the Russian Supreme Soviet 
passed a resolution calling for a reassertion of Russian control over Sevastopol and overturning the 
deal struck between Yeltsin and Kravchuk to divide the Black Sea Fleet (Kortunov, 2004: paragraph 
69). . . 
157 Acting Deputy Director, Department for Cultural Relations and CNESCO Affairs in the \lIrustry 
of Foreign Affairs. 
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system, in Russia it was weak and lacking coherence.158 There was a clear desire 
by the state and all political groups to find a new and powerful 'idea' for Russia 
that could unite and motivate the nation in the face of its troubles (Thibault & 
Levesque, 1997).159 Yet even by 1994 Izvestiia was still claiming that, "'the 
Russian question - that is the most important problem of Moscow diplomacy in the 
new year".160 Communism had been overthrown, but in the difficult circumstances 
in which the Russian nation found itself in 1992, it was a complicated and difficult 
process to build a positive national alternative (Szporluk, 1994: 8-9). Russia had to 
build a national identity rather than a Soviet or Tsarist empire, and this proved a 
painful task. Russia's sense of national identity, for historical reasons, was 'weak 
before the creation of the Soviet Union and tightly bound with the Soviet vision. [It 
became] even less clear after the Soviet collapse' (Ponarin, 1999: 1). 
In July 1996, after his victory in the presidential elections, Yeltsin 'gathered 
his top campaign aides: '''in Russia's history in the twentieth century" he told them 
"there have been various periods - monarchism, totalitarianism, perestroika, and, 
finally, the democratic path of development. Each epoch had its own ideology. 
[But] now we don't have one. And that's bad." Accordingly, they were instructed 
to "give Russia an idea'" (Urban, 1998: 969), and he created a commission to find 
a national idea. In the end, 'the commission ... quietly dropped its original intention 
of drawing up a preliminary sketch for public discussion and [instead decided 
on] ... a long-term research project, according to which it would catalogue and 
evaluate the national ideas put forward by democrats and centrists, communists and 
patriots' (Urban, 1998: 983). Rossiiskaia Gazeta (the government's official daily 
newspaper161) launched a nationwide appeal for ideas on the theme. 
The feeling was sometimes expressed that the very existence of the nation 
was at stake. The question of national identity assumed the form of an urgent need 
to discover what Russia was, where its borders should be, who were the Russian 
people. These questions were never entirely settled (and never can be) but a version 
acceptable to many in the Russian elite had been found by the mid-1990s. 
158 See Prizel (1998: 177) and Dunlop (2000: 2). 
159 See also Prizel (1998), Williams & Neumann (2000: 364), Eggert (2002). 
160 Cited in Szporluk (1994: 12). 
161 RFEIRL Russian Media Empires Ill, 1998. 
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The elite and guardianship of national identity in Yeltsin's Russia 
Defining the national interest and ensuring a successful foreign policy is considered 
by members of the nation and outsiders to be the business of officials within the 
structures of the state. A~ well as the state foreign policy elite, the wider cultural 
elite of journalists, academics and religious figures is influential because it adopts 
and is accorded the authority to expound upon issues of national significance, 
although the ideas propounded by the elite must have wider resonance to be 
successful. Owing to the struggle in Russia over the constitution and particularly in 
the situation of dvoevlastie (dual power) before the showdown of 1993 there was a 
great deal of confusion and competition among members of official power 
structures. 162 
The early Yeltsin period built on and wrestled with structures and personnel 
inherited from the Soviet period (the elite dominating the new state was made up of 
many of the same people who had dominated the old Soviet state, raising questions 
as to the depth of the revolution); many of the political battles of the time were 
fought to establish which of them had authority, against the backdrop of the launch 
of 'shock therapy' and severe political conflict. Severe struggles for power took 
place, even after the 1993 conflict and its resolution in favour of the presidency. 
The President and his administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry 
of Defence, economic and atomic agencies, the regions, the Security Council, the 
Defence Council, the Council of Ministers, powerful economic interests and 
parliament, all vied for power in the new Russia. After the 1993 political conflict, 
Yeltsin was able to gather more power into the central bodies of his regime and 
rationalise to some extent foreign policy-making. In terms of state-building, the 
decade might be characterised as demonstrating an uneven drift towards 
centralisation of power in the president's hands (see Chapter 4 for details ).163 
162 At the end of 1993 the conflict between President and Parliament came to a head with the siege 
and consequent violence around Moscow, culminating in the shelling of the White House and 
surrender of those inside. Crucial to this victory for Yeltsin was the support of the army. The 
violence was followed by a referendum on a new constitution and later by elections to the new 
Federation Council as prescribed in the constitution. One notable aspect of politics in Russia after 
this point was Yeltsin's increased power if not authority as president, and the achievement of 
consensus in foreign policy, which was achieved notably by a change in the line being propagated 
by the foreign policy elite. 
163 Parkhalina (interviewed by the author in Moscow, 12 July 2002) argued that it would take a 
generational change to bring about a change in Russian perceptions of the West and hence foreign 
130 
At the same time, the sudden freedom experienced by the media, the 
discrediting of Soviet ideology and democratic elections led to a burst of argument 
in which many voices fought to be heard. Leading journals and newspapers were 
also important mouthpieces for elite interests and others to disseminate their 
views. 164 
The Russian idea: historical roots 
The familiarity of the debates in the 1990s shows how Russians have looked both 
consciously and unconsciously to the past to understand their present. The elite 
discourse which developed in the Yeltsin period very clearly reflected Russian 
thought of the previous two centuries, showing the importance of interpretation of 
the past in understanding the present; 165 and in influencing what those in the 
present saw as guidelines for rebuilding the Russian nation. 
The 19th century thinkers who established ideas such as Slavophilism and 
Westernism were of course themselves drawing on a more distant past, but it was 
here that the origins of the modem debate were to be found. Many of the debates 
originating with 19th century liberals, socialists, nationalists and statists, were very 
much alive in the 1990s, as shown by the popUlarity of reprinted works by thinkers 
such as Solovev and Danilevskii, and political arguments along Westemiser-
Slavophile lines. 166 
After centuries of development, sometimes consciously seeking to imitate 
Western systems of government, economic production and war-making, sometimes 
retreating into isolation - of glories and disasters, modernisation and stagnation -
Russia, in the 19th century, had come to be accepted as a European Great Power. 
policy. Attitudes to the West were ingrained in the diplomatic corps in the 1990s as a result of their 
Soviet education. 
164 A controlling stake in the daily newspaper Izvestiia, for example, was held by the 'oligarch' 
Vladimir Potanin's Oneximbank. A controlling stake of the newspaper Nezavisimaia Gazeta was 
held by Boris Berezovskii's LogoVAZ Industrial-Financial Group through its subsidiary 
Obedinionny bank (details from Russian Media Empires, May 1998). The journal International 
Affairs, with the current Foreign Minister as chief editor, and various other members of the Foreign 
Ministry and other high-ranking civil servants and academics on the editorial board, was a 
mouthpiece for the diplomatic elite. 
165 In Russia, this looking to the past is a very obvious part of the national culture. Like the Poles, 
for Russians 'It is a long-established tradition ... [to] debate and assess contemporary problems 
through the prism of their recurrent historical... dilemmas' (Sanford, 1999: 1). 
166 Danilevskii's 'Russia and Europe' was republished for example, and the contemporary work 
'Why Russia is not America' (by Andrei Parshin) became a bestseller. 'One gets the impression that 
Russia entered the 21 st century from the 20th and through the 19th centuries' (Trenin, 2004: 11). 
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This was largely a result of the defeat of Napoleon and the entry of Russian troops 
into Paris as part of the victorious alliance. 167 Russia continued its expansion 
southwards too, in the 19th century, conquering territories in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus. These exploits were recorded by Pushkin, Lermontov and Tolstoi (of 
whom only the last was critical of Russian imperialism). But the abortive invasion 
by Napoleon's Grande Armee was the latest manifestation of Russia's troubled 
relations with Europe. 168 
The 19th century was also the century of nationalism, when industrialisation 
and modernisation led to the development of national consciousness in European 
countries through the broadening of electoral politics, urbanisation and increasing 
literacy.169 Russia's development was different. The state, as distinct from the 
nation, enforced top-down versions of an official state national ideology on a 
variety of peoples, few of whom developed any kind of Russian national 
consciousness. The Russian state evolved as an 'empire-state' rather than a 'nation-
state'. As a result of 'Russia's relentless expansion ... permanently blurring the 
distinction between Russia proper and its periphery... nationalism was a 
manipulated state ideology' (Prizel, 1998: 165).170 The ruling elite were distinct 
from the mass of its subjects who did not experience any sort of national 
awakening. According to Ramazan Abdulatipov,171 this 'suggests to us where to 
start rebuilding Russia: to take into account the special role of Russian statehood in 
the development of our society. An explanation must be sought first of all in 
Russia's historically multinational nature and the openness of its geopolitical space 
to both the West and the East ... it must be taken into account that Russia was 
developed and formed historically as a multinational and multicultural state'. 
167 Particularly after the defeat of Napoleon in the early nineteenth century, it 'became a full 
member of, and a leading power in, the European "concert." At the same time, Russia's active 
European policy in no way prevented it from establishing versatile contacts with China, Japan, the 
United States, and countries in South America, all of which were not key actors in the world arena 
at that point in history. Actually, that period spawned the idea of a multidirectional foreign policy 
that has now become one of the most fundamental principles underlying contemporary Russian 
foreign policy' (Ivanov, 2001). 
168 This period also led to a change in Western perceptions of Russia, with Russia being accorded 
the status of serious and reasonably civilised European player. 
169 See Gellner (1983), Anderson (1983), Smith (1986) on the place of a pre-existing (or imagined) 
national consciousness in this process. 
170 See also Tolz (1998: 995), Lieven (1998: 261), Zevelev (2002a: 12). 
171 Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet's Council of Nationalities, cited in Russia and Eurasia 
Documellts. 1993: 212. 
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The state expanded through warfare and treaty, and its identity was partly a 
result of this expansion. The lands taken were home to Muslims, the mountain 
peoples of the Caucasus, the orthodox Christians of Georgia and Armenia, and the 
Turkic peoples of Central Asia.1n Many of these had collaborated with the Slavs in 
throwing off the 'Mongol yoke'. Such a development also assisted in the creation 
of the 'empire-state', and is part of the reason for the popularity of the idea that the 
Russian state is a 'civilisation' rather than a nation, and was the birth of the 
messianic aspect of the Russian idea (Berdiaev, 1947, 8_9).173 The Rossiane lived 
in a confusion of lands, mingling with each other. This mixing was particularly the 
case in the Ukraine and Belarus. Elsewhere, the populations often lived apart. In 
the Soviet period, local elites would assume the top positions in republics, ready to 
take over in the wave of elite-led nationalism of the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
As an empire, whether Tsarist or Communist, the core ethnos of the Rus 
was subsumed by the state. This gave rise to a supranational identity which 
manifested itself in loyalty to the Tsarist or Soviet state. Thus the phenomenon of 
'statism' in Russia can easily be allied to the nationalism of empire building or 
resuscitation of the USSR; the concepts of Russia and the empire or Union were 
often confused. Nevertheless, both in Tsarist and Soviet times, a certain purely 
Russian nationalism existed. 
The state elite (along with Russian intellectuals) was always confused, 
however, about the correct mix of political, ethnic and religious forms with which 
to brew its official nationalism. The Orthodox religion, for example, was often 
perceived as superior to Western Catholicism and Protestantism and Moscow was 
referred to as the Third Rome, even though Church and state had very different 
ideas about the Church's relationship to the state, and hence the legitimacy of both 
(Yevgeneva, 1999: 74). Nationalists in the 19th century often evoked the traditions 
of Russian antiquity in music, art and literature. 
Slavophiles and Westernisers 
Two major themes in Russian national life that continued into the 1990s reflected 
the fact that the West became the most significant external factor in Russian 
172 What is now Tajikistan also includes people of Persian descent. 
173 See Lieven (1998: 375) and Parkhalina (2002: 4). 
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cultural life over the course of the 19th century,174 because both philosophical 
traditions are defined in relation to the West. Naturally, the divisions between the 
two philosophies were not always clear. In many ways they were a reflection of 
each other, both concerned with Russia's relationship to the West. 175 
The Slavophiles 'maintained that there are three principles of Russia: 
Orthodoxy, autocracy and the sentiment of nationhood. But they understood these 
things in a sense which was different from the official ideology of the government 
in which Orthodoxy and the sense of nationhood were in SUbjection to autocracy. 
In their classification Orthodoxy occupied the first place' (Berdiaev, 1947: 51). 
Slavophiles promoted the unity and uniqueness of the Slavic peoples and included 
a rej ection of the values of the West. Westernisers, on the other hand, felt that 
Russia should emulate Western political and social fonns, and that this would 
ensure a moral, prosperous and civilised future. 
Both Westernizing and Slavophile views understood the Ukraine and 
Belorussia as integral parts of Russia or at least as being so close for it to be 
unthinkab Ie that they should exist as separate states (Prizel, 1998: 161). However, 
the union of these western slavs with Great Russia 'in the seventeenth-eighteenth 
centuries ... contributed to the westernisation of Russia from within, as it were, 
since they became internal elements of the Russian body national. Conversely, the 
departure of Ukraine and Belarus makes the post-1991 Russia feel less 'European' 
than it was before' (Szporluk, 1994: 9). 
20th century developments 
During the Soviet period, the Eurasianists (a group of thinkers exiled in the West), 
argued that the Russian state was a unique fonn of civilisation unknown in either 
West or East. The movement was antagonistic towards westernising tendencies in 
Russia, because Europeanisation would destroy Russia; it would result in the ruling 
174 The West signified for Russians Western Europe, later to include the USA once that country 
came to play an important part in world affairs. As before, the concept of the West contained 
negative and positive connotations for many, which complicated the overall Westemiser-Slavophile 
divide. 
175 For Berdiaev, the matter was slightly different: for him, the key to understanding Russia lies in 
the fact that 'within the Russian soul two principles are always engaged in strife - the Eastern and 
the Western' (Berdiaev, 1947: 2-3). Echoing this idea today, in considering the phrase 'Russian 
nationality', Komarov (2001: 5) asks, 'what associations does [the word Rus] ... evoke in s~meone 
who hears it? Expanse or lack of control? Freedom or anarchy'? Freedom from \\·hat? EqualIty of 
whom or what'?' 
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elite becoming Europeanised while 'the rest of the people will be demoralised and 
self-loathing' .176 
In the Soviet Union, meanwhile, Marxism-Leninism was the only publicly 
acceptable viewpoint. The official view did not suggest that a nation's identity was 
important, yet Russian uniqueness was sometimes included in official ideology 
(Diligensky, 1991: 11) in an inconsistent manner. The Orthodox Church was e\"en 
drafted in when it seemed as if the Wehrmacht would live up to Hitler's boasts, and 
nationalism was sought as a tool to provide fighting spirit. This shows that a sense 
of Russian nationalism existed and was founded on an ethnic, religious and 
territorial base. 
Even earlier, however, the Bolsheviks had attempted to use nationalism to 
bolster their legitimacy though it 'would be wrong ... to claim that Stalin "accepted 
National Bolshevism as a political programme and put it into practice'" (Duncan, 
1998: 60). In the Soviet period, from time to time, official ideologists incorporated 
the messianic mentality, panhumanism, communitarianism, statism and anti-
Westernism of Tsarist Romantic nationalists in a particularly Russian communism. 
'To the extent that Russian Marxism was more Russian than Marxist, the 
intellectual legacy of the Russian idea was largely responsible' (Scanlan, 1996: 38). 
Under the Soviets there was an attempt to create an overarching Soviet national 
identity that would coexist with the individual nationalities. What was consistent 
throughout the Soviet period was the anti-Western animus of the state and official 
ideology. The West was, by its capitalist nature, aggressively antagonistic towards 
the USSR and its allies. 
The official ideology could not prevent other beliefs from existing, even if 
only in limited circles, through underground and informal means, such as samizdat. 
The expert institutes, such as the Institute of American and Canadian Studies 
(rSKRAN) and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations 
(IMEMO), which were connected to, and controlled by, the state (Tsigankov, 2002: 
11), could make limited contact with outside ideas and develop heretical views in 
their own close circles. 
Among dissidents who managed to circulate their ideas were included 
Slavophiles, who believed that Bolshevism had turned Russia away from its true 
176 Prince Nikolai Trubetskoi, cited in Neumann (1996: 112-113). 
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path (among other evils). More recently, Solzhenitsyn, one of these Slavophiles, 
suggested again that Russia should isolate itself in order to concentrate on reviving 
. . h' (S 1 h . 177 Its umque entage 0 z emtsyn, 1995). In this view, it is by looking inward that 
Russia would rediscover its true character. Other dissidents, with Sakharov at their 
head, were of the liberal or Westernising tendency and advocated a fonn of 
Western liberal democracy, becoming standard-bearers for the Democrats in the 
late Soviet period. 
In the Soviet Union of Perestroika, Russian nationalism was reborn as a 
public force with the emergence of the neformali (infonnal public associations not 
connected to the CPSU). The first public organisation to be registered, in fact, was 
pamiat, dedicated to the restoration of public monuments, which soon became 
dominated by extreme nationalists. Other groups, including the Communist Party 
and the military were still concerned to maintain the USSR, and attacked 
Gorbachev for letting things slip: they were still 'Soviet' patriots, but they saw they 
had with the nationalists a common enemy and often adopted nationalist 
clothing. 178 This enemy was the liberal, democratising government of the young 
refonners. The red-brown alliance was born with this new coalition of ideas. The 
Gorbachev period thus allowed the re-emergence of Russian nationalism as a 
public force, not to mention among the other Union republics: and it was perhaps 
the prime factor in the collapse of the USSR. 
The Russian idea and the west in the 1990s 
During the 1990s, the above themes recurred in national debates and often defined 
the political programmes espoused by individuals and groups. The particular brew 
of national identity they put forward also defined their views on foreign policy; for 
those in power it strongly influenced the way they carried out foreign policy. The 
177 See also Guroff & Guroff(1994: 79). 
178 Gorbachev's conservative Second Secretary, Ligachev, for example, attempted to 'play the 
Russian card' in an attempt to slow or halt the reforms. He did this by appealing to the so-called 
village prose writers, like Rasputin, and other elements of the conserva~ve int~llige~tsia, and thus to 
potential supporters (mainly at that time within the Party) who sympathised WIth t~elf v1e.\\s. The 
democrats also used nationalism to further their goals. Yeltsin suggested that RUSSian natIOnalism 
was democratic, struggling against the unitary, CPSU dictatorship. 
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multitude of political parties, 'blocs' and factions in Russia in the 1990s can be 
broken down into three categories. First, those who saw the need for Russia to 
become a 'normal' state, a democracy in its current borders that had close and 
cooperative relations with the West, particularly the USA (Westernisers, often 
called Atlanticists in the 1990s). A second group demanded the restoration of the 
Soviet empire or the Russian empire and propounded many Slavophile and 
Eurasianist ideas; they were highly antagonistic to the West. In their view Russia's 
identity required it to be the core of a multinational empire, which by its nature was 
inconsistent with and superior to the values of the West. The third group believed 
that Russia should instead focus on rebuilding its power regionally and globally 
without reincorporating the former empire (statists or pragmatic nationalists). The 
last exalted the strong state (whether Tsarist, Communist or both); they advocated 
'realistic' relations with the West, not precluding cooperation as long as it was in 
Russia's interests. 179 They 'favoured the consolidation of democracy ... and did not 
want a return to past economic and political practices. However, they also adopted 
a modified version of the nationalism of the Fundamentalist Nationalists into their 
ideas' (Light, 2004: 45). 
The early period: Atlanticists in control 
After achieving his personal victory over the coup plotters, and becoming leader of 
independent Russia in December 1991,180 Yeltsin obtained the freedom to act in 
pushing through the shock-therapy programme. Parliament granted him the right to 
179 These classifications have been adapted from Light et al (1996), Parkhalina (2002), Zevelev 
(2002a) and Tolz (1998). According to Parkhalina, 'these positions can be attributed respectively to 
the views of liberal reformers, national conservatives, and moderate nationalist centrists ... The three 
groupings advocated, in the foreign policy field, first, 'moving closer to the West and Europe, the 
second urges renouncing strong links with the West in favor of the so-called Eastern alternative, the 
third supports a balance between East and West' (Parkhalina, 2002: 2). Light et al. (1996) called the 
three groups Liberal Westernizers, Pragmatic Nationalists and Fundamentalist Nationalists. Zeveley 
(2002a: 22), on the other hand, suggests that 'there are five major perspectives, or projects, on 
building the state and nation as well as corresponding visions of international security in 
contemporary Russia. They are: new state-building, ethnonationalism, restorationalism, 
hegemony/dominance, and integrationalism'. Tolz (1998: 995-996) based her breakdown of 
nationalist groups on whether they advocated: 1) a union identity, with the Russians defined as an 
imperial people or through their mission to create a supranational state; 2) the Russia~s as a state. of 
all Eastern Slavs, united by common origin and culture; 3) the Russians as a commumty of Russlan 
speakers, regardless of their ethnic origin; 4) the Russians defined racially, i.e. blood ties constitute 
the basis of common identity; 5) a civic Russian (rossiiskaia) nation. 
180 He had been chairman of the Russian Supreme Sm'iet since June 1990; Russian President since 
June 1991. 
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rule by decree, which later became a major bone of contention between president 
and opposition. The appointment of Kozyrev as Foreign Minister, was, like that of 
Gaidar as acting Prime Minister (with overall control of economic reform), to have 
far-reaching consequences. 
With Kozyrev and Gaidar, figureheads had been found for the new Russian 
state, in which liberal democracy at home on the Western model was inextricably 
linked to solidarity with Western Europe and the USA abroad. The latter 
represented 'civilisation' and 'normality'. Liberty and the future prosperity of 
Russia were tied together in a commitment to democracy, the rule of law and the 
free market. The liberal-democratic vision for Russia was a state which was the 
current size of the Russian Federation and with a liberal citizenship pOlicy.181 
Although some liberals apparently also viewed the Slavic core of the Union as 
indivisible (a liberal form of Slavophilism), many accepted the borders inherited 
from Soviet times. Their nationalism was not based on ethnicity, but civic values 
(Tolz, 1998: 1008), they preferred free market capitalism, and their foreign policy 
flowed to some extent from this. 182 As Kozyrev noted in his speech to the United 
Nations in September 1992: 'Development ... will not be achieved or ensured in 
full measure, like political and economic rights and freedoms, unless the creative 
potential of the individual can be unshackled in a free market environment'. The 
West was rich, capitalist, democratic - a haven of individual liberty - and 
something to which Russia should aspire. 
The 'Atlanticist' foreign policy required Russia to become a 'normal' state 
enjoying close relations with the West, whereby 'the democratic revolution in our 
country and its reintegration into the mainstream of human development will 
radically change international politics' (Kozyrev, 1992: 287). In a perfect example 
of how the Atlanticists saw their role in the new world order, Kozyrev stated that 
181 In February 1992, Russia adopted a nationalities policy in which all those who at that time 'were 
in permanent residence on the republic's territory' were acknowledged as Russian citizens, 'as legal 
successor to the USSR, Russia gives all citizens of the former Union the right to take Russian 
citizenship for three years' (Abdulakh Mikitaev, interviewed in Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 19 January 
1993). Although Mikitaev reported problems in processing claims as a result of the delay-
symbolic perhaps - in adopting a new coat of arms for the Russian Federation. . . 
182 Later, liberals, could switch to support of more nationalistic policies as being more m tune WIth 
the defence of the individual rights of Russian-speakers in the former Soviet Union. And democrats 
could come to advocate a more social-oriented market as long as the institutions of democracy were 
maintained. Such strains were to be emphasised by their failure to secure a successful vision of the 
national idea. 
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'we suggested that the already existing practice of submitting drafts of Russian 
laws for expert assessment become a standard procedure' (Kozyrev, 1992: 290).183 
The Atlanticist programme continued the longstanding westernising tradition of 
those who suggest that there is nothing specific or unique about the Russians and 
that Russia's best hope is to discard its historical traditions (Prizel, 1998: 
224) 184,185 In th' d' S' . 
. e Imme late post- oVlet enVIronment, then, 'the term "Russian" 
was defined in opposition to the term "Soviet". Russia was also defined as a nation 
in transition to democracy, a prodigal son coming back to the family of Western 
nations. This anti-Soviet, pro-Western and democratic ideal was symbolized by 
[Kozyrev]' (Ponarin, 1999: 2). Izvestiia was suggesting early in 1992 that 'The 
West is the new Russia's natural ally' (16 January 1992). 
Western countries, and particularly the USA, were regarded by the young 
reformers in an extremely positive light. There were high hopes in these circles for 
future close relations. With the signing of the SALT II treaty, for example, 'one can 
confidently say, that 2-3 January 1993 will remain historic days, printed in history 
as days when the two largest nuclear powers took a decisive step towards a safer 
world' (Izvestiia, 20 December 1992). In February 1992 Bush and Yeltsin met at 
Camp David and produced the Camp David Declaration on 'Principles of New 
Mutual Relations', as reported in the Russian media. 186 The presidents declared that 
Russia and the United States do not regard one another as potential adversaries. 
Henceforth, the distinguishing feature of their relations shall be friendship and 
partnership based on mutual trust, respect, and a common commitment to 
democracy and economic freedom... We will make all necessary efforts to 
disseminate our common values and the ideals of democracy, the supremacy of 
law, the observance of human rights, including the rights of ethnic minorities, the 
respect of state borders, and peaceful changes in the world.' 
Yeltsin at this stage was playing the role of democratic hero and global 
statesman bringing Russia back to what was seen as its rightful place at the table of 
183 Kozyrev was reporting his own speech at the 48 th session of the United :\'ations Commission on 
Human Rights, 12 February 1992. . . 
184 In Baranovsky's classification, it was part of the tradition of seeing Russia as laggmg behmd, but 
definitely a part of, Europe. . . 
185 This view corresponds to the 'liberal reformers' in Parkhalina (2002), 'liberal westerrnzers' m 
Light et al. (1996), and 'new state-builders' in Zeyeley (2002a). 
186 For example. Rossiiskaia Gazera, 3 February 1992. 
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civilised great powers. But he also conjured a vision of Russia playing a full part in 
civilising the world in partnership with the USA in this heroic task. Thus he 
expressed the hope in January 1992 that 'for the first time in history, there is a real 
opportunity at last to put an end to despotism and dismantle the totalitarian order , 
. h fi' . ,187 h III W atever orm It may eXIst. Kozyrev's speech to the 4t session of the 
United Nations General Assembly in New York (22 September 1992) contained 
references to 'Russia's special interest and responsibility for establishing civilized 
principles of the United Nations and the CSCE'. Thus (at least in 1992) Kozyrev, 
like Yeltsin, clearly saw his role as bringing Russia into a pre-existing realm of 
civilised states, and as a bearer of civilisation to other (non-Western) areas of the 
world. 
For the reformers in government in 1991-1992, therefore, in an echo of 
traditional Westernising arguments, the ideal reality (as Berdiaev [1947: 29J put it) 
was a 'normal' Western-style state. This idea never entirely died out, and the 
pragmatic realism that came to dominate foreign policy thinking among the elite in 
the middle of the decade retained aspects of this way of thinking. However, the 
'ideal realities' of those dedicated to overthrowing Yeltsin's regime often included 
the Soviet or Tsarist periods, and only rarely something original. Members of 
Y eltsin' s regime were accused of selling out to the West, or of acting as agents for 
a West whose aim was to destroy Russia. It had quickly become clear that in the 
Russian national identity debate the West was assuming its traditional position as 
Russia's most important other, whether positive or negative. Indeed, different 
aspects of the West had often been seen as good and bad, and the West was 
therefore not always seen as homogeneous. This became very noticeable in the 
1990s as Russians compared Europe with the USA. 
The nationalist groups and their ideas 
Of the members of the opposition which grew quickly and ferociously in 
. 
opposition to Yeltsin and the young reformers during 1992, many were nationalists. 
Despite fragmentation among the nationalists, they found common ground on the 
ideas and policies they opposed: liberalism, democracy, the West and cooperation 
with the West, and the Yeltsin administration which espoused such policies. They 
187 Speech at a session of the UN Security Council, 21 January 1992. 
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proposed a stronger defence of 'Russian national interests' in foreign policy. of the 
integrity of the Russian state, and of Russians living outside the state. Some 
proposed restoring the Soviet UnionlRussian Empire, others adapted their 
ambitions to ensuring a 'strong state' on the existing territory. These "derzhavniki" 
("great power-ists" such as Primakov and Luzhkov) with a view of the Russian 
state in civic nationalist terms were still very assertive about Russian national 
interests but aimed to see Russia 'integrated within a world community ruled by 
international laws' (Ponarin, 1999: 4). Nationalists 'tended to idealise pre-
revolutionary Russia' (Prizel, 1998: 231) and rej ected the Western model as devoid 
of morality and spirituality, as had their forebears in the 19th and 20th centuries. 
Nationalists commonly referred to 'Mother Russia', 188 an image familiar to 
anyone who had read Russian literature of the 19th century, evoking a suffering 
maternal figure. This concept had become something of a cult when the 'Church 
appropriated the pagan cult of Rozhanitsa, the goddess of fertility ... In its oldest 
peasant form, the Russian religion was a religion of the soil' (Figes, 2002: 321). By 
constant repetition of this theme, it became easy to portray Yeltsin and his liberal 
advisers as inhuman and cruel, rather than simply representatives of an alternative 
political viewpoint. This line of thinking became increasingly common, when 
nationalists muse on the damage done to the country by Yeltsin and his 'criminal' 
(liberal) supporters. 189 
Restorationists and statists 
The restorationists 190 wanted to rebuild the Soviet or Russian empires. These ideas 
were popular in military circles. Nezavisimaia Gazeta reported in February 1992, 
for example, that 71 % of army officers favoured restoring the USSR. 191 They were 
sometimes nationalist in an ethnic sense, seeing Russians as naturally dominant in 
188 See for example Batyuk (1999). 
189 The fIrst Russian nationalist sentiments to emerge in the perestroika period were related to the 
environment, aimed at preventing the diversion of Russian rivers into Central Asia. 
190 Corresponding to Parkhalina' s (2002) national conservatives, Light et al.' s (1996) 
"fundamentalist nationalists' and Zevelev's (2002a) ethnonationalists, restorationalists, 
hegemonists, and integrationalists. 
191 The study was carried out by personnel from the Moscow branch of the All-Union ~e~tre for the 
Study of Public Opinion on Social and Economic Questions and members of the AssoClatIOn of 
Military Sociologists, polling participants in the All-Officers Assembly, 17 January 19~2. Around 
5000 offIcers and Generals from all branches and categories of troops and from all regIOns of the c~untry took part, ;fwhom 1,489 completed questionnaires (article cited in Russia and Eurasia 
Documents Annual 1992: the Russian Federation). 
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the areas previously under the control of Soviet or Russian empIres. Racial 
nationalism was often neo-fascist in its views. Aleksander Barkashov, leader of the 
Russian National Unity Party, stated that he and his colleagues 'give pride of place 
to the nation.' He added that 'I call this national-socialism. We differ from German 
Nazis in that we do not divide nations into superior and inferior ones. We consider 
the national-socialists of any nation to be our natural allies.' 192 
One of the most prominent politicians of the 1990s, Vladimir Zhirinovskii, 
led the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia on a platform exhibiting 'a curious 
amalgam of nationalist, non-nationalist and even anti -nationalist ideas'. But 
Zhirinovskii appealed to Russian nationalist sentiments with vague promises of 
conquest and the destruction of enemies; he used crude racism in his speeches and 
particularly in the West he was seen as an 'ultranationalist'. The party - in practice 
a very loose conglomeration - gained electoral success in the 1993 parliamentary 
elections, winning 64 seats, and then 51 seats in 1995. 
Aleksandr Rutskoi, as Vice-President until October 1993, was a highly 
prominent statist. 193 He wrote in January 1992 (while Vice-President) an 
excoriation of the reformers in government, and asked 'Will we, a great power, 
Russia, which was famed through the ages for its invincible army, where honour 
and dignity were held in high esteem, and where the motherland was sacrosanct -
will we really reduce this army to poverty and arbitrariness? .. Let me remind all 
the "dividers" of Russia into "banana republics" that Russians and Bashkirs, 
Udmurts and Karelians, Yakuts and Chukchis, Kalmyks and Jews, Chechens and 
Ossetians were united in the Russian Army for centuries. Let us take a closer look 
at who and what is dividing us during this "time of troubles" described as "the new 
democracy". Can we really no longer live together on Russian soil? .. We must not 
allow anyone to destroy with one blow the memory which is the link between the 
past and the present, to claim that everything is beginning from scratch today, that 
Russia's history has no meaning' .194 He claimed not to be advocating the rebirth of 
192 Interviewed in Moskovskie Novosti (15-22 January 1995). Cited in Russia and Eurasia 
Documents, 1995: 154-155. 
193 Hero of the Soviet Union Rutskoi was Yeltsin's Vice-President in 1991-1993. He sided with the 
Congress of People's Deputies in its showdown with Yeltsin for which he was j ailed. After forming 
a party "Derzhava" and campaigning unsuccessfully for president, he became governor of Kursk 
Oblast. 
194 Cited in Russia and Eurasia Documents, 1993: 231. 
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the Soviet Union, however, and that the creation of the CIS was the best solution 
there was at the time, given the half baked agreements of Belovezhskaia. Rather, he 
advocated a 'strong state' on the current territory of the Russian Federation; yet the 
implication was that this state would dominate the former Soviet Union and the 
form such domination was to take was unclear as it often was for derzhavniki _ 
clearly, this echoed sentiments familiar to the 19th century nationalists, and was in 
practice often close to restorationism. 
Unlike many statists and Communists, who envisioned a multi ethnic state, 
some nativists - Slavophiles who believed that Russia should return to her 
traditional peasant roots and have little to do with the outside world - 'have 
insisted on a theocratic Russian state consisting of the territories populated by 
orthodox east Slavic peoples ... they alone reject Eurasianism as yet another 
entanglement that will distract Russia from its spiritual and economic needs' 
(Prizel, 1998: 232). But they often found common ground with the Communist 
Party. 
Well-known politicians such as Evgenii Ambartsumov, Sergei Baburin and 
Oleg Rumiantsev used the legislative forum to disseminate statist anti-Western 
ideas and influence foreign policy. Nationalist views were shared by the Speaker of 
Parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov, who also supported patriots and statists in an 
attempt to gain allies against Yeltsin, giving them floor time in parliamentary 
sessions. Newspapers, such as Den (renamed Zavtra after being banned following 
the October 1993 clash between parliament and president) provided media 
exposure for extreme nationalist views. 
The Communist Party and Russian nationalism 
Gennadii Ziuganov and other officials of the Communist Party talked of 'the 
targeted subversion of Russian spirituality' and the destruction of 'the great 
Eurasian power'. They criticised the 'Yeltsin-Kozyrev foreign policy course' 
which was not 'based on a sober appraisal of the realities of contemporary 
international life but on propaganda utopias in which even our Western "partners" 
themselves have never believed. Russia has gradually lost all its allies and its 
international positions. Any timid attempts to bring up Russian interests are cut 
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short with harsh bellows, as happened recently in Budapest. 195 On the other hand 
, 
the adventurism and unpredictability of the Russian authorities in the internal 
affairs are pushing our East and Central European neighbours into NATO's 
embrace' . 196 
The Communist Party drew on Slavophile and Eurasianist thinking as well 
as some remnants of Communist thought, but mainly emphasised a strong state and 
the memory of the Soviet Union as a 'respected' world power. This was not 
particularly Marxist, and indeed 'for the revamped Russian communists to splice 
together a representation of Russia with explicit references to both these traditions 
[spiritual and statist nationalism] and to put it to good discursive work despite the 
aggressively nonspiritual history of the Communist movement itself is no mean 
feat' (Neumann: 175). But it makes sense when viewed through the lens of 
Russia's history. Ziuganov 'updated' many aspects of Soviet ideology in order to 
manage this feat: 'foremost among them are modifications of Marxist theory to 
accommodate the Russian idea more fully and frankly. [By jettisoning] those 
elements of Marxist-Leninist theory that interfered with the wholehearted 
endorsement of the Russian idea during the Soviet period, while retaining most if 
not all of the others' (Scanlan, 1996: 38). Communist ideas essentially became 
subsumed into the more effective nationalist ideas which resonated with the 
public. 197 The Communist Party believed that Russia should lead 'a world order 
that is at odds with the existing Western-liberal model' (Prizel: 231). And so 'the 
others of this [ representation] were not only a hostile "West" but also the very 
forces of cosmopolitanism and globalization that it was said to have set in train and 
to control' (Neumann: 168-169). 
The Communist Party used the most evocative of nationalist symbols to 
promote its vision of Russia when (also in January 1995), a declaration at the 
party's Third Congress 'to the citizens of Russia' appealed to them 'in this difficult 
hour for the Fatherland. Russia has not been threatened by a misfortune on such a 
195 The December 1994 CSCE Summit. 
196 Published in Sovetskaia Rossiia (5 October 1995) and cited in Russia and Eurasia Documents, 
1995: 128-146. 
197 An opinion poll carried out in 1999 showed that respondents viewed 'people carrying portraits of 
Stalin' far more favourably than unfavourably (Poll carried out by VTsIO\1, in Skidelsky & 
Senokosov, 2000: Russia on Russia, June 2000). VTsIOM (or VCIOM) was the All-Russian Centre 
for Public Opinion Research, an independent polling organization founded during perestroika and 
under the directorship of its founder, Iurii Levada. since 1992. 
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scale ... since the Battle of Stalingrad. The ruling regime's policy has not just led 
the country into an impasse; it has brought it to the brink of national catastrophe. 
The time for action has come ... Russia, a great power of the modem world had , , 
has, and will have another path' . 198 
The alliance of Reds with 'browns' (extreme nationalists), the birth of 
which was mentioned in connection with the last days of the Soviet Union, was 
therefore maintained by their shared hostility to the West and common 
identification with a certain vision of Russia. 
The Church and Russian nationalism 
At the same time, the Orthodox Church came to be the most respected of all 
Russian institutions, as shown by opinion polls over several years. The Church had 
become an influential member of the cultural elite. Russia-wide polls taken by 
VTsIOM199 in June 1992, October 1993 and March 1994 'found the Church to be 
consistently the highest rated of seven Russian institutions ... (the presidency, the 
government, the army, the secret police, the trade unions, and the press. The army 
consistently came in second) ... In January 1995 a Russia-wide poll by VTsIOM 
'found the Russian Orthodox Church to be the most trusted of eleven institutions' 
(Dunlop, 2000: 1). The Church was to playa role in committing Russians to the 
defence of their Orthodox 'brethren' in Serbia, and generally in advocating a role 
for the 'great' Russian state. Russian messianism and Eurasianist statism, anti-
Westemism and communitarianism began to feature in the Communist Party's 
programme too, with the influence of religion noticeable. 
Statist nationalism becomes the core nationalist argument 
Views among the conservative alliance changed with time, and the idea of 
recreating the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union had faded within a couple of 
years, so that 'among those [who believed that Russia's identity was that of a 
union, like the USSR, some had]. .. decided by late 1993-early 1994 that Russian 
national identity could crystallise in a union with Ukraine and Belarus rather than 
within the entire post-Soviet space were the leader of the Russian Public Lnion, 
198 Published in Pravda (24 January 1995), and cited in Russia and Eurasia Documents, 1995: 125-
126 
199 See footnote 195. 
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Sergei Baburin, and the majority of leaders of the National Salvation front, such as 
Igor Nikolaev, Yuri Belyaev [and so on] ... all speak about eastern Slavs, "one 
history, one nation, one Russia'" (Tolz, 1998: 1000). And as we have seen. the 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation, under Ziuganov, had also followed 
this path. In 1995, the party led by Baburin (Russian National Union) was still 
stating in its Party Programme (decided at its Fourth Congress on 26 March 1995), 
that 'the collapse of the Soviet Union (of historical Russia), [led] to incalculable 
suffering and losses for all the former Soviet republics, the collapse of economic 
links and economic collapse, local wars and conflicts, a stream of refugees, 
national enmity and hatred, as well as to the collapse of that geopolitical national 
unity, which for centuries made up the foundation of Russian identity, embodying 
in itself of the historical way of life of Russia' (Pashentsev, 1998: 144-145). 
Historical Russia formed the core of a Eurasian space. In this text the Soviet Union 
is always followed by the word Russia in parentheses to emphasize their 
congruence. 
The end of pro-Westernism as the dominant elite view 
The attacks of these nationalist groups were extremely effective in changing the 
dominant view of Russian identity among the elite; this was achieved partly 
through changing the views espoused by surviving members of the elite, and partly 
by enforcing a change in personnel. Soon almost every member of the elite could 
be heard advocating nationalist views of Russia and hence a more 'independent' 
foreign policy. Despite this, in the rough consensus of pragmatic nationalism which 
dominated from the mid-1990s onwards, the vision of Russia as a modem and 
civilised part of the West did not entirely disappear, and Russian statesmen and 
high officials clearly perceived themselves in this light. The dominant elite view 
became something of a mixture of anti-Western nationalism and a sense that 
Russia, despite everything, was a civilised European county; at least, it was more 
Western than Asian. The result was a consensus on pragmatic nationalism, or 
balancing of various foreign policy vectors reflecting an uneasy consensus on 
national identity. 
The end of the 'romantic' period of pro-Westernism and the victory of such 
views was the result of two factors. First, the Atlanticists had failed to deyelop a 
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coherent vision of Russian identity that resonated among elite and public. Second, 
the reformers failed to achieve positive results in people's daily lives and in 
Russian foreign policy: they were successfully blamed for the catastrophic situation 
in which Russians found themselves and the apparent inability of the state to 
achieve success in its international goals (Ponarin, 1999: 3). 
Thus the Russian elite had failed to 'find a unifying idea acceptable to most 
of the Russian people' (Zevelev, 2002c: 458-459). The liberal democrat/Atlanticist 
vision came unstuck as a result of the fact that until 1990, 'it appeared that anti-
communism - expressed "positively" by allusions to the imperative of joining the 
"civilised world" (the West) - and the celebration of individualism, always 
provided sufficient wind to raise their rhetorical sails. As a consequence, 
Communism's collapse represented a crisis for democratic discourse. It now had no 
"other". . . the democrats had developed no national purpose that might 
psychologically absorb some of the shocks visited on society beginning in 1992. 
There was no greater good to justify the sacrifices and the suffering' (Urban, 1998: 
975).200 
The two flaws of the Westernising philosophy of the young reformers 
merged, as the catastrophic situation faced by ordinary Russians and international 
weakness preyed on the lack of resonance for ordinary Russians of their vision. 
The liberal democrats had united around an anti-Communist agenda, but 'were 
never particularly interested in defining Russian national interests [and as a 
result]. .. were not ready - intellectually or psychologically - to compete with 
consistent nationalists' (Kortunov, 2004: paragraphs 25_26).201 'The political 
strength of the nationalist representation began to work on the Westernising 
representation, stripping it of what came to be known as its "romantic" tendency to 
hold up the "West" as an entity to be unequivocally copied... Nationalist 
representation came complete with references back to an unbroken and proud 
200 See also Prizel (1998: 217). 
201 Writing in January 1993, Ramazan Abdulatipov, had argued that owing to its mix of peoples, 
cultures and languages, 'the Russian Federation really is a "model of the world as a whole". Perhaps 
that is why we in Russia sometimes find it difficult to summon up the strength and indicate our 
unity. And this characteristic has basic meaning in determining not only the priorities of Russian . 
statehood but also the conditions and future of the whole world order' (Cited in Russia and EuraSia 
Documents, 1993). 
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national history... the nationalist representation drew its strength from the 
narratives it told about itself and its role in Russian history' (Neumann: 169-170). 
The failure of Russian intellectuals in Y eltsin' s commission to formulate a 
'national idea' in August 1996 was indicative. By the mid-1990s, many influential 
Russian foreign policy-makers realized that by embracing the ideology of 
liberalism and democracy, Russia seemed to confine itself to the secondary role of 
a country 'in transition' in the international arena. Such countries are led J'udaed 
, b' 
praised, and punished for progress or lack of it by others. In the absence of an equal 
partnership with the US, Moscow's overarching concept of international relations 
required adjustment. Kozyrev's 'Russia joining the civilized world' was replaced 
with Primakov's 'Russia as one of the centers of power in a multipolar world' 
(Zevelev, 2002c: 458-459). Those opposed to Yeltsin for various reasons - many 
of which were bound up with competing conceptions of Russia's place in the world 
- found that a nationalist discourse stressing Russia's alleged greatness and the 
requirement not to kow-tow to 'the West' became powerful tools in the foreign 
policy debate. 
Election results and opinion polls offer mixed evidence of the broader 
Russian population's enthusiasm for nationalist messages, because nationalists 
were supported to some extent merely because they offered opposition to the 
ruinous economic policies of the reformers. In the Duma elections in 1993, 
nationalist parties achieved great success,202 and 'Russian liberals of all shadings ... 
were ideologically and politically defeated by ultra-nationalist champions of 
velikoderzhavie ['great-powerism']. In a startling about-face a few days after the 
elections, Andrei Kozyrev suddenly changed his rhetoric and started talking about 
the need to "defend Russian national interests at all costs". Interestingly, he also 
became quite tough with regard to Russia's dealing with the West. This admitted 
defeat of the government's foreign policy agenda amounted to an ill-concealed 
attempt at jumping on the bandwagon of Russian velikoderzhavie' (Kortunov, 
1999: 34). This incorporation of the opposition was sometimes physical. Viktor 
202 In 1993 the party of the government, Russia's Choice, managed to win 70 seats (of the total in 
the Duma of 450), while Zhirinovskii's LDPR won 64, the Communist Party 48 (and its close ally 
the Agrarian Party 33 seats); Yabloko won 23 seats. In 1995 the Communist Party won 157 seats. 
Zhirinovskii's LDPR 51 seats, Nash Dom Rossiia 55 seats and Yabloko 45. Of the others, the 
Agrarian Party won 20 seats this time round. 
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Aksichits, for example, 'a prominent patriotic ideologue, publish[ed] an essay 
excoriating the present government for anti-Russian policies and raise[d] its 
removal from office to the level of "a policy of all-national salvation'" (Urban, 
1998: 978). Within weeks, Aksichits joined the government as an adviser to First 
Deputy Prime Minister Boris Nemtsov. Similarly, the Communist Party's 'most 
prominent ideologue, Nikolai Podberezkin, while never flinching in his resolve to 
rid the country of those "anti-popular", "anti-national" elements that have seized 
and are wrecking the Russian state, can find time to pen the political programme of 
the "party of power", NDR [Nash Dom Rossiia]' (Urban, 1998: 978). 
In 1999, when asked 'Are you sorry that the USSR has disintegrated?' 74% 
of respondents answered 'Yes'. Some 72% thOUght that Russia was no longer a 
great power. When asked to list Russia's enemies respondents agreed that Western 
industrial and financial circles (28%), the US (22%), NATO (19%),203 Oligarchs 
and bankers (17%), Democrats (15%), Russophobes (13%) (Senokosov, 1999). 
Further polls on the role of the army and security services in political life did also 
seem to suggest that 'the majority of Russians would put state security above 
individual rights (Senokosov, 1999: 10).204 A comparison of results from 1994 and 
1999 also showed that the trend over the decade was, if anything, towards a 
hardening of views (thus roughly matching the trend shown by the political elite). 
In 1994 for example, 44% of respondents answered yes to the question, 'would it 
have been better if things in this country had remained as they were before 1985?' 
In 1999, 58% thought so. Moreover, a lower percentage of respondents thought that 
closer links between Russia and the West were a good thing in 1999 than in 1994 
(Lev ada, 1999: 15). 
Many if not most of the ideas that were to dominate the elite discourse of 
the 1990s had come into common usage by the end of 1992. From late 1992 (the 
time of the Seventh Congress of Peoples Deputies), nationalist ideas seeped into 
the dominant discourse. Zevelev (2002a: 21) has said that' Although the 1993 crisis 
and the subsequent adoption of the new constitution, as well as the 1993, 1995. 
1996, 1999, and 2000 elections changed the relative strength of each perspective. 
these events hardly led to the emergence of radically new ideas in the area of 
203 The poll was taken before the bombing of Yugoslavia in the Kosovo conflict. . 
204 For example, 50% of respondents thought that the army had too small an influence on soclety. 
and 37% that the security services commanded too small an influence on society. 
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nation-building and security policies'. Within a couple of years of the end of the 
Soviet Union, the language of Yeltsin, Kozyrev and other senior members of 
government had changed along with the weight of dominant ideas in the elite and , 
the course of Russian foreign policy with it. Hence Kozyrev's repeated assertion of 
the fact that 'the entire geographic area of the former USSR is a sphere of vital 
interest to us' .205 In time a form of statism plus Eurasianism came to be accepted 
by many in Russian politics, with consequences for the relationship of Russia to the 
two organisations of the West intent on expanding to the East.206 Yeltsin told the 
Congress of People's Deputies in April 1992 that 'Russia is rightfully a great 
power by virtue of its history, its place in the world and of its spiritual and material 
potential' (Truscott, 1997: 37). 
'The thrust of Russia's foreign policy in 1993 was summed up by the first 
issue for the year of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs journal, International Affairs, 
which was dedicated entirely to the theme, "Russia Has Entered the Year 1993 To 
Be a Renewed Great Power'" (Russia and Eurasia Documents, 1993: 296). The 
adoption of the new constitution after the showdown of October 1993, led to 
elections to the Federation Council in late 1993. The lower house, or Duma, was 
dominated by opposition parties. In December 1993 the Communist Party, LDPR 
and Agrarians obtained 32.2% of Duma seats; in 1995 the Communists, Agrarians, 
and the Liberal Democrat Party (there were a number of other oppositionist 
factions) between them gained 51 % of seats. 
Nationalism was seen as a powerful peg on which to hang various policies, 
one that aided attack on the government with the use of easily accessible symbols 
of a great past, and thus one that the government, President, his administration and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were keen to deny their opponents. Many of the 
leaders 'changed their opinions during the early 1990s. Not only did Yeltsin and 
Kozyrev change the way they described Russia's "national idea" and its consequent 
foreign policy rights and duties, but some politicians changed their party 
205 This quotation is taken from Kozyrev's 1993 article in NATO Review. In this ~r:ticle, however, he 
was still reiterating his desire for Russia to make the transition to 'civilized COndITIOn ... and a 
"common space" where everyone is interdependent and helps one another'. 
206 As Parkhalina (2002: 1; and reiterated when interviewed in Moscow by the au~or, 12 July 2002) 
put it, 'to a large extent, Russia's foreign and security policy is influen~ed by ~ussI~n cultural . 
tradition. For many Russians, especially those of the older generation, mteractlOn WIth the West IS 
above all a psychological problem'. 
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allegiance. For example, Sergei Glaziev, in the beginning of the 1990s, when he 
was a member of Gaidar team, was the first who suggested that Russia have to joint 
[ sic] NATO' (Kosals, 2001: 5). Then he joined the CPRF, strongly opposed to 
NATO 'in general and its enlargement in particular' (Kosals, 2001: 5). Despite this, 
some liberals continued to hold fast to the idea that nationalist ideas in\'olvina 
b 
messianic visions for Russia would lead to disaster, and the only realistic route for 
the country to take was a balanced one that included good relations with the West. 
After this point it became accepted that nationalism, or, at least repeated 
criticism of certain Western institutions and policies must be an integral part of a 
successful political programme. Only rare politicians (like Konstantin Borovoi) and 
the moderate and independent-minded Yabloko party, did not stick to the script at 
all times. The success of parties and candidates including in their programme 
ostentatious nationalist language in the parliamentary and presidential elections of 
1995 and 1996 only emphasised this requirement. After this, even supposed 'new 
reformers' like Boris Nemtsov began to use the language of the nationalists.207 This 
was combined with an overtly pragmatic desire to deal with the West. The 
Vancouver Declaration by the Presidents of Russia and the US, in April 1993, for 
example, asserted 'Russia's harmonious integration into the community of 
democratic nations and the world economy is essential'. 
Alienation from the West 
One major factor in the success of the nationalist opposition was a quickly 
developing sense of international shame: Russia's international weakness turned 
into a sense of humiliation at the hands of the West. The change in the dominant 
view among the elite on Russian national identity was specifically a result of a 
widespread sense of rejection by or alienation from the West. Thus, 'since the end 
of the Cold War, Russians have encountered a powerful, alien culture that makes 
them feel powerless, disadvantaged and inferior. Globalization has nurtured the 
emergence of a global culture rooted in North-European Protestant ethic and 
epitomized by US culture. Many Russians who encounter this new standard culture 
find it alien and exclusionary. Yet because of the nature of globalization they 
207 In 1999, for example, he labelled NATO leaders as 'barbarous' (Summa!)' of World Broadcasts, 
3 June 1999). 
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cannot avoid it and are confronted by it every day: on television, in print media, in 
advertising' (Ponarin, 1999: 3). The defeat of the "romantic" tendency in Russian 
foreign policy is connected to the 'the European discourse on Russia ... Russia was 
not recognised as a European country in a number of key social, political and 
economic contexts' (Neumann, 1999: 169). This led to the Russian elite searching 
for a way of asserting their roles as representatives of a 'great power' based on a 
different national identity. 
Russian statist-nationalism had an impact on the national interest in shifting 
the parameters of the state's foreign policy priorities. By 1994, statists and 
national-patriots were making effective use of the fact that they were able to 
'propagate their theories in legitimate and effective fora [such as parliament and the 
media]; attach them to powerful symbols; and obtain support from state actors and 
institutions. As a result, their ideas have had a palpable effect on the definition of 
Russia's interest. .. In a sense, the empowerment of statist-nationalist ideas has 
changed what is "politically correct" in Russian foreign policy' (Tuminez, 1996: 
52-57). The old form of the question of Russia's national identity returned. In the 
1990s, as in the past 'century and a half, the debate over Russian identity, nation 
formation, and Russia's future has focused primarily on Russia's relation to and 
interaction with the West' (Zevelev, 2002a: 13). In the 1990s this problem was to 
resurface and become the key to Russia's foreign policy, partly because 'non-
communist Russia's challenge [is] to define itself with reference to Europe on new 
terms' (Szporluk, 1994: 9-10). 
The transition from Communism to something new put Russia in the 
position of a "'pupil" of advanced countries ... Although the Soviet system (like the 
Soviet Union itself) stopped existing as a result of the cessation of the Cold War, 
and the Western ideas, it seemed, gained the upper hand, paradoxically, what 
happened in Russia wasn't a "military defeat" - to a much greater extent it was an 
act of self-liberation ... The question of victory in the cold war is thus of primary 
importance for understanding the situation, which developed in Russian-Western 
relations after this confrontation stopped. "Undefeated" Russia wasn't a "liberated 
country" either - such was the status of countries of the former Warsaw treaty' 
(Trenin, 2004: 10). 
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A . 1 . . 208· 
S an artIc e m Krasnaza Zvezda pomted out in November 1995, 'The 
American side concentrates its main efforts on its own security ... through support 
for stability across the vast expanses of Russia and not on cultivating a mighty 
superpower rival. Therefore, if you look at, say, the financial component of our 
countries' relations, what strikes you is a bias toward disarmament that is entirely 
out of proportion with the talk of "partnership". This swallows up at least half, if 
not more, of all the resources that were supposed, in theory, to serve the cause of 
the formation and consolidation of democracy and market reforms in Russia' .209,210 
Yeltsin's attempts to intervene in Bosnia generally met with humiliation 
when, for example, Tudjman refused to go to Moscow for a trilateral summit. The 
West was blamed. 'Politically, Russia's Balkan policies had become bankrupt, 
giving rise to increased criticism of Yeltsin by his domestic enemies. Combined 
with the war in Chechnya, the war in Bosnia was pushing Russian foreign policy 
more than ever before toward an isolated, anti-Western position' (Donaldson & 
Nogee, 2000: 239). 
Adranik Migranian211 complained in the summer of 1993 that, 'for too long 
we have kept the West under the impression that a positive policy in the case of the 
Soviet Union, and then also Russia, is when we accept all the proposals by the 
Western countries. We supported Germany's unification, renounced the "Brezhnev 
Doctrine", withdrew troops from eastern Europe, and supported the war in the 
Persian Gulf. But no sooner had President Yeltsin come forward recently with 
proposals on Yugoslavia and the near abroad which were somewhat different from 
those of the West than they immediately started telling us: it means that your 
commie-patriots are gaining in strength'. Migranian's reasoning was that 'for too 
long we were unable to send a clear-cut signal to the West, concerning our own 
objectives and interests. That is why any sign of independence in Russian foreign 
208 The official newspaper of the Ministry of Defence. 
209 Mikhail Pogorelii, Krasnaia Zvezda, 1 November 1995. Cited in Russia and Eurasia Documents, 
1993: 256. 
210 The sense of exclusion for ordinary people even resulted from the new 'Western' language of the 
business elite which 'betrays idolatry before the West. Everything, like there, it must even sound the 
same ... politicians, secretaries, press agencies, and officials of the new democratic epoch ... the 
simple people do not hear [understand] your speech, and for this reason they frequently do not tru~t 
you ... We must feel our backwardness, our insignificance, and become reconciled to them' (SergeI 
Gerbov, Rabochnaia Tribuna. 17 March 1993; cited in Russia and Eurasia Documents, 1993: 216-
218). . . 
211 Member of the Presidential Council; interviewed in Mosco1\' News. 18 June 1993. CIted ill 
Russia and Eurasia Documents. 1993: 316-317. 
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policy catches the Western countries unawares and seems abnormal. But this is 
exactly what must be normal. Our partners must be persuaded that we have certain 
specific interests and they have to be reckoned with ... the latest developments, 
when Estonia was admitted to the Council of Europe, have shown that they are 
absolutely reluctant to take our interests in the Baltics into account. This is an 
obvious case of a double standard'. 
After October 1993, what Medvedev called 'culture two' became dominant. 
This is the often repeated phase of Russian political life when Russia's identity is 
constructed by 'distinguishing itself from the other; [ commonly] attributing the role 
of the other to the West ... In the mid 1990s, Russia's national interests are largely 
formulated by seeking points of divergence with the West. .. the very concept of 
national interest in post-Soviet Russia was nourished by anti-Western rhetoric' 
(Medvedev, 1999: 43-44). Yeltsin and Kozyrev on a number of occasions, in fact, 
'complained about the "non-constructive" policies of its Western partners' 
(Sergounin, 1996: 11). By 1994 Kozyrev was warning his foreign audience that 
'aloofuess on the part of the West, attempts to keep Russia out by means of new 
"iron curtains" and cordons sanitaires would merely provide fertile ground for 
nationalist and imperial extremism' (Kozyrev, 1994: 6). This was one of several 
warnings to the West on the theme (in this case veiled references to NATO 
expansion). The Foreign Minister added that 'Russia is "doomed" to be a great 
power' (Kozyrev, 1994: 6), and that he did not 'expect the West to applaud our 
every move. But we have no intention of copying every step taken by the West' 
(Kozyrev, 1994: 13).212 
Regarding France's recent testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific, 
Sovetskaia Rossiia asked in September 1995 why 'Moscow officials passed over 
Jacques Chirac's completely unforgivable statements. However, the emasculation 
of all that was specific to our nation among those in charge of our foreign policy, 
who are singing in the choir of the Atlantic political intriguers under the baton of 
Washington, took place long ago. The Bosnia War and the genocide of the Serbs 
212 In a rare acknowledgement of how Russia's actions might be seen by the rest of the world and 
negatively affect Russia's situation, Sergei Stankevich (in Literaturnaia Gazeta, 10 February 1993: 
cited in Russia and Eurasia Documents, 1993: 204), admitted that 'As bitter as it may be to 
acknowledge, the Russification of the former republics and the vastness of Russia have made the 
Russians an "imperial" nation in the eyes of the whole world', 
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have demonstrated that our "friend Bill"... our "friend Helmut"... and, indeed, 
other friends from NATO and the United Nations don't give a damn about present-
day Russia and its leadership. What is more, they have serious grounds for acting 
in the way: Russia is visibly weakening. ,2l3 
The pragmatic nationalist consensus 
As noted in Chapter 4, by the mid-1990s some form of consensus was formed at 
the new centre of Russian politics, 'pragmatic nationalism' associated in foreign 
policy with Evgenii Primakov. By 1994, most of the elite agreed that their country 
should preserve its great power status in the form of a Eurasian state distinct from _ 
and acting independently from - the West. This formula for Russian national 
identity echoes Slavophilism, Eurasianism, but also contains elements of pragmatic 
Westernism. After this point, the Russian elite began to act in ways consonant with 
this concept of Russian national identity, and the West began to be viewed 
explicitly through this lens. Russian national identity was never a settled, happy 
issue, but most of the elite could agree that Russia was a former superpower which 
would not be able to regain its former glory very quickly. Rather, Russia had to 
adapt to a role as a regional great power. The well-chronicled chaos or anarchy of 
Russian foreign policy-making reflected the fact that the state had not been built 
into anything stable; but there was some stability in Russian national identity as 
regards its relationship with the West. One of the key themes running through 
Russian political thought over the past two centuries has been the division between 
those with positive and those with negative views on the matter. This theme 
continued in the post-Soviet period, and the pragmatic consensus seemed to be one 
way to deal with the issue, by defining Russia's role as independent from the West. 
The consensus combined nationalism with some remaining elements of pro-
Western sentiments resulting from a pervading sense that Russia was and remained 
a part of the West. Russia saw itself as belonging to the same civilisation as the 
Western world: 'in the fight against terrorism and Islamist extremism and 
aggressive separatism. We are in the same camp. We are part of one civilised and 
2I3 Sovetskaia Rossiia, 23 September 1995. Cited in Russia and Eurasia Documents, 1995: 2S 1-252. 
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democratic world' (Izvestiia, 29 September 1999).214 The 'Russian elite and, to a 
large extent, society, insist on keeping a traditional sovereign identity for the 
country. Integration, in prevailing representations, must help Russia defend its own 
interests most effectively in the new global sphere, and not tum Russia itself into a 
"new West". According to an apt expression, "New Russia" and "the New West" 
will be in a state of interaction, not integration ... Never before in national history 
was the influence of the West as strong as in the years from 1988 to 1993. The 
official Moscow set itself the goal of making Russia enter in the composition of the 
enlarged EU in the rights of one of the leading states of "the New West". The 
Kremlin and the foreign ministry confirmed that "New Russia" is, as before, the 
"great Russia", while also being "civilised" now, e.g. in fact "European" (Trenin, 
2004: 10). 
A sense of Primakov's priorities is to be found in a speech given on the 
200th anniversary of the birth of 19th Century Czarist minister Aleksandr 
Gorchakov soon after his appointment. Primakov identified Gorchakov as a model 
for Russia's approach following the collapse of the USSR. He had been able to 
rebuild Russia's power and influence after its defeat in the Crimean War. 
'According to Primakov, Gorchakov believed that "a vigorous foreign policy" was 
essential for creating the conditions that would allow Russia to renew itself at home 
and regain influence abroad... Russia, even weakened by defeat, can pursue an 
active foreign policy ... Second, Gorchakov insisted that Russia's foreign policy 
must not be limited to a single direction or area of concern ... Third, as Primakov 
notes with approval, Gorchakov had no doubt that Russia had "enough strength" to 
playa leading role in the world. Fourth, Gorchakov understood that Russia could 
always exploit the resentment many smaller powers feel vis-a-vis larger ones ... [all 
of which leads] Primakov to say that "there are no constant enemies, but there are 
214 An article in Izvestiia of 26 November 1999 argued that 'the two options are either the east with 
its frightening power and negative energy and lack of democratic traditions and lack of sympa~y 
for the individual human freedom, (backwards) and forwards there's only the pan-European uruty 
whose roots are in ludaeo-Christianity ... But if we fail to detach ourselves form this natural feeling 
of hostility towards the West, and if we don't draw the line between disagreement ~nd hatred, we 
will allow the boat of our government to drift towards the authoritarian east. We Will make 
irremediable/irreversible mistake by doing so ... In the last century, the genius Russian thinker and 
ecstatic mystic, Vladimir Sergeevich Solovev, wrote verses in which he was asking ~s ~otherla.nd 
which east do you want to be: the east of Xerxes or the east of Christ? It seems that It s time agam 
to answer this harsh and direct question. ' 
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constant national interests'" (Goble, 1998). This admiration for Gorchakov and the 
interpretation of his policies tells us much about Primakov's foreign policy 
thinking. Primakov clearly saw his role as Russia's top diplomat in these terms.215 
The overlap in language among political parties was, not surprisingly, 
confusing. 'The Yeltsin regime was skilful enough to co-opt even the most extreme 
nationalists, who were much closer to the regime's byzantine worldview than was 
the democratic left' (Reddaway and Glinski, 2001: 364). The language of great 
powerism and suspicion of the West was easy for leaders to fall into, given the 
continuities of the post-Soviet elite from the Soviet elite. 
As the language of nationalism gained popularity, Issues such as the 
Russian diaspora also grew in importance. The loaded terms 'near abroad' or 
'former Soviet Union' which were used by nationalists and centrists, had been 
adopted by members of the presidential circle; the term implicitly suggested 
Russia's right to dominance of the region - which had already been explicitly 
stated. Referring to the CIS suggested an acceptance of the right to independence 
of these states. 
In May 1995 Clinton and Yeltsin held a summit at which 'the leaders of the 
two states stressed: Today we understand one another, our worries and concerns 
better. We failed to reach unity of views on all positions, but the main result of the 
talks is that the rumors and conjecture regarding insoluble differences or even a 
crisis in relations between Russia and the United States were convincingly 
overturned. The presidents coordinated a practical action program designed to 
implement extensive plans for cooperation between our countries in the immediate 
future. ,216 Practical cooperation on the basis of 'Russian national interests' held the 
field. 
The pragmatic consensus involved Russia developing a 'great power' rather 
than superpower mentality, like India and China. Such states are 'preoccupied with 
maintaining and strengthening their independence and sovereignty'. The 'globally 
215 Interestingly, Igor Ivanov, in 2001, also referred approvingly to Gorchakov: 'G.orchakov's main 
objective was to create the best possible external conditions for the liberal domestIC reforms 
initiated by Emperor Alexander II ... Gorchakov was well aware that ~e eno~ous .expans~ of 
Russia, its unique geographic position bridging Europe and Asia, and Its relatIvely .msuffiCIent 
economic development (compared to other leading world powers) called for an actIve but prudent 
foreign policy that avoided adventurism' (Washington QuarterZr. 2001 [2 .. L3]: 19). 
216 Krasnaia Zvezda, 12 may 1995. Cited in Russia and Eurasia Documents. 199): 2-+ 1 .. 2-+2. 
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omnipresent US and the countries of the European Union, which were committed 
to transatlantic solidarity and institutions, usually did not view the world in these 
terms. Instead, both the US and the EU employed a rhetoric of globalization, 
integration, and democratic enlargement during the 1990s' (Zevelev, 2002c: -+52). 
Unlike the US 'with its visions of "building a better world", Russia 'portrays itself 
in a more humble way ... Russia describes itself as "one of the world's major 
countries, with centuries of history and rich traditions" (Zevelev, 2002c: 452). 
* * * 
The West remained, as it had been for two hundred years, Russia's most significant 
external point of reference in the development of its identity debate. During the 
1990s, the dominant view of Russia's national identity altered from pro-
Westernism to a form of statist nationalism that emphasised the need for Russia to 
defend its national interests which meant in practice a degree of cooperation with 
the West; this altered concept of national identity, based on historical formulas, led 
to a change in how Russian policy-makers viewed Russia's role in the world. The 
West had played a large part in this process. Disillusionment with the West 
combined with Russia's historically based national identity debate led to the end of 




RUSSIAN AND NATO: 
THE CONSTRUCTIVIST EXPLANATION 
The Westemising view which dominated the early leadership came to be replaced 
by a more 'balanced' view of Russia's identity which built on Eurasianist and 
Slavophile elements but which had at its centre an avowedly pragmatic and 'statist' 
view of Russia as a great power with a right to dominate the former Soviet 
republics. The aim of this chapter is to see if these developments help explain 
Russia's attitude towards NATO. The chapter will also examine NATO's role in 
the debate and how the Alliance itself acted to cause Russian perceptions of the 
West to change - and how this in turn influenced Russia's foreign policy. 
NATO's member states had almost immediately begun to discuss 
enlargement after the end of the Cold War. By June 1994 the Partnership for Peace 
(PiP) had been signed by Russia despite misgivings that it was a means of 
expediting enlargement. Despite further doubts held by many in the elite, Russia 
joined the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), after tortuous negotiations, in 1997. 
New members indeed joined NATO in 1999. Decisions towards expansion were 
therefore the outcome of several years of discussion, which included dialogue with 
Russia. 
NATO and the challenge to Russian identity 
The westernising elite 
At the beginning of Yeltsin's term as President, Kozyrev called for close relations 
with NATO as part of the pro-Western policy. He spoke of 'the need to "advance 
eastwards" the lines of "common defense" ... of the values of the [CSCE]' (Glinski 
Vassiliev, 2000: 6). Russia's aim was to achieve close relations on equal terms 
(hence partnership) and a new pan-European security structure on the basis of the 
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CSCE.217 'Atl " h 
antlclsts at t e helm of Russian foreign policy had no problem in 
principle with the idea of an "eastward expansion" of "European values" (i.e. the 
West) against the Asian "rest". In fact, the 'only divergence between them and 
some Western proponents of NATO expansion was whether Russia was entitled to 
be a part of the West's expansionary drive, or whether it should be relegated to "the 
rest'" (Glinski Vassiliev, 2000: 6-7). 
NATO's decision to enlarge without Russia, to relegate Russia to 'the rest' 
was the catalyst for change. NATO expansion implied not only exclusion, but also 
seemed to demonstrate the continuing view in the West of the potential threat 
emanating from Russia. This development played a powerful role in changing the 
weight of views in the Russian elite and would mar relations between Russia and 
the West. It had a powerful influence on Russians' perception of their country's 
place in the world. 
The end of the 'honeymoon' 
By around the middle of 1992, the prevalence among Russia's elite of the 
somewhat naIve pro-Western views dominant at the beginning of the year was 
coming to an end. Nationalists suspicious of the West became increasingly 
vociferous - they were more and more evident in public debate in the media and 
parliament and gained positions of power in the state hierarchy. Other members of 
the elite changed their public opinions (see Chapter 7). The rise of anti-NATO 
sentiment, combined with this articulation of the need for cooperation, as long as 
Russia's 'special' importance was taken into account, was part of the general tum 
away from pro-Westernism caused by those factors identified in Chapter 7, and the 
rise of pragmatic nationalism. But it was also a key cause of that change. NATO 
played an important role in how the national identity debate proceeded. 
Relations between Russia and NATO 'have always been a particularly 
difficult foreign policy sector, which is not surprising in view of the heavy burden 
217 Having championed the CSCE/OSCE throughout the 1990s, in December 2004 Russia ?locked 
the adoption of the OSCE's budget, calculating that it didn't meet Russia'~ interests. ~elat\Ons were 
spoiled for two reasons: fIrst, 'because the OSCE had the bad taste to rermnd the RUSSians about the 
commitments taken several times to remove her troops from or close bases in independent states of 
the former USSR'. Second, because the OSCE 'also took great pains to monitor elections in these 
countries, which cause the Russian Foreign Ministry to complain of' disequilibrium' in the OSeE' s 
activities (Le Monde, 9 February 2005). 
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of mutual distrust and suspicion that grew over more than 40 years' (Kelin2: s, 
2004: 17).219 NATO's decision to retain the Cold War characteristic of an exclusiye 
military alliance did nothing to remove such distrust and the decision to enlarge in 
the post-Soviet era provided fuel for the nationalists in Russia. Westemisers in the 
Russian elite therefore complained that NATO expansion merely handed opponents 
a golden opportunity to damage their credibility, gain seats in parliamentary 
elections and hurt the entire 'reform' programme. It demonstrated to many in the 
Russian elite that the West in fact did not see Russia as belonging fully to the 
Western world. It was threatening because it implied that the West ultimately saw a 
military guarantee as necessary in its dealings with Russia. The rise of anti-
Westernism and anti-NATO feelings were tied up with each other. 
The effects of exclusion were influential in their own right. 'Being 
"outside" affects the way people perceive themselves and their environment. It also 
affects their relationships with both "insiders" and fellow "outsiders". Exclusion 
from the expanding NATO alliance influences outsiders' security perceptions and 
the way they view their role in Europe. The perception of exclusion, therefore, has 
important consequences for the domestic and foreign policies of outsiders' (Light 
et aI, 2000a: 1). 
A sense of exclusion was not only the result of NATO's official plans to 
expand. It was also caused by the tenor of US political debates, speeches and in 
much of the US media. US politicians and commentators often took an extremely 
hostile or disdainful attitude to Russia. The official documents argued otherwise: 
talk of 'equal partnership' (NATO, 2000: paragraph 4) were added to portrayals of 
Russia as an important part of NATO's future. Javier Solana, on Russian television 
in May 1998, for example, said that 'It is difficult to imagine [Europe] without 
Russia ... basic European organizations such as NATO and the European Union 
should be open to all European countries" (Summary of World Broadcasts, 28 May 
1998). As Kober (1996) pointed out, however, the Russians were not 'blind': 'Are 
we supposed to win the Russians' trust by telling them NATO expansion is not 
2\8 Andrei Kelin was First Deputy Director, Department of General European Cooperation, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Russia. . . 
219 As Dmitri Trenin put it, 'farsighted opponents of NATO expansion opposed Its approaching the 
shores of the Vistula and Vltava if only not to let it come to the ~ eman and ~ arva. They feared and 
continue to fear not so much NATO expansion as the transformation of Russia's political regime 
into something like Scythians deeply inimical to the West' (Mosco\!· Times. July 16. 199-;'). 
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directed against them? Are we to assume the Russians are that gullible? Apparently 
we are also to assume that they never read statements by prominent Americans to 
the contrary (Kober, 1996: paragraph 29). 
These prominent American views were noted by Russian commentators. 
Kortunov (1998: 1-2) for example, in citing Brzezinski, Kissinger and many others, 
highlighted these 'Russophobic sentiments' in which Russia is either a supplicant, 
or, when it shows the least sign of revival and independence of policy, 
demonstrates a "'revival of Russian imperial potential". .. In other words, each and 
every nation, except the Russians as an imperial nation, has the right to self-
determination and national interests'. The tone of such notions suggests that 
'Russia is not welcome in the "effective" security structures in Europe ... The 
arguments in favour of NATO enlargement often have anti-Russian connotations, if 
not direct mentioning of Russian threat. Clashing with Russia's objections, they 
mutually reinforce each other. Moreover, investigation of both sides' strategic 
interests reinforces this point about the inescapable Russian-enlarged NATO 
contention' (Krivosheev, 1997: 192-193). 
Trent Lott, the US Senate majority leader, argued that 'Those countries not 
invited to join NATO this summer [1997] should be assured that NATO 
enlargement will not be a one-time event. Otherwise, the security of Europe could 
be undermined as, for example, the Baltic States ... succumb to the fear that they 
will be abandoned to the whims of a powerful neighbor for the second time this 
century.' William Safire, a prominent New York Times columnist, stated that 
'Russia is authoritarian at heart and expansionist by habit' .220 This was a reiteration 
of Kissinger's remarks (Kissinger, 1995 and 1996) on Russia's 'proclivity' for 
expansion. Brzezinski, too, had put forward this idea. Madeleine Albright,221 
testifying before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted that 'questions 
about the future of Russia [remain and that]... one should not dismiss the 
possibility that Russia could return to the patterns of the past' (cited in Starr, 1998: 
6). Mark Gage222 stated in 1998 that Russian 'challenges' to US foreign policy -
like the attempt at 'creating the "multipolar world" that prevents the United States 
220 Cited in Zevelev (2002a: 6-7). 
111 h . 
-- Secretary of State at t e tIme. . 
222 Professional Staff Member for East Europe and the New Independent States Comnuttee on 
International Relations, in the House of Representatives. 
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from exercising global leadership ... will make the U.S. less able and willing to ... 
assist or support states neighbouring Russia as they seek to consolidate their 
independence from Russian domination' Gage saw a sinister Russian plot in 
'support' for President Lukashenko of Belarus for economic and political reasons: 
he was the 'first step' in Russia's dream of recreating the Soviet Union. Gage 
suggested that Russia's aim is to 'undermine NATO, with the ultimate objective of 
effectively getting the US out of Europe ... While some argue that Russia's 
agreement to a NATO-Russia Council shows a new willingness to accept NATO 
and its expansion eastward, I would instead recommend that they watch closely 
how Russia seeks to influence the individual NATO allies and how it seeks to use 
the revisions in the [CFE Treaty] ... Russia cares more about its future ability to 
affect affairs in Europe than about maintaining an effective organization that _ 
along with the European Union - can link all of Europe into a cohesive, 
cooperative whole' (Gage, 1998).223 
Russian nationalism and NATO 
To the sense of exclusion were added powerful symbols of failure and humiliation 
which provided fuel for Russian nationalism. Pride of place was given to NATO 
and its supposed master, the US. Thus 'the communist-nationalist political 
opposition to Yeltsin's government at home quickly realized that the prospect of 
NATO's extension eastward could be exploited so as to undermine the 
government's nationalist credentials. Nationalists described dealings between the 
Russian leadership and NATO as betrayals of Russian national interests. Anti-
Westerners 'blame NATO's opening to the East [on] ... intrigues by anti-Russian 
forces in the West. They fear that foreign policy aimed at integrating Russia into 
Western institutions will relegate the country to a second-rate power and will insult 
Russia's national dignity' (Parkhalina, 2002: 2). Ziuganov was able to call on 
perhaps the most powerful symbol available to the opposition, the Great Patriotic 
223 Some Western commentators increased their own warnings on Russia's tendencies to aggression 
and expansion as the anti-NATO talk: heated up in Russia. There was then a vicious cir.de of . 
negative perceptions. The language used by Ziuganov, Zhirinovskii and others playe~ Its p~rt m. 
creating a certain image of Russia within Western capitals, in which the fear of RussIan natIOnalIsm 
has helped determine NATO's policy of enlargement. This response has also giv~n sup~ort to those 
in central and eastern European countries who argue that membership of NATO IS reqUIred because 
of the persistent Russian threat to their security. 
163 
War, and link it to NATO expansion. NATO here was tied into the general anti-
Western discourse among Russia's nationalists. A link could even be made 
between NATO and Nazi Germany, which was possible because of the rise of 
virulently anti-Western nationalism and the associated view of Russia's identity 
which they espoused. These were fuelled by NATO's moves. Yeltsin and Kozyre\" 
could therefore be portrayed as traitors in the most emotive imagery available. 
Ziuganov described as 'blasphemous' the fact that in 1994 'in Brussels on 
the 22nd June [the anniversary of the Nazi invasion of the USSR] our Foreign 
Minister Kozyrev, on behalf of Yeltsin, is signing a treaty on the entry of the 
Russian Federation into the Partnership for Peace programme'. As Chapter 7 
described, the Communist Party managed to combine various nationalist and 
Communist ideas in some novel combinations. The use of the word 'blasphemous' 
here is one example. As Ziuganov explained, 'The real aim of this programme is 
not to guarantee peace, but the gradual introduction into NATO of former socialist 
states which used to be part of the Warsaw Pact. The new organisation, in this way, 
is set to become an instrument of geopolitical expansion to confirm a new world 
order. It was [president] ... Bush who first introduced the concept of a new world 
order and he borrowed the term from Nazi Germany. After the unilateral 
dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty, Bush announced at a session of the NATO 
CounciL .. that NATO and the military presence of the US in Europe are required 
for another 100 years or so. The new twist to US expansionism, which is 
implemented under the banner ofPtP is aimed above all against Russia's rebirth as 
a great power'. 224 Ziuganov linked the expansion of NATO not only to Nazi 
Germany, but to the West's general attempt to destroy Russian power. Thus there 
was a link between the Nazi invasion and 'the establishment of a new world order 
in which as Pentagon specialists underline, the first aim is to prevent the rebirth of 
a rival great power from appearing on the territory of the former Soviet Union and 
other places. In the light of this the capitulation of Russian diplomacy must be seen 
as yet another betrayal of Russia's national interests on the 53rd anniversary of the 
b .. f H' I ' I B b ' 225 eglnnmg 0 It er span ar arossa . 
224 Zasedanii Gosudarstvenoi Dumi; Bulletin no. 42, 22 June 1994: 6, paragraph 1. 
225 Zasedanii Gosudarstvenoi Dumi; Bulletin no. 42, 22 June 1994: 6, paragraph 2. 
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Russian nationalists examined NATO and its plans for expansion through a 
'great power lens' and 'created a new reality of an alleged anti-Russian strateav 
0_ 
based exclusively on the inferred goal of primacy ... many American policies 
would have bothered Russia little had they not interfered with the core of Russia's 
strategic vision, namely maintaining their role as a great power' (Zevelev, 2002c: 
456). NATO expansion had become the most obvious result of the pro-Western 
policy. 
In response, Yeltsin rapidly moved to close the rhetorical gap with the 
Communists, so that there was 'no longer a serious difference between government 
and opposition on the issue,.226 He often took an extremely aggressive line towards 
NATO, playing the role of the tough statesman defending his country's national 
interests, and felt the need to threaten serious consequences if NATO were to 
expand. In December 1994, for example, he caused a stir at the CSCE Summit in 
Budapest by 'refusing to condemn the violence in Bosnia and sharply attacking 
NATO's plans for a fast-track expansion into the former Soviet satellite states of 
eastern Europe ... Yeltsin mentioned a "cold peace'" (Moscow Times, December 8 
1994). In his address to the Federal Assembly in February 1995, talking of 'the 
new democratic Russia', he explained that 'sometimes we hear people say that it is 
premature to discuss partnership with the new Russia. As a rule, this kind of talk 
conceals an intention to oust a potential rival. If such sentiments gain the upper 
hand in the West, all efforts to build a fairer and more secure world order will be 
thwarted. Mankind would not then stride towards the 21 st century; it would instead 
be thrown back into the 19th century... such attempts are characterized by the 
declared intention to prod NATO towards an expansion to the east - to the 
detriment of joint efforts to formulate a new model of genuine pan-European 
security ... the West wants to expand NATO for the ostensible reason of protecting 
East European countries from Moscow's evil intentions. Let me state quite frankly: 
we have no evil intentions. Whatever the controversies of the transition period, 
Russia is devoted to democratic values' .227,228 
226 Allen Lynch, cited in Williams & Neumann, 2000: 382. 
227 Cited in Russia and Eurasia Documents, 1995: 6. 
228 Western concerns to protect the eastern European and former Soviet states from a possible 
Russian threat predated the end of the Soviet Union. In January 1991, for example, the :\ATO 
leadership had urged Gorbachev 'not to use force and intimidations against [the Baltic sta~es]' 
(Hunns, 1997: 1). NATO Secretary General Womer had also 'attempted to reassure the \\arsaw 
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Defenders of the national interest 
In the construction of national identity as it occurred in Russia in the 1990s 
, 
members of the elite clearly perceived their own role as defenders of the national 
interest to include overt hostility to NATO expansion. Opposition to NATO was a 
key factor in providing some unanimity among the elite. Thus 'the only issue we 
have more or less unity on, is our disapproval of NATO' (Rogov, in Kozyrev et aI., 
1996: 27). There are some 'fundamental foreign policy issues most of the political 
forces in Russia agree on. Extremely negative attitude toward NATO's 
enlargement is one of the issues that unite Russian political elite' (Zevelev: 2).229 
This was articulated 'through a new set of doctrinal documents' (Kassianova, 2001: 
829-830), the national security and foreign policy documents of 1997 and 2000. 
In public speeches, the language of 'national interests' and opposition to 
NATO expansion (and standing up for Russia's interests) had become 
predominant. In his state of the nation address of February 1996, Yeltsin stated that 
'the possible expansion of NATO is the most serious current challenge to Russian 
interests' (RFE/RL, 25 February, 1996). The Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev, 
also in February 1996 and following a visit to Belgrade, stated that 'Russia would 
take "appropriate measures" to counter NATO enlargement. .. if NATO expands, 
Russia would "start to look for new partners in CEE and the CIS to set up a new 
politico-military alliance'" (RFEIRL, 12 February 1996). However, by June, 
Grachev was offering NATO cooperation if it would refrain from expansion. He 
'supported making the current temporary liaison offices there permanent. NATO 
liaison officers were to be invited to work with the Russian General Staff. A 
Pact countries of the West's good intentions and promised support for Gorbachev's reforms in the 
USSR in return for progress on human rights, including self-determination, "responsible behaviour 
in foreign policy and a reduced military potential" ... The Soviet Union's demise took the West by 
surprise, but it was not wrong-footed ... After their London Summit meeting in July 1990, the 
NATO Heads of State and Government, affIrmed ... that the Cold War was over. That should, in the 
opinion of some Western commentators, have led immediately to the disbanding of N A TO, quid pro 
quo for the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact ... Worner engaged in a campaign to save the Alliance, 
and especially to keep the USA's participation in it ... Worner therefore continually warned his 
Western audiences about the East's superiority in the number of troops and in certain types of 
military equipment. .. and about its continued modernisation of its weaponry. Nevertheless, in \1ay 
1991, the US House of Representatives called for a reduction of US troops in Europe from 250,000 
to 100,000' (Hunns, 1997: 1). 
229 See also Rogov (1996). 
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colonel-general was to head the office, giving it "much higher status" than the 
liaison offices of other PfP countries' (RFEIRL, 17 June 1996). 
In the summer 1996 presidential elections, both Yeltsin and Ziuganov could 
agree that Russia should defend its 'interests' and oppose NATO expansion, and 
indeed Yeltsin was granted some breathing space by the US government, in order 
to manage this, by means of a pause in public discussion of NATO expansion 
plans. Once Yeltsin had secured a hard-fought victory, he began to criticise 
NATO's plans more vociferously once more. On 18 March 1997, in the build up to 
his summit meeting with Clinton, which he described as potentially 'the hardest in 
Russian-American relations', Yeltsin complained about US trade restrictions, "the 
holding of NATO exercises in the Black Sea against Russia's wishes, and the 
"exclusion" of Russia from international organisations "because of opposition from 
the US", arguing that "NATO is an American organisation" reiterating opposition 
to NATO expansion and "ruling out" suggestions that Russia might join the 
alliance unless it transforms itself into a purely political organisation, and that 
Start-III talks could not begin until Washington and Moscow resolve their 
differences over the 1972 ABM treaty' (RFEIRL, 18 March 1997). 
NATO was usually described by the Russian elite as an imperialistic, 
aggressive force that was attempting to impose a military ring around Russia. This 
language contrasted Western militarism with Russia's role as bearer of generous 
and Christian principles for the benefit of all mankind. NATO expansion was 
described as the key 'betrayal' by the West of Russia's magnanimous declaration 
of peace which ended to Cold War. While Russia retained its interest in becoming 
an important member of the 'civilised' world, hostility to NATO remained. In early 
1997 Dmitri Riurikov23o said that "overcoming the concept of NATO expansion 
eastwards will be a "major goal" of Yeltsin's foreign policy during 1997 ... 
Moscow views NATO expansion "as a kind of offense ... Russia won the Cold War 
by doing away with military confrontation for the good of all countries'" (RFEIRL, 
2 January 1997). Russian First Deputy Defence Minister Andrei Kokoshin warned 
that NATO could 'set off a backlash against Russian reforms if it expands ... 
[because it is a] "historical injustice". This is the way it was seen by opponents of 
230 A foreign policy aide to Yeltsin. 
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refonn. "We have retreated to the east and NATO is advancing, pushing us further 
and further east'" (RFE/RL, 5 February 1996). 
The consensus on pragmatic nationalism 
The gathering of elite views around a consensus reflected the manner in which 
debate over Russia's national identity was conducted. There were a few areas in 
which agreement was possible, and many disagreements remained. However, a 
centrist and consensual position could be reached because confrontation between 
Russia and the West on a 'civilizational or geopolitical basis' can 'play a 
stabilizing role in the evolution of the new Russian state. Under the accustomed 
conditions of a hostile front, it is easier to fonnulate and enforce a single national 
ideology, at the same time consolidating the authoritarian foundations of power' 
(Trenin, 1996: 33). 
Thus NATO's exclusivity was a useful tool for the elite in building a vision 
of Russian identity, which resonated well with history and which also served in an 
attempt to bind the popUlation against an external threat. The pragmatic realist 
consensus created this opportunity: it could cope with the enlargement of NATO as 
long as powerful and loud obj ections were made. The development of the national 
identity debate in Russia involved a balance between nationalism and pragmatism; 
many members of the Russian elite adopted the language of pragmatic, realistic 
independent foreign policy, whose keynote was hostility to NATO expansion, 
combined with a world-weary acceptance of the need to 'do business' with that 
organisation. Russian national identity did not involve a total break from the West 
and acceptance of Slavophile or Eurasianist ideas. It emphasised Russia's 
predominantly European character, and the need for Russia to have close dealings 
with the West. The pragmatic aspect was included in the official national identity 
discourse because the West remained an important part of Russian foreign policy 
as a necessary partner; this reflected the widely-held view among the elite that 
Russia was more European than Asian. Where the consensus differed most clearly 
from Atlanticist foreign policy was in its assessment of Russia as a unique great 
power whose interests should at the same time be defended. The key themes were 
national interests and independence. 
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In keeping with the pragmatic theme of Russian foreign policy thinking, 
many members of the elite (those in the presidential administration and in the 
ministries with responsibility for foreign policy) were keen to describe ~ATO 
expansion as being something more or less inevitable, and hence their role as being 
to make the best of a bad job. Russia's current and unfortunate weakness meant 
they acted on behalf of a European great power rather than a superpower, and 
hence there was a need for realism in relations with NATO. Solana affirmed, as if 
to emphasise this point, that NATO's expansion decision had been taken 'long ago' 
(RFE/RL, 12 March 1996). 
Pragmatic realist foreign policy was in part a result of the realisation of 
Russia's weakness. It was NATO that forced home the message that pragmatism 
was necessary, given this weakness, and hence the Alliance had a powerful 
influence on Russian perceptions. 
There was prevarication on NATO's enlargement throughout the 1990s. 
Kozyrev, in early 1993 for example, was still saying (while emphasising Russia's 
'vital interests' in the former USSR) that 'Russia sees cooperation with NATO as 
an effective mechanism for overcoming the division of Europe and for mutual 
adaptation'. Yeltsin, on a visit to Poland in August 1993, claimed that Russia 
would welcome NATO enlargement to include that country and others. This was in 
fact hastily retracted and 'shortly afterwards the Russian government. .. expressed 
outright oppOSItIon to the Eastern and Central European states joining NATO' 
(Braun, 1997: 58).231 In 1994, a high-ranking representative of the Foreign 
Ministry could still use the word partnership with regard to the West, albeit 
qualified by criticism of NATO and emphasis of Russia's importance. He added 
that 'naturally, Russia's partnership with NATO should be more advanced both in 
scope and content than that with other countries' (Kazantsev, 1994: 21_22).232 
The official foreign policy and national security documents reflect the 
balanced, pragmatic view of NATO expansion which had become dominant in the 
231 NATO itself was under pressure in the post-Soviet period and was prone to its own bureaucratic 
and national divisions as it tried to create a raison d 'etre. The new political and strategic situation in 
Europe after the end of the Cold War meant that the Alliance 'found itself under considerable 
external pressure [from the central and eastern European states] ... This rush of requests for 
admission caught NATO unprepared and thus created an embarrassment (Bebler, 19~9: 49). 
232 Evgenii Kazantsev was Deputy Director of the Department of European CooperatIOn of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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Russian elite. In 1993, NATO 'was referred to in terms of the potential for 
"collaboration" and "exchanges" ... as an embodiment of "western values" ... 
NATO [was regarded as] ... one of the several elements of the security mechanism 
in Europe' (Kassianova, 2001: 835). In 1997, however, NATO was considered to 
be 'a source of "'division" ... and implications of "unilateralness", subsequently 
developed by the 2000 documents into the allusion to "Western institutions as 
forums of limited membership'" (Kassianova, 2001: 835-836). In keeping with the 
struggle to define Russian identity, the view of NATO in these documents was 
clearly directed towards the desire to manage a workable relationship. The key 
problems of NATO expansion (confirmation of which came at the Washington 
summit in April 1999), intensified bombing of Iraq and actions in the former 
Yugoslavia, had the affect of derailing only temporarily this attempted modus 
vivendi which seemed to reflect Russia's own vacillation in its domestic struggle to 
define itself. 
The language used by Primakov and many other members of Russia's elite 
followed from the development of the consensus on Russian identity.233 In his first 
speech on accepting the job of Foreign Minister, on 12 January 1996, he argued 
that 'Russia was and remains a great power. Her foreign policy should correspond 
to that status'. He expressed a desire for reasonably friendly relations with the US, 
though 'we proceed from the need for an equitable... mutually beneficial 
partnership'. Any further expansion of NATO would disrupt this equilibrium: 'I 
have a negative attitude to the possible expansion of NATO. I think it is 
counterproductive for the stabilisation of the situation in Europe and would 
undoubtedly create a new geopolitical situation for Russia' .234 In an interview with 
Izvestiia soon after his appointment, in March, he said that Moscow would '''more 
vigorously and effectively" defend Russia's interests, rejecting a "strategic alliance 
[with] former Cold War adversaries," warning that any enlargement of NATO 
would only encourage "a revival of the Russian military and a more assertive 
Russian policy in Europe." In saying that Russia's goal would also be closer 
233 The Foreign Intelligence Service, under Prirnakov, had produced the report on 'Russi~-CIS: 
Does the West's Position Need Modification?' (for details see Chapter 5). Attempts by -:\ATO to 
expand would compel Moscow to review its military planning and deployments, \\ith negative 
consequences for the country's internal reforms. 
234 Cited by Leighton (1996: 3). 
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integration of the newly independent states, he describes them as "parts of the 
fonner Soviet Union" rather than the CIS' .235 
In its dealings with NATO under Primakov, Russia often displayed a sense 
of the need for compromise. In August 1996, Primakov publicly suggested 
compromise on NATO expansion. But conflicting messages were sent out. In late 
September 1996, for example, Yeltsin said that a Russia-NATO pact must precede 
expansion, signifying that Russia saw expansion as inevitable but hoped to 
influence the tenns under which it occurred. However Primakov also reiterated at 
this time his long-standing threats to revise a 'whole series' anns control 
agreements if NATO were to accept new members. Again, this seemed to be aimed 
at influencing the possible NATO-Russia pact rather than blocking expansion. In 
October 1996, in an article in Nezavisimaia Gazeta,236 Primakov laid out four 
conditions for a stable post-Cold War international order. 'Preventing "new 
dividing lines"; breaking the mentality of "leaders" and "led"; democratising 
international economic relations; coordinating cooperative action by the 
international community; [and] that the OSCE should lead a European security 
system, while conceding that NATO, the EU and UN should play important 
parts ... Russia was ready to negotiate a special pact with NATO if necessary' 
(RFEIRL, 22 October 1996). 
In January 1997, Aleksandr Lebed travelled in his capacity as Chairman of 
the Security Council to Western Europe to visit NATO headquarters. His position 
on expansion was 'characterized as "flexible" by Senator William Roth (president 
of the North Atlantic Assembly), (RFEIRL, 21 January 1997). A major nationalist 
figure, Lebed demonstrated an ambivalent, pragmatic attitude towards NATO, with 
the explanation that expansion was inevitable, but the damage to Russia's interests 
should be minimised.237 
By the mid-1990s, coinciding with NATO's increasing talk of expansion 
(culminating at Madrid in 1997), the consensus and the relationship with NATO 
can be seen to have settled into a pattern of overt hostility combined with talk of 
235 Cited by Goble (1996). 
236 Owned by Boris Berezosvkii's LogoVAZ Industrial-Financial Group. 
m Aleksandr Lebed had gone from folk hero after his activities as commander of the l .. jth Army in 
Moldova, to presidential candidate (coming third in the fIrst round of the 1996 elections), and 
thence to his appointment as Chairman of the Security Council. He was sacked from all posts by 
Yeltsin in October 1996 and later became Governor of Krasnoiarsk Krai. 
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compromise - as long as NATO showed respect to Russia by singling it out as 
unique and hence a country with which NATO needed to establish a special 
relationship. The tone of Russian officials in 1997 did briefly become more harsh 
with confirmation that NATO was to accept new members. Russian Minister of 
Defence Sergeev,238 for example, visited Germany on 28-29 January. He met 
Germany's Foreign Minister and complained that NATO expansion 'doesn't 
threaten anybody except Russia'. In February 1998 Russia criticised a plan to 
create a north-east NATO corps to be NATO's first-ever permanent military 
mission in central and eastern Europe. Sergeev argued that the move amounted to 
NATO's 'advancing toward the Russian border with weapons in its hands' 
(RFEIRL, 6 February 1998). But until the Kosovo conflict the general tenor of the 
language used remained remarkably stable. 
The modified restorationism which accepted that the empire would never be 
restored in its entirety (although Russia should still dominate the Eurasian space) 
matched the pragmatic foreign policy: a strong state had to prove its worth by 
rebuilding Russian greatness, denying the West the spoils of an ill-gotten victory in 
the Cold War, forming a union with Belarus, and asserting control over the 'near 
abroad'. 
As regards the public at large, survey results show that NATO expansion 
'was both far more salient and a source of greater concern for Russian elites than it 
was for mass publics in 1995. In 1995, all foreign policy issues were of less 
concern both to elites and to mass publics than their misgivings about "the inability 
of Russia to resolve its internal problems'" (Zimmerman, 2001: 239). VTsIOM 
found inconclusive evidence in 1997. A poll in January of that year found that 
'50% of Russians oppose admission of former Soviet Union states to NATO and 
41 % say former Warsaw Treaty states shouldn't join; but 17% and 22% were 
indifferent to the issue of NATO membership for former Soviet Union or WTO 
states, respectively. Asked how Russia should defend its interests, 26% said it 
should not join any alliances, 22% favored cooperation with NATO, 17% said 
Russia should form its own alliance with other CIS states and 8% said Russia 
should join NATO' (RFEIRL, 21 January 1997). A recent nationwide poll by 
VTsIOM found that 'only 29.7% of respondents said they were "concerned" about 
238 Sergeev had taken over from Grachev after the latter's sacking in August 1997. 
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NATO's plans for eastward expansion, while 44.7% said they were not concerned 
by such plans' (RFEIRL, 20 June, 1997). 
Thus, 'Russian society demonstrated a remarkably low mobilization 
potential [because] the overwhelming majority of Russians do not care about 
foreign policy. Foreign policy has always been an elite sport in Russia and this is 
even more the case now, given the enormous domestic problems that the country 
must face' (Kortunov, 1999: 23). Compared to issues such as price inflation and 
unemployment, NATO expansion is of limited interest. Opinion polls 'support the 
idea that the Russian people, while generally, if asked, voice the preference for a 
"strong country" or for NATO to desist from its expansion plans, also rank such 
matters very low on their list of priorities , (Lieven, 1995: 194).239 Parties espousing 
nationalist foreign policy programmes were the most successful in successive 
parliamentary elections. This can partly be explained as the result of anger directed 
towards the disastrous reformist programme. But at the same time, the public 
responded to the theme of 'defending Russia's national interests'. 
Russian identity in response to the challenge of NATO 
The Russian riposte 
Russia's attitude to NATO by the mid-1990s reflected the general trends outlined 
in Chapter 7. NATO was viewed by the Russian elite with the hostility combined 
with pragmatism that reflected the weight of opinion in the elite about Russia's 
relations with the West in general. This in tum was a reflection of the debates 
regarding Russian national identity that by 1995 had coalesced around a 
'consensus' on the need for a strong independent Eurasian state. 
NATO created a specific challenge for Russian foreign policy however, 
because of its promised enlargement into central and eastern Europe. Such an 
expansion was clearly not going to include Russia and there would be no equal 
partnership Moreover, NATO had in the post-Cold War years begun to describe 
itself as a force for the spread of democracy: 'ostensibly a defence alliance ... 
NATO has now attempted to sell itself as a political-security structure, in some 
D9 See also Shlapentokh (2000: 182). 
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ways competing with the EU on the political front with its avowed agenda of state 
building and the promotion of liberal democracy' (Sanford, 1999: 92).2'+0 The 
reaction in Russia was to 'retreat to an old role - that of a strategic nation-state 
trying to maximise its national interest in keeping its former allies from becomina 
~ 
allied to NATO [but] this role was denied to it by NATO's new self-identification 
as a "democratic security community''' (Williams & Neumann, 2000: 361-362). 
Thus 'the oft-noted vacillations in Russian NATO policy in the first half of the 
1990s ... are explained by NATO's power to specify the roles which Russia could 
legitimately adopt and the unease of the Russian leadership in coming to terms with 
conducting a policy predicated on these terms' (Williams & Neumann, 2000: 361-
362). The Communist Party's 'principal thinker on foreign policy and Vice 
Chairman of the Duma Committee on International Affairs, Aleksey Podberezkin, 
[understood that] "the first holds that Russia's national security points out a 
separate path for the country"... another approach is oriented towards bringing 
western values to Russia and towards her joining "the family of civilized nations" 
at any price, because, as official policy tells us, there are no alternatives to this 
'joining'" (Williams & Neumann, 2000: 377-378). 
An examination of Russian foreign policy statements, however, shows that 
Russia did manage to come up with a riposte in kind, which was partly about 
building a new identity for the nation and partly about combating NATO's 
ambitious new claims. It developed in reaction to the challenge presented by 
NATO, but was based on historical national identity models. The Russian 
leadership began to describe NATO itself as less than civilised, as a threat to peace 
- and Russia as the defender of civilised values. In other words, Russia was no 
longer with NATO as a global defender of civilisation (as in the honeymoon 
phase), but against, and superior to NATO as the defender of civilisation. In 1998, 
in a discussion of the possibility of Russia joining NATO, Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov argued that it would be unthinkable: 'just as I see no prospect of Russia 
joining the European Union ... if Russia were to join these organizations would 
cease to be what they are. Our country is too great, the Russian scale of things .. " is 
too expansive. Neither NATO nor the EU could simply remain as they \\"ere' 
(Summary of World Broadcasts, 29 October 1998). 
240 See also The Spectator, 25 No\'ember 2000. 
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Russia was thus cast in the role familiar throughout the past two centuries as 
a force for morality counterposed to the often venal and militaristic West. The 
vision of Russian national identity dominant among the elite from the mid-1990s 
allowed the foreign policy-makers to create this counter to NATO's moves. This 
role was subsumed to the general pragmatic nationalist vision in which independent 
Russia was obliged to deal with the West, and competed with the other visions of 
Russian identity which struggled for supremacy in the 1990s; but it allowed the 
Russian leadership to seize the moral high ground when it was necessary to salvage 
dignity in the face of NATO's overwhelming power and their diplomatic 
impotence. 
The Russian elite's response to NATO's new interest in peacemaking in the 
former Yugoslavia was therefore to suggest that by acting 'unilaterally', NATO 
was a threat to European and world peace. The latter was being upheld by Russia. 
This was often part of wider Russian complaints about the creation of a dangerous, 
'unipolar' world order. Yeltsin's speech to the UN General Assembly 50th Jubilee 
Session (22 October 1995), for example, contained many references to a system of 
security in Europe that is for 'the whole of Europe, or, as was the case previously, 
one that is only for some. The strengthening of one bloc today will mean the 
beginning of new confrontation tomorrow. That is not the way to build ajust world 
order. Such an order has to be based on different principles. Russia is for a world 
order in which priority is given to international law and international cooperation ... 
in which a steady movement toward peace is guaranteed, free of weapons of mass 
destruction, and in which the role of the United Nations will grow, as an instrument 
for achieving peace, resolving conflict, and providing aid for development' .241 
Such arguments could be adapted for use against the US and its allies even 
when NATO itself was not strictly involved. In December 1998, following 
bombings in Iraq, the Duma adopted a statement by a huge majority (394 votes in 
favour, one against and two abstentions; and supported by the Foreign Minister, 
Ivanov) that the parliament 'resolutely condemns "the barbaric bombing of the 
Republic of Iraq, carried out by the USA and Great Britain without the 
authorization of the UN Security Council" ... Primakov rejected [AI Gore's] ... 
arguments for airstrikes [against Iraq] telling him that "Russia unequivocally 
241 Cited in Russia and Eurasia Documents, 1995: 255. 
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condemns the American and British military action and regards it as a crude 
violation of the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council, the UN Charter 
and the universally recognized principles of international law"... According to 
Primakov, the Anglo-American action against Iraq "infringes the whole of the 
world legal order that has been established since the second world war and 
undermines the efforts and authority of the UN Security Council'" (Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 19 December 1998). 
Another way in which the Russian leadership managed to portray Russia as 
being morally superior to NATO was by means of the emphasis on Russia's role in 
ending the Cold War, which could be described as a unilateral action taken for the 
benefit of all. The logical next step for humanity would be a world in which 
dividing lines were removed and a multipolar world order established rather than a 
unipolar order led by the United States. As Minister of Defence Sergeev put it, 'On 
the threshold of the 21 st century, we have rid the world community of a heavy 
burden - the global confrontation between two opposing political systems. In its 
place, a new process has begun, one of transition to a multipolar world order in 
which there is a growing variety of political, economic and cultural developments 
in states and nations ... Today it is an established fact that Russia and NATO do not 
regard each other as adversaries ... [but] In spite of the fact that the line of military 
confrontation between the two blocs has been erased from the map of Europe, there 
are still forces striving to create new dividing lines on the continent' (Sergeev, 
1998: 16). The PJC, Sergeev argued, 'may provide a favourable basis for extending 
cooperation and for arriving at mutually acceptable solutions to existing problems 
between Russia and NATO. However, there are fears that these arrangements may 
not be implemented in full. These fears would be justified if Russia's role in the 
Permanent Joint Council was arbitrarily restricted. Russia cannot remain passive in 
response to NATO's eastward expansion ... the implementation of these plans, in 
their present form, could be a destabilising factor in contemporary international 
relations .... [the new] security architecture should be based on the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe ... the only organisation on the continent that 
fully reflects the interests of all participating states in its activities and ensures all 
have equal rights, irrespective of their membership of various unions and alliances' 
(Sergeev, 1998: 18). 
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Kosovo and a unipolar world 
The actions by NATO in Kosovo brought about the low-point in Russia-::\ATO 
relations. It also brought home to the Russian elite the fact that the PJC would not 
fulfil the role they had hoped it would, because Russia had not been consulted on 
the decision to use force. The Communist faction in the Duma took up the cause of 
'brother Slavs, Christians as its own. Fiery speeches were made about the unity of 
the Slavic and Christian peoples' (Brovkin, 1999: 21). The Communists managed 
to put Yeltsin on the defensive. 'He could not comfortably explain why Russia was 
inactive when its "brothers" were being systematically bombed into the ground. 
The only explanation that came to mind was Russia's weakness, which the 
opposition claimed was the result of Yeltsin's pro-Western policy. The salvation 
for Russia, so the argument went, was not to seek favors from the West... not to 
swallow insults but to show that it still was a power to be reckoned with. Russia 
had to show to the world that no European problem could be resolved without her. 
This was the official line of the Russian President echoed in stronger terms by the 
Communists and Nationalists ... When TV stations reported from Belgrade day 
after day about NATO bombing raids and destroyed bridges, hospitals and 
apartment blocs, showing hundreds of thousands of refugees supposedly on the run 
because of NATO bombing, it was hard in such an atmosphere to defend NATO 
actions in Russia' (Brovkin, 1999: 20). 
Kosovo seemed to show what the future held for a US-led, unipolar world. 
Yeltsin himself said that 'the Russian President warns NATO not to "push [Russia] 
towards military action. Otherwise there will be a minimum of a European or 
maybe even a world war, which must not be permitted'" (RFEIRL, 12 April 1999). 
The crisis 'drew together all the political forces in Russia (except the marginal 
politicians)' (Fedorov, 1999: 51). During interviews with the foreign policy elite in 
September 1999, 'interlocutors across the political spectrum condemned the 
airstrikes against Serbia, disapproved of NATO expansion, and argued that the ne\\ 
strategic doctrine undermined Russian security. Focus group discussions confirmed 
that Kosovo had made a deep and negative impression on people at all levels of 
society' (Light at aI., 2000a: 5). In a nation-wide poll on 27-30 March 1999, '90 
per cent of respondents said that NATO had no right to bomb Yugoslavia \\"ithout 
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the approval of the UN Security Council. A year later, 56 per cent of respondents 
believed that NATO is an aggressive alliance, while only 17 per cent regarded it as 
an alliance for defence' (Light et aI., 2000b: 494). 
During the period when activity in Kosovo was heating up on the road 
towards military conflict, there was a flurry of comments on the theme of NATO as 
a threat to civilisation. On meeting Kofi Annan in March 1998, Yeltsin stressed the 
UN's role in establishing a multipolar world order (Summary of World Broadcasts, 
1 April 1998). Two months later, the Minister of Defence, Sergeev, in Brussels to 
attend the PJC and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council242 and for meetings with 
NATO ministers, stressed that "the use of military force is possible only after a 
political decision and only under the aegis of the UN Security Council' (Summary 
of World Broadcasts, 11 June 1998). The same day Yeltsin stated bluntly that 
Russia-NATO relations "'remain frozen; we will see later what happens", while an 
unidentified Foreign Ministry official told Interfax that the announced pause in 
NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia is not a justification for a renewal of relations 
with NATO ... the "Russia-NATO founding act will need rethinking" he said. 
Anonymous Ministry of Defence sources said renewing relations with NATO "is 
not on our list of priorities now'" (RFEIRL, 12 June 1999). 
The point was repeated by Foreign Ministry spokesman Vladimir 
Rakhmanin243 the following day, and a week later the Russian attache to NATO 
headquarters, Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov,244 said that 'if NATO "resorts to 
any violent action to resolve the Kosovo conflict without the sanction of the UN 
Security Council, this would be the start of a new Cold War in Europe and will 
determine Russia's conduct. .. the military means is the thousand-and-first [means 
of settling the conflict]. But a decision of the UN Security Council is needed to 
make use of it" (Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 June 1998). 
In June 1999, Russia and China also issued a joint communique 
condemning the 'barbarous' bombing of Yugoslavia; at the G8 summit of June 
1999, Yeltsin talked of spreading democracy in international relations. High-
ranking officials in the Foreign Ministry added to the furore. Aleksandr Matveyev 
242 The EAPC had replaced the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1997. 
243 Spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. .. . . 
244 Head of the Defense Ministry's Main Department for InternatIOnal ;v1thtary CooperatIOn. 
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(1999: 53),245 for example, suggested that NATO's war in Yugoslavia 'manifested 
in a most graphic manner the new nature of the political system existing on this 
planet. Lying in ruins are the foundations of international law and political trust ... 
Based on the UN Charter, the international law proved too narrow to contain the 
global aspirations animating the new Goliath. Like many centuries ago, force is 
again the only criterion of importance of states and their spiritual values. 
Substitution of stone arrowheads for Tomahawks makes little change' (Mat\'eyev, 
1999: 53). Americans, he suggested, see themselves as natural rulers of the world , 
as 'the best, the most perfect, the strongest, the incomparably more humane and 
understanding. They stand taller than others, they are above others' (Matveyev, 
1999: 56). And in the end, NATO is nothing more than 'a bridle for Europe and a 
tool of intimidation hanging over many countries from Yugoslavia to Brazil' 
(Matveyev, 1999: 59). 
Nezavisimaia Gazeta (25 March 1999) pointed out the differences between 
Russia and the US, and in particular how, 'The NATO bloc took Europe to war'. 
'Waking up on Wednesday morning the Europeans learnt that during the night. .. 
Solana considered that "all efforts for reaching a political agreement of the Kosovo 
crisis through negotiations have collapsed and there is no alternative left but to take 
military action". From this moment the destiny of Europe was delivered by Solana 
into the hands of American general Wesley Clarke ... it was agreed to perpetrate an 
aggression against a sovereign state bypassing the system worked out by the 
international community after the Second World War (see Chapter Seven of the 
UN Charter). ' 
Krasnaia Zvezda, which up to then had usually adopted a reasonably 
straightforward and businesslike tone regarding NATO and the West, on 3 April 
1999 described the bombings as 'barbarian ... the general picture after the daily 
bombings ... can be expressed in two words: death and hunger. .. NATO bombings 
have provoked a massive exodus... UNHCR experts consider that "in 
circumstances of a humanitarian disaster caused by NATO, hundreds of thousands 
of people could still leave Kosovo'" on top of those thousands already dri\'en out. 
Meanwhile, the leader of the Kosovo Albanians, Ibrahim Rugova, was said to have 
declared that the bombings should stop, 'completely undermin[ing] :\ATO's 
245 Adviser at the Russian Federation's Permanent Mission to the OSeE. 
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attempts to try on the full-dress uniform of the "Balkan peacemaker'''. The 
newspaper also mentioned fears voiced by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, and the possibility of a serious environmental disaster. 
Interviewed in June 1999, Colonel-General Ivashov argued that 'The CS 
did more than any other country to trigger the war in the Balkans, and Russia did 
more than any other country to bring it to a close. The military action in 
Yugoslavia was an example of open aggression against a sovereign state ... the fact 
that a new world order has been established represents a defeat for Russia and for 
the whole world community. What we have allowed to emerge is a one-polar 
world, where one country or group of countries can impose their will on others and 
when, in the name of peace, entire countries can be transformed into ruins and 
people die .... Unless we learn the lessons from what has just happened, it could 
well be that the bombing of Yugoslavia was only a beginning - the beginning of a 
new re-division of the world through the use of force. If force can be used to make 
peace between Serbs and Albanians, then where's the guarantee that NATO, acting 
with the noblest of intentions, won't decide to use force to reconcile North and 
South Korea, Taiwan and China, to bring democracy to Belarus, Iraq and Syria? ... 
for over two months, NATO was able to use the Balkans as a testing ground for 
new forms of warfare'. His colleague, General Viktor Kazantsev suggested that 
'further shifts in the policy pursued by the North Atlantic Alliance have been in 
many respects the consequence of Russia's string of initiatives on issues of 
European organization, its firmly negative position on plans for NATO expansion, 
and demands to take into consideration the legitimate concerns of the Russian side 
in connection with the possible emergence of the NATO military machine on 
Russian borders' (Kazantsev, 1999: 23).246 
Writing after the accession of new members and the Kosovo conflict, 
Izvestiia (27 April 1999) described NATO's 50th anniversary celebrations in 
cynical terms a long way from those the newspaper was using in 1992: 'NATO's 
super summit carried out its work under the stilted rhetoric of Washington and the 
deafening sound of exploding bombs in Yugoslavia. One can wonder if Solana's 
new strategic concept of NATO is democratic ... The NATO summit took place 
under the sign of NATO's expansionism and enlargement to the east'. 
~+6 General Kazantsev would go on to head the military campaign in Chechnya in 1999. 
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Thus the Russian elite and media adapted a worldview which had developed 
over the decade to counteract NATO's own claims to be defending humanitarian 
1 . h c: 247 
va ues In t e lormer Yugoslavia. Perhaps, 'the key to understanding Russia's 
policy on [Kosovo] ... is realizing that it is only remotely related to the conflict 
itself. Russia's policy in post-Cold War European conflicts can only be understood 
through the prism of Moscow's complicated relations with the North Atlantic 
Alliance and bitter opposition to the process of NATO expansion ... Moscow still 
views NATO as a weapon aimed primarily at Russia, and NATO expansion as a 
hedge against any "future revival" of Russian power' (Stepanova 1999: 2). 
More than any other action by NATO, that which transpired in Kosovo 
seemed to suggest all that was wrong with enlargement, and what, despite its 
pragmatism, Russia stood to fear from it. Andrei Fedorov claimed that 'the war 
against Yugoslavia has done Russia at least one favor: many people, including 
those placed high enough, grew disappointed with the West as a strategic partner. It 
has been obviously taking Russia into account to the extent it sets itself. It is for 
Russia to shape her foreign policy herself once more that would rely on her idea of 
the world and her possibilities' (Fedorov, 1999: 47).248 The military action placed 
'Russian perceptions [under]. .. severe strain ... The US and NATO were striving to 
acquire world hegemony ... Not so much the substance of the new NATO polices 
as the style, the pompous omnipotence, and the demonstration of disregard to 
Russia's views and the fanfare of the fiftieth NATO anniversary tended to alienate 
Russia' (Brovkin, 1999: 2). General Lebed proposed at the Federation Council to 
declare Yugoslavia a zone of Russia's geopolitical interests. Russia was to oppose 
NATO aggression and provide military assistance to Yugoslavia. 'According to 
Lebed Russia in the role of a fighter would consolidate [Russia's] dignity and unify 
the nation.' (Brovkin, 1999: 16). 
247 Coverage of the conflict in Russia generally demonstrated that the ~ussian ~edia 'esse~tially 
reproduced Serbian propaganda lines and footage. Refugees were ~eemg ~mencan bombmg. 
Hundreds of thousands ofrefuaees were the result of NATO bombmg. This was repeated day after 
day ... This was an example of fue Soviet era manipulation of the media .. The difference \\.ith th~ 
Soviet times was that then people were in the habit of disbelieving offiCIal propaganda. "\0\\ ... 
propaganda lies were perceived as true coverage' (Brovkin, .1999: 2-3!. . . 
248 Fedorov was President of the Political Research FoundatIOn and Drrector ofPohucal Programs at 
the Foreign and Defense Policy Council. 
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After Kosovo: a return to stability 
Russia's elite described their country as a moral force faced with a physically 
powerful but immoral West. NATO represented the West's physical strength, 
potential for violence and lack of spirituality, but in other ways Russian national 
identity was closer to the West than to 'Asia'. Russia was still European and 
needed to retain its links with the West. Russia's duty was to show the West _ 
notably the US - where it was going wrong. Aleksandr Avdeev,249 while claiming 
that Moscow did not expect a return to the Cold War and categorically denying 
"any anti-US direction in our politics" argued at the same time that 'Moscow not 
only doesn't accept but "openly opposes" the West's efforts at a unipolar world and 
the "dissolution of separate but extremely important principles and norms of 
international law'" (RFE/RL, 18 November, 1999). The Russian elite managed to 
claim some success as a result of these criticisms, taking credit for the fact that, by 
the end of the decade, 'Russia no longer considers NATO enlargement to be a 
menace because the alliance has undergone a radical transformation from a Cold 
War instrument to a defence against global terrorism and other 21 st-century threats' 
(Binyon, 2002). Russia had become a great power, a leader of the multipolar 
challenge to the US. 
These arguments allowed the Russian leaders to deflect any hint of 
humiliation at their inability to influence the course of the Kosovo conflict. The 
voices of 'pragmatism' were audible once more soon after the end of the fighting in 
Kosovo. Sergei Stepashin, at that time Prime Minister, stated plainly that the 
'sufferings of Yugoslavia's population was caused not only by NATO bombings 
"but chiefly by the regime of Slobodan Milosevic'" (RFEIRL, 2 August 1999). 
Little by little their voices began to be heard ever more loudly. General Boris 
Gromov, for example, with a reputation as a tough 'patriot' and a veteran of 
resistance to Yeltsin in 1993, 'voiced the opinion echoing that of [Yeltsin] and of 
the "patriots" [that] the policy of Russia must be principled and firm. We will not 
accept NATO in the role of the World's policeman'" (Brovkin, 1999: 16). 
However, he added, 'providing military assistance to Yugoslavia would imply a 
return to the Cold War, which was unacceptable' (Brovkin, 1999: 16). In mid-
September 1999, the US Secretary of State, William Cohen, said that agreement on 
249 Deputy Foreign Minister (1996-1998), then First Deputy Foreign \1inister (1998-2002). 
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rewriting the ABM treaty was possible after a cordial meeting with Sergeev. 
Sergeev was more reticent but indicated that Moscow wanted to improve military 
relations with the US - even though he was still critical of NATO actions in 
Kosovo. First Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Avdeev, meanwhile, stated that 
Moscow did not expect to return to the Cold War. He 'categorically denied any 
anti-US direction in our politics', but he added that Moscow not only did not accept 
but openly opposed the West's efforts to create a unipolar world and the 
'dissolution of separate but extremely important principles and norms of 
international law'. 
Relations between Russia and NATO quickly returned to those prevailing in 
the mid-1990s. Izvestiia (29 September 1999) suggested, in the wake of a visit by 
Canada's Prime Minister and with regard to the Chechen conflict, that 'Russian 
diplomacy can now breathe freely: the reaction of the Canadian minister is 
favourable. The West is on our side. The world is ready to accept the version of 
events given by official figures in Moscow ... It isn't the first time that the west has 
shown extreme delicacy in relation to the Kremlin's actions in the north Caucasus. 
Five years ago when the "first Chechen war" started, the members of the G7 had 
also distanced themselves from public criticism... Of course, the situation was 
different at the time: there was no Kosovo, no default [referring to the August 1998 
financial crisis], no anti-West hysteria which politicians are expressing now, but 
this is the first time we've received total support from the West ... The West again 
expressed its loyalty to Moscow, and in this way reiterated the fact that in the fight 
against terrorism and Islamist extremism and aggressive separatism. We are in the 
same camp. We are part of one civilised and democratic world.' 
The speed with which relations reverted to a position of grudging pragmatic 
acceptance of reality and lost their vitriol is instructive and provides support to the 
argument that a relatively well-established and widely accepted vision of Russian 
national identity was held by Russia's elite. It meant that relations with the outside 
world were reasonably stable, despite shocks such as that inflicted by NATO in 
Kosovo. Thus Yeltsin's policies 'have more to do with such an outcome of debate 
on NATO expansion in Russia than with NATO expansion itself. .. He had chosen 
to distance himself from NATO and yet to conclude Partnership for Peace. to 
embrace nationalist rhetoric... Most definitely [he] was manoem ring b~t\\'een 
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contradictory policies which he himself so eloquently expressed in July 1999 that 
Russia would not quarrel with NATO too much but would not be too friendly 
either' (Brovkin, 1999: 40). Once the Kosovo furore had settled down, Russia 
settled into a role with which it was confident - a great power but not superpower. 
Prime Minister Putin contended that 'Russia should be and will be an integral part 
of the civilized world and in this context we will cooperate with NATO'. However, 
referring to the former Yugoslavia, he added, 'we have geopolitical interests and 
we will stand up for them' .250 
NATO had played a pivotal role in changing perceptions among the Russian 
leadership. The policies of expansion and out-of-area operations had been a snub to 
Russia. But the development of pragmatic nationalism had countered this situation 
and created a regional great power role for Russia which also stood up for a 
multipolar world against NATO's unipolar aspirations. This took some time, 
because 'the Yeltsin period was partly about the old generation. Their cultural 
background lay in the Soviet period, and they had been subject to propaganda all 
their lives. Culture can only evolve slowly - a revolution is not possible' .251 
The 2000 Foreign Policy Concept was notable partly for the predominance 
of a pragmatic nationalist tone and the impression given that Russia's foreign 
policy was by now a fairly settled one, 'predetermined by the geopolitical position 
of Russia as one of the largest Eurasian powers,' and the need to balance 
'objectives and the possibilities for attaining those objectives' ?52 Western 
institutions are in fact referred only to in the document in rather negative terms, as 
'forums of limited membership' partly to blame for the 'negative tendencies' in 
Russia's international situation referred to in paragraph 3 of the document. 
'Integration processes, in particular, in the Euro-Atlantic region are quite often 
pursued on a selective and limited basis', the document goes on to lament. 253 There 
is a rather mild suggestion that 'on a number of parameters, NATO's present-day 
political and military guidelines do not coincide with security interests of the 
250 Cited in RFEIRL. 16 August 1999. . 
251 Tatiana Parkhalina interviewed by the author, Moscow, 12 July 2002. Her argument was ~at m 
the Soviet period, 'anti-Western propaganda was used to justify the Soviet system that ~C\\ It 
couldn't compete on equal terms (owing to a lack of sophistication).: i.e. ~~ We.st as en! \~as a 
necessary other. But this meant that a certain generation grew up WIth this Idea Implanted. 
252 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. 2000: paragraphs 28 and 29. 
253 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. 2000: paragraph 21. 
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Russian Federation' .254 As Ivanov argued, 'What is most innovative about the 2000 
foreign policy doctrine is its realism. Our foreign policy priorities are now more 
closely linked than before to the long-term tasks of internal development and are 
more in keeping with Russia's real possibilities and resources' (Ivanov, 2000: 
paragraph 2). 
254 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. 2000: paragraph 83. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE EU AND RUSSIA: 
THE CONSTRUCTIVIST EXPLANATION 
NATO was a high-profile foreign policy priority for Russia and had a strong 
influence on the way Russian foreign policy developed over the decade. The 
Alliance heavily influenced Russia's domestic political debate and the manner in 
which the Russian elite came to view the West. At the same time, for most of the 
1990s, the great majority of the Russian elite showed little interest in the EU and 
there was scant recognition of its potential significance. Relations between Russia 
and the EU were generally smooth and low-key, although some areas of contention 
arose as the decade progressed. In Chapter 6 an explanation was sought in the 
international distribution of material power. This chapter will examine how the 
changing vision of Russian national identity among Russia's elite influenced 
perceptions of the EU and its significance (or lack of it), and how interactions 
between the EU and Russia in tum influenced the domestic identity debate. 
Russia and the EU - a low-key relationship 
The Atlanticist period 
In contrast to NATO, the EU rarely featured in Russian public discourse. The 
Russian elite demonstrated a lack of interest - or even knowledge of - the 
organisation. Very few references were made to the Union in public forums. When 
referred to, the EU was described positively, in terms of ·partnership'. Yeltsin 
declared in late 1993, for example, that 'he saw Russia as being ready to "become a 
real partner of Western Europe'" (RFEIRL, 10 December 1993).255 However. 
255 He was still describing the relationship between the EU and Russia as a 'partnership' in '\ 1 arch 
1997. 
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Russia's official view generally appeared to lie somewhere between uninterested 
and neutral- at least for the early part of the decade.256 
In the early 1990s, Russian political leaders had only a very vague 
knowledge of the EU and its potential. Moscow 'lacked a tradition of dealing with 
Brussels' (Malgin, 2001: paragraph 21) despite the fact that 'the Soviet leadership 
realised that the European Communities were a real political force ... Gorbachev's 
"new political thinking", with its stress on Europe, led the Soviet Union to sign the 
1989 agreement that was, to some extent, an act of official recognition of the EC as 
a political actor and a Soviet counterpart on the world scene. After 1991 the new 
Russian elite lost track of this preceding logic in its dealings with Western 
Europe ... These were liberals, but US-centred liberals ... It was ideologically easier 
for the new generation to deal with the USA than with Europe' (Mal gin, 2001: 
paragraph 21).257 It was 'ideologically easier' because the US was, in the somewhat 
simplistic foreign policy of the time, the Westernising elite's most important point 
of reference. In their formulation, the West meant the US. The EU, in contrast, was 
taken for granted. 
The almost exclusive focus on the US was also an indication of how, just 
after the end of the Soviet Union's existence, some members of Russia's elite still 
saw their country's importance as being on a par with the US. 'The top political 
leaders of Russia who consider relations with the United States their foreign policy 
priority are obviously entertaining illusions of their country's great power status' 
(Inozemtsev, 2002: 130), despite the leadership's adoption of an overtly humble 
attitude in international relations. The explanation may ultimately lie in the novelty 
of the situation and the lack of time in which to contemplate the implications of the 
Westernising course. It was also caused by a 'lack of prominent foreign policy 
experts among the founders ofYeltsin's regime [which] made it follow a simplistic 
256 See, for example, Malgin (2001: paragraph 20); Artem Malgin is Deputy Director of the Post-
Soviet Studies Centre at MGIMO University, Moscow. . . 
257 A similar analysis comes from Lo (2002: 44) who argues that, 'there was a palpable tenSIOn m 
liberal thinking between an inclination towards a European cultur~l-historical heritage ~n th:. one " 
hand, and over fifty years of superpower tradition in which Amenca had been th~ d~rrunant other . 
Intellectually and emotionally, the liberal foreign policy leant towards Europearuzanon and 
"partnership" with Western European institutions and processes; instinctu~lly, howeye:, any ~o­
called liberals found it hard to escape from the Americacentrism that had mfonned theIr poiIncal 
up bringing' . 
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RussiaJWest scenano, with Washington as the only counterpart (Malgin, 2001: 
paragraph 21).258 
A further reason for the lack of interest in the EU was that while the GS 
(and NATO) had been, as a powerful military force, the Cold War enemy of the 
Soviet Union, the EU was an economic and political organisation without a history 
of enmity towards Moscow - despite the overlap in membership with NATO. As 
Yeltsin put it, referring to Europe as distinct from the US, 'We all have unfortunate 
experience of the Cold War' (RFEIRL, 10 December 1993). While the US went 
from superpower rival to most important partner, and then bete noire of Russia's 
nationalists, the EU did not present the same challenges to Russia's sense of its 
new place in the world. It was also a result of the fact that most Russians regarded 
themselves as in some way European, even if this was just one aspect of a Eurasian 
identity. Some nationalists regarded Russia as spiritually superior to Western 
Europe, but nevertheless as forming part of European civilisation. Yeltsin was able 
to declare in late 1993 that "'We are all Europeans" (RFEIRL, 10 December 1993), 
but it would have been impossible to describe Russia as being part of the 
transatlantic civilisation represented by the US and NATO. The Atlanticist view of 
Russia, which tried to connect Russia very closely to the US, collapsed to a certain 
extent as a result: Russians would never see themselves as American. In the end, 
perhaps, Russian 'society could not accept friendship with the US' .259 
In the early period then, when the focus was on the US, Europe was 
regarded positively, even as a 'partner', but with a large degree of indifference. The 
result was that by 'focusing its attention initially on the United States, Russia has in 
a certain sense "missed out" on Europe. Under these conditions, forces not 
interested in rapprochement with Russia assumed a higher profile in Europe, and so 
Russia is being excluded from Europe' (Trenin, 1996: 31). This also led to the 
situation whereby, despite vociferous appeals against NATO enlargement to 
include former Soviet republics, 'the Baltic states' drive to join the EU was given 
258 Eggert's (1997: 10-15) view was that 'drawing "spheres of influence" is the favourite pastime. of 
many influential Russian politicians. They are completely oblivious to ideas of glo~al markets WIth 
their ever increasing competitiveness, and planetary communications networks, whIch make 
geographic distinctions less and less relevant. It's only too natural that in such schemes, ~based on a 
somewhat Stalinesque perception of the world, Europe as a whole barely figures at all. such are the 
roots of "Euro-ignorance'" . 
259 Konstantin Eggert, interviewed by the author,S December 2002. 
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quick and almost casual Kremlin approval in advance where nobod h ' 
, y... as yet 
tried to calculate the pluses and minuses of such a move for Russia itself. ~oscow 
may well miss the European train just because it prefers not to notice that it's 
coming' .260 
The rise of pragmatic nationalism and the ED 
In the shift from Atlanticism towards the pragmatic nationalist view of Russia as an 
independent, Eurasian great power, NATO played a prominent role, strongly 
influencing the way in which relations with the West faltered and then turned sour. 
Yet in this case 'the West' meant NATO and its leading light the US, and did not 
include the EU. The 'urge to portray Russia as a victim of Western betrayal was so 
strong that the real implications of EU enlargement were overlooked'. This 
'derived from the identity crisis of Russia', which was focused on the military 
alliance's enlargement. 
The EU played little part in the end of the 'honeymoon with the West' and 
the rise of pragmatic nationalism. Russia's elite did not even challenge the EU's 
eastward enlargement, whereas clearly it seemed vitally important to them to play 
the role of defender of Russian national interests by resisting NATO expansion. 
The North Atlantic Alliance's plans for enlargement were perceived in Russia as 
posing a threat to the country's security. The EU's enlargement plans, on the other 
hand, were often regarded positively, whether by comparison with those of NATO, 
or on their own merits. Primakov noted in late February 1997, for example, that EU 
expansion would be a positive development. On 3 March 1997, Yeltsin and EU 
leaders Wim Kok and Jacques Santer discussed trade issues in Moscow. 
Afterwards Yeltsin declared that the 'partnership' between Russia and the EU was 
the 'key to strengthening security and stability on the continent'. He added that 'the 
1994 EU-Russian partnership accord which awaits ratification in several countries 
should go into effect in the summer. Kok noted that while Yeltsin reiterated 
Russia's opposition to NATO expansion, he did not oppose the EU's parallel plans 
to expand into eastern Europe' (RFEIRL, 4 March 1997).261 Perhaps it was the case 
that European aspirations even with regard to the former Soviet Union 'are \'ie\\'ed 
260 This and the following quotation from Konstantin Eggert, interviewed by the author. 5 December 
2002. 
261 For more examples, see Chapter 6. 
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not as an increasingly important factor of regional realpolitik but as an amusing 
curiosity' (Eggert, 1997: paragraph 9). 
As a result of this continuing neglect, Brussels was 'the real initiator' of 
relations between Russia and the EU' (Mal gin, 2001: paragraph 23). Later in the 
decade, when the EU did become more significant to the Russian elite, Russia 
sought to have a say in enlargement, while not opposing the principle. In August 
1999, for example, the Russian official responsible for working with the G8 
(Aleksandr Livshits) made this point, adding that the Russian side wished to ensure 
that nothing would be done to 'make anything worse for Russia'. The point was 
that EU enlargement would include countries that 'have historically served as 
major markets for Russia'. Livshits added that it was acknowledged in Western 
capitals that 'there is a problem', if expansion were to proceed in ways that failed 
to take Moscow's concerns into account.262 
The EU and NATO both developed similar criteria for membership: the 
accession criteria set out at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and the 
Madrid European Council of 1995 included political and economic factors: among 
the former were respect for human rights and protection of minorities, treatment of 
women and children, the strengthening of judicial systems and reduced corruption; 
economic criteria included development of a market economy and the capacity for 
such an economy to flourish within the Union. Both the EU and NATO, 'while 
opening their doors for the Eastern European nations, put off Russia's admission 
for the future' (Pichugin, 1996: 95). It would appear strange, then, that the EU's 
exclusion of Russia was so long in drawing a response, although a muted response 
did come in the end. The constructivist explanation does not account very well for 
the initial lack of interest shown by Russia in the EU, particularly once expansion 
was tabled. 
The EU's attempt to develop a defence capability 
The EU raised the possibility of founding a purely European army during the 
1990s, through the reinvigoration of the Western European Union (WEU), and later 
262 Cited in NUPI Chronology, 23 August 1999. 
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by means of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). 263 This aspect of 
the EU's changing character also did not arouse controversy in Russia, despite the 
fact that it meant that the EU would become a military alliance (in a close 
relationship with NATO) that would soon be expanding to Russia's borders. In the 
view of the Russian elite, the EU still did not pose a threat. It was clearly seen as 
either lacking military threat or hostile intentions, or as an opportunity to 
undermine NATO's coherence. 
If anything, the EU's development of a military role was regarded 
positively. Izvestiia commented, on talk of the creation of an EU army, that 'a good 
thing is that it would create an independent defence structure independent from the 
US. If it was to be pan-European then Russia could not be ignored' (Izvestiia, 16 
November 1999). The Russian leadership seemed to feel that Russia's importance 
as a European power would mean it would automatically be given higher status in 
any purely European developments as opposed to those under the influence of the 
US (it was also seen at first as an alternative and possible counterweight to NATO). 
Again, the nonchalant attitude among Russia's elite resulted partly from an 
inherent confidence in Russia's importance in Europe. Thus 'the decision taken at 
the Cologne European Council to expand the EU's Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) made little impression in Russia. Even when asked directly in 
September about what the implications would be for Russia, the foreign policy elite 
revealed little awareness of the EU's intention to develop a military capacity. No 
alarm was expressed. Foreign Ministry officials directly concerned with relations 
with the EU were better informed, but in September 1999 they seemed preoccupied 
by the consequences of exclusion to Russia's economic security, particularly in 
relation to the EU' (Light et aI., 2000a: 8). 
263 This came to a head in 1999, when 'The Europeans in the European Union Treaty co~cluded in 
Maastricht have reaffIrmed their goal of [ESDI, which would be part of but apart from ':'.ATO], and 
at its Summit in April 1999 NATO and the US endorsed that goal. ESDI ,,:ould ~iv~ strength to 
another European aspiration: the search for a Common Foreign and Secunty PO~ICy. (European 
Security, 2000: paragraph 1). Kosovo had been a 'wake-up call' to the EU. makm.g It accel~rate the 
creation of the ESDP machinery outlined in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties (Yfalgm: 
paragraph 24). 
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Points of contention 
While it was true that the Russian elite generally demonstrated a complacent 
attitude towards the ED, certain issues gradually pushed relations higher up the 
agenda, and it was economic security that was the most important of these issues. 
But such points of contention, though occasionally heated, were generally dealt 
with quickly and without fuss. The ED's enlargement and exclusion of Russia 
developed into a serious issue in the mid-1990s, for example, but despite 
presenting similar challenges to those posed by NATO's expansion, were dealt 
with in a discreet manner. 
The ED's enlargement, like that of NATO, was often described as involving 
the spread of democracy and membership as requiring full democratic credentials -
in the liberal Western tradition. Like NATO, the ED excluded Russia from the 
process. The ED, like NATO, never considered Russia as potentially a full 
member. The ED Trade Commissioner stated in 1996, for example, that 'Europe 
has a vital geopolitical role. The biggest threats to international security and 
stability - Russia, the Balkans and the Middle East - are all on Europe's doorstep' 
(Brittan, 1996: 2). Russia, once again, is on the doorstep, but not fully a part of, 
true 'Europe'. Exclusion from the ED was similar to that of NATO in the manner 
in which the ED constructed its own post-Cold War identity - and that of potential 
members. 
Some foreign policy experts in Russia did recognise the significance of 
statements such as these. Vladimir Lukin, for example, criticized the EU for putting 
up 'civilizational' as well as economic barriers to Russia,z64 The criticism by the 
EU of Russian activities in Chechnya, the Kaliningrad issue, ED support for NATO 
action in Kosovo and others also occasionally raised the profile of the EU and 
sometimes registered among Russians. Hence the criticism that the EU 'makes 
meaningless statements about 'Greater Europe', but is putting up barriers, so that 
'after the upcoming expansion becomes reality, the EU will put up impenetrable 
barriers on its new frontiers. The motive of this shortsighted policy is this: Russia. 
staying behind the fence we have erected around our fold, must protect us against 
all dangerous winds blowing from the east and southeast'. Russia was obliged to 
provide security and energy guarantees for Europe 'in exchange for cordial words 
264 Cited in Moscow Times (online), 27 February 2005. Online at http: new.mn.ru englishiissue.php. 
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that do not imply any real participation in all-European affairs. The Russian 
community in Europe has the status of a ghetto. A ghetto always presents danger _ 
to itself as well as those living around it'. 265 This styling of Russia as an unthanked 
bastion against eastern threats is a familiar one, but used in this example with 
regard to the ED demonstrates the potential for construction of the ED in such a 
negative manner. However, statements along these lines were to remain rare, even 
with respect to the various areas of disagreement that arose between the EU and 
Russia. 
Physical exclusion 
The issue of exclusion persisted as a possible thorn in the side of EU-Russia 
relations. Kaliningrad became an important issue once the EU had confirn1ed its 
intention to welcome new members among states whose membership would lead to 
Kaliningrad being cut off from the rest of the Russian Federation. Given the 
importance attached by the Russian elite to the problems of borders and Russian 
populations stranded outside the country, this was not surprising. The 'irredenta' 
became a cause celebre for the Russian elite in its tum away from 'romantic' 
foreign policy: Kaliningrad's isolation within the EU would place a group of 
Russians not only outside the state's borders, but cut off from the Motherland by 
states which had been admitted to the European club, including the Baltics, which 
for Russia were the most sensitive area for NATO expansion. Yet under Yeltsin the 
administration raised few objections. Later, what Malgin (2001: paragraph 27) 
called 'older Russian "strategic" concerns about the enclave, inspired by the 
military lobby [and others holding to the nationalist view], have nearly 
disappeared, but real problems are still there ... Certainly, the Kaliningrad problem 
will be the subject of further multilateral and bilateral consultations and 
agreements. However, we already have a mechanism that could help solve this 
problem. It is the "Northern Dimension" initiative. This multifaceted and 
d . ,266 multilateral project. .. [is] also a model for further transbor er co-operatIOn. 
265 Cited in Moscow Times (online), 27 February 2005. Online at http:lnew.mn.~english issue~php. 
266 Recently, the Kaliningrad issue featured in Russian concerns about ElJ expa~slOn ~~ra\'da. tor 
example, calling the issue a 'bitter' one for Russia [2517102], although It \vas faIrly S\\ Iftly 
resolved). 
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Once again, the constructivist national identity account can go some way 
towards explaining why this was an important issue for Russians, but the manner 
with which the Kaliningrad issue was dealt cannot be explained by reference to 
Russian national identity, indeed, the constructivist framework would lead one to 
expect it to have become a much more serious issue. 
Chechnya 
Along with economics, the most serious area of confrontation between the EU and 
Russia was Chechnya. The EU and associated bodies showed themselves to be 
more willing than NATO to criticise Russian actions in the Caucasian republic. 
Criticism of Russia 'was energetically endorsed by some "pure European" 
multilateral structures, including the EU and the Council of Europe' (Baranovsky, 
2000: 456). This caused some irritation in MoSCOW.267 The first Chechen conflict, 
which began at the end of 1994, led to suspension of ratification of the Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in EU countries. The EU made several 
statements on Chechnya in early 1995. In January, for example, the Commission of 
the EU 'declared it would not forward the Interim Agreement [on trade and 
commercial aspects of the PCA] ... Instead, the commission first wanted to discuss 
freezing the whole matter among EU countries as a protest against Russian actions' 
(Pursiainen, 1999: 149). 
Human rights treaties signed by Russia were cited in such circumstances: on 
17 and 23 January 1995, for example, the EU referred to Article 2 of the PCA, 
which states that 'respect for the democratic principles and human rights as defined 
in particular in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe 
underpin the internal and external policies of the Parties. The Partnership 
Agreement itself was not in force, however, and "sources" from the Commission 
informed journalists in December 1994 that because of this, appeal could not be 
made to the articles of the agreement referring to human and minority rights' 
(Pursiainen, 1999: 135, footnote 96).268 
267 Especially when the ED states (with a little wa~ering) suppo~ed NATO actions i~ ~B~~ia­
Herzegovina and Kosovo. However, compared WIth the opprobnum heaped on the C~, 
European states were relatively lightly treated from this point of view. . . '. 
268 On 10 January, the Council of Europe also made an announcement on puttmg RUSSIa ~ 
membership application on hold. 
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This provoked some signs of reaction among the Russian elite. As one 
commentator put it, 'one cannot. .. fail to notice the EU tries to impose sanctions on 
Russia, which runs counter to the declared principles of partnership. For example. 
in early 1995 the signing of an EU-Russian Provisional Agreement was frozen. 
This Agreement would bring into effect the "greater" [PCA] trade articles - until 
the ratification of the Agreement, which can well be delayed for rather a long time. 
Pretext for it was found in the events in Chechnya' (Pichugin, 1996: 94)?69 The 
Russian side demonstrated signs of resentment towards its European (as opposed to 
NATO) interlocutors on this issue. According to Trenin (1996: 31), while in 
general as we have seen, 'Russia and the European Union have failed to embark on 
broad interaction - partly owing to the continuing economic crisis in Russia and 
partly owing to internal problems related to national egoism in the EU countries, 
[this was] basically for political reasons related, in particular, to the war in 
Chechnya'. 
To many in the Russian leadership the Chechen conflict was - among its 
many causes - about the integrity of the Russian Federation. It was a demonstration 
of the determination of the new Russian state to defend its borders and ensure its 
very survival. The Chechens were seen as a dangerous and extremist group of 
bandits by many people in Russia and became an extremely important domestic 
'other'. The conflict was closely connected to Russian national identity. Therefore, 
'Europe appeared to be obstructing the fight against terrorists' (Donaldson & 
Nogee, 2000: 230). Opinion polls showed that many Russians also believed that a 
negotiated settlement would be required to bring an end to the conflicts.270 
Although Russia was subjected to criticism by the EU, the effects in Russia 
were limited. Kozyrev stated, in 1995, 'common sense tells that the USA or the EU 
will not adopt economic sanctions against Russia' (Pursiainen, 1999: 153). Yet 
'such sanctions need not have been strictly material. One of Russia's openly 
declared main goals in Europe was to be integrated into the all-European 
framework of cooperation and Russia was vulnerable from this point of vie\\-' 
269 Boris Pichugin was chief research associate with the institute for European Studies of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences. 
270 At the end of the decade (December 1999) the Levada Centre asked respondents 'Do you __ 
. . - . '1- -' Ch hnya or begin peaceful negotiatIons conSIder that It IS necessary to contInue rru Itary actIOn III ec _ _ 01 . 
with the Chechen leadership?' 22% replied that peaceful negotiations. were reqUIred. while 67/0 said 
it was necessary to continue military operations (see http://WWw.russlavotes.org chechma). 
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(Pursiainen, 1999: 153). Once again, the situation was potentially extremely grave 
from Russia's point of view. The EU was able to portray Russia as lvin~ outside 
~ ~ 
the civilised pale - of Western civilisation - and suspension of Russian accession 
to EU and related bodies was the means by which this was carried out. 
The Russian response was muted. In the conflict zone itself the military and 
security services continued as before, although some token and grudging 
acceptance of observers was agreed to by Moscow. In diplomatic forums, Putin (as 
Prime Minister) 'refrained from over-reacting to the EU's position on 
Chechnya271 .•. Similarly, the presidential administration dampened the ardour of 
the State Duma when the idea of withdrawing from the Council of Europe was 
discussed' (Baranovsky, 2000: 457, footnote 8). The EU itself began to water down 
its comments on Chechnya, beginning to aim some negative comments at the 
Chechens themselves. By the end of 1996, ratification of the PCA had been carried 
out in 9 of the 12 member-states of the Union, which had signed the agreement in 
1994. 
The Council of Europe, meanwhile, admitted Russia after a tortuous process 
involving many of the same issues as those just noted.272 Kozyrev had stated in 
1992 that 'the task of reintegration into the family of European civilization and 
developing a state based on the rule of law mandates that Russia join the Council of 
Europe' (Kozyrev, 1992: 290). Russia applied for membership in May 1992 and 
was only accepted in early 1996. This followed criticism of Russia's human-rights 
violations in Chechnya by the Council and, as noted, by the EU. Membership was 
offered in January 1996, which the Russian Duma approved on 21 February and 
the Federation Council the following day. Only a few weeks earlier, in mid-January 
1996, the Council had criticised Russian human rights. Russia, it said, 'could not be 
considered a "rule of law" state ... but the Council fact-finding mission leader 
Rudolf Bindig said it would recommend Russian membership as it was making 
progress and membership would encourage more progress' (RF EIRL , 15 January 
1996). 'The Council of Europe's February 1996 decision to invite Russia to 
become a member served as a signal towards a de-freezing of contacts between 
271 The one adopted in December 1999 in Helsinki. T... . 'J! 
272 As noted in Chapter 6, though the Council is not an ElJ mstItutIOn, m~mbershlp of the Coun,-
was a step towards integration with Europe, to closer relations with the l J1Jon, and was used by the 
EU as a means of reaching out to potential future members. 
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Moscow and Western European capitals' (Evropeiskii Soiuz, 1997: 23). Even after 
this, Yeltsin had said that Russia was unwilling or unable to meet some Council 
conditions for membership, in a meeting with German Foreign Minister, Klaus 
Kinkel. 'It is feared ... that failure to satisfy the Council's high standards reoardino 
b b 
human rights and democracy would leave Russia vulnerable to severe criticism that 
might seriously damage its prestige' (Baranovsky, 2000: 453). 
Towards the end of the decade (and before the start of the second war in the 
republic), the Chechnya issue had again been sidelined and positive remarks were 
commonly heard being made about the EU's role by the Russian side: in late 1999. 
for example, Ivanov supported Putin's statement273 that Western leaders 
understood the anti-terrorist measures undertaken by Russia and that Chechnya is a 
purely domestic matter, and said that he welcomed European and EU support for 
Russia's territorial integrity. At around the same time the US pressed Russia to find 
a political settlement, provoking irritation among Russians who thought the US 
should have done the same in Kosovo. Criticism at the Helsinki Summit in 
December 1999,274 for example, was regarded as 'hypocritical, reflecting double 
standards, in the light of what had happened in Kosovo' (Donaldson & Nogee, 
2000: 230). After this the EU tended to adopt a 'balanced' criticism of the 
Chechens along with mild censure of the Russian side. Thus the issue became one 
of regret at the war, rather than an overt attack on Russia's uncivilized 
behaviour.275 The EU drew back from its criticism of this extremely sensitive point 
for Russians. 
273 At that time Prime Minister. , ' _ '
274 The EU-Russia Summit was the fourth such summit to be held in accordance \\lth the provlsiOns 
of the PCA. , ", d fi fr h man riohts 
275 Such activities in turn brought the EU and its assocIated mstltutlOns un er Ire o~ u ~)-
. . ft R " dmittance to the Councll of Europe. groups, such as when in March 1996 (l.e. Just a er uss~a s ~, ' 
Human Rights Watch criticised the EU for ratifying the mtenm trade ac~ord d\\' 1 tlh RUSSI,~ ((RFtheE RL 
d C 'I f E pe to end "sllent lp omacy I, previous November) and urged the EU an ounCI 0 uro 'h 't 
19 March 1996). The Council did still raise questions over Chechnya and related Issues, as w en I 
criticized Russia on its use of the death penalty, in the summer of 1996. 
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The economic irritant 
The other major serious area of discord between Russia and the ED \\'as oyer 
trading rights and Russian exclusion from the ED free trade zone, which \vould 
expand eastwards with the accession of new members early in the 21 SI century.276 
Russian industries would be subject to trade restrictions because the Russian 
economy was not considered to be a full market economy. Through its anti-
dumping measures, the EU excluded many Russian goods from tariff-free trading 
rights. 
A frequent criticism ofYeltsin's governments by their nationalist opponents 
was that they were allowing Russia to become a source of cheap subsidies to the 
West, leading to the plundering of the country's natural resources; the West, it was 
suggested, had an interest in preventing Russia from recovering economically. in 
order to maintain this flow of cheap materials; one means of doing so was through 
inequitable restrictions. The government's response was to echo these calls in 
international forums; Viktor Chernomyrdin, for example, frequently called for 
greater access to EU markets for Russian products. 
When it came to impeding Russia's economic development, the ED was the 
chief villain: it had become Russia's largest trading partner, accounting by the mid-
1990s for 40% of its foreign trade. 277 Thus the protective tariffs in place were 
particularly painful for the Russian economy, and a threat to the rebuilding process 
and the aim of creating a powerful state. This was certainly something that 
produced a relatively high level of anti-ED protests from Russian commentators. It 
was also an area for which NATO certainly could not be blamed (Lukin, 2002)?78 
To some Russians, these trade barriers resulted from the manner in which 
the ED perceived Russia in general terms. 'Though an agreement was signed in 
1994 between Russia and the EC, my country remains more of an irritant than a 
partner for the Brussels officials. This is why discriminatory measures against 
Russian goods are introduced with such ease. In this situation it is senseless to 
276 A 'pre-accession strategy' was adopted by the European Council in 1994. In June 199:, ~e 
European Council recommended that the European Commission should commence negotlat~ons 
with the governments of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Pol~nd and Sl.ovema for 
membership of the EU. In October 1999 Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romama, Bulgana and :-"lalta 
were also invited to begin negotiations. (Light et al., 2000b: 490). 
277 d '1 See Chapter 6 for full eta! s. ... ) 
278 Vladimir Lukin, writing in Moscow News in December 2002. CIted ill Mosco\\' .\ ('\\'s, _7 
February 2005. Online at http://new.mn.ruJenglishlissue.php. 
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complain. One of the saddest consequences of the Cold War is that Russia has been 
outside the European and global markets which have been built in recent years. It is 
now absolutely impossible to join them immediately' (Golts, 1997: paragraphs 1-
4). A discriminatory situation for Russian products also emerged 'in the Central 
and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states as well' (Pichugin, 1996: 93). EU 
spokesmen, nevertheless, 'allege that emergence of a free trade zone between the 
Community and the associated countries does not affect Russian interests seriously, 
as the Union's custom tariffs for our goods average less than one percent. They 
seem to be dodging, since the stated number does not correspond to the actual state 
of the facts' (Pichugin, 1996: 93-94). 
To Russia's political realists the argument was still true that 'in contrast 
with the past, the West now prefers economic rather than military instruments for 
putting pressure on Russia. According to these paradigms, the aim of the EU 
policies is to secure Russia's status as the West's "younger partner" and a source of 
cheap natural resources and labour' (Sergounin, 2000: 3). The prevailing consensus 
on the West, as it had developed by the mid-1990s, was more cautiously 
nationalistic, however, and hence the general tone emerging from elite mouthpieces 
was milder. One further effect of Russian national identity on relations with the EU 
was that the language of the pragmatic-realist school which dominated Russian 
security discourse led to 'a discrepancy between the Russian and European 
discourses on borders and their role in the future international relations system. 
While the Russian discourse emphasises the need to protect national interests and 
territorial integrity, including external borders, Europe increasingly finds itself in a 
post-modem world where borders are relatively unimportant (within the EU itself) 
and emphasis is placed on cross-border and trans-border co-operation' (Sergounin, 
2000: 5). 
Despite the concerns of these commentators, the issue was generally seen as 
a practical problem that could and would be dealt with by the appropriate 
ministerial departments. After the excitement over the trade agreement \\"elcomed 
with such enthusiasm by Yeltsin, Kozyrev claimed that 'The document signed falls 
short of the comprehensive agreement that both sides had hoped for'. But he 
. h h ~ 11 t ould be simed within the next 
'expressed hIS assurance t at t e iU agreemen w b 
twelve months ... in an interview with IT AR-TASS on 9 December [he added that 1 
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that the discriminatory barriers for Russian exports, which existed in the first 
versions of the treaty, had all been removed' (RFEIRL, 10 December 1993). 
Thus a j oint declaration issued by Yeltsin, Gerhard Schroeder and J acq ues 
Santer in March 1999 contained the usual references to the settlement of regional 
conflicts, including a political settlement in Kosovo, increasing the role of the 
OSeE in questions of European cooperation and security and so on. But it also 
included the statement that 'Russia expressed itself in favour of making joint 
progress towards creating equal and non-discriminatory conditions of economic 
cooperation, a balanced improvement of the regime of goods and services trade. 
The EU expressed concern over the significant fall in exports from the EU to 
Russia and ... underlined the growing need for the Russian government to settle the 
EU's remaining concerns relating to market access' (Diplomaticheskii Vestnik, 
March 1999). 
* * * 
Thus there were obstacles to the smooth progress of Russia-EU relations, which 
would seem to have had the potential to become more serious than they did in fact 
become. Russia's national identity issues made the issue of the EU problematic 
because 'for Russia, with its problems, the "entry into Europe" as regards 
conformity to the criteria of membership of the EU, is a task of the non-foreseeable 
future. Moreover, the perspective of its entry in the EU is really absent, not only 
owing to the social and political backwardness of the country and the low standard 
of living of the majority of the population' (Trenin, 2004: 12). Yet the more 
strongly nationalist elements among Russia's elite maintained at the same time that 
'Russia is great enough for dominating the EU, once it has become a member of it. 
The Russian leaders, who are in favour of a development of the economic, political 
and humanitarian relations, do not accept the Russian Federation to be just an 
object of "Europeanization" policy. The enlargement of the "normative empire" of 
the European Union is a challenge for Russia (Trenin, 2004: 12). But it was not a 
challenge that particularly taxed either Russia's elite taken as a whole or the 
population at large. 
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It is in fact difficult to explain why the Russian elite remained so 
detenninedly ignorant or blase with regard to the Union, and in particular its 
expansion. This ignorance 'is characteristic not only of ordinary people - which is 
understandable in the tense socio-political climate - but of representatives of the 
elite, who are supposed to be aware of major processes taking place in the world at 
large' (Eggert, 1997: paragraphs 1-2). Lowenhardt (2000: 6) found that views 
within the elite were broadly in agreement with this analysis. Indeed, only 'officials 
in the relevant ministries who deal with EU expansion are well aware that EC 
enlargement may have negative consequences for Russia' (Light et aI., 2000a: 7). 
They evidently did not have the ability to raise these issues to a level of great 
importance for the foreign policy elite. Therefore, while 'remaining outside the EU 
as it expands its territorial space and functional scope may exacerbate Russia's 
concerns about its own role in Europe, for the time being, these concerns have not 
been articulated in a very explicit way - supposedly due to Russia's obsession with 
the issue of NATO enlargement. .. further consolidation of the EU will sooner or 
later make it clear that the dividing line between members and non-members might 
become much more fundamental than in the case of NATO' (Baranovsky, 2000: 
453). 
A balance of views 
Near the end the end of the decade, the EU and Russia fonnalised relations in two 
major documents: the EU produced its 'Common Strategy toward Russia' and 
Russia a 'Medium-Term Strategy for Developing Relations of the Russian 
Federation with the European Union for 2000-2010'. These two documents laid out 
in detail each side's perception of the other. The Common Strategy demonstrated 
how the EU saw Russia and its role in relation to Western Europe; the Russian 
reaction confinned how the foreign policy establishment viewed the Eli, and also 
to what extent Russia's sense of its place in the world was influenced by the EL. 
Decisions taken at the Cologne (3-4 June 1999) and Helsinki (10-11 
December 1999) summits between the EU and Russia 'stressed the role of the 
. E and in Europc:m Western European track within security developments III urope 
201 
politics in general. Both of these summits were equally l' rt C' R . . 
mpo ant lor ussla-EC 
relations' (Malgin, 2001: paragraph 25). In Cologne the EU' 'C 
, s ommon StrateQ:v 
toward Russia' was adopted - the first of its kind. This emphasised the differen:~ 
in many Russians' minds between the EU and NATO, and also 'effecti\ely played 
the role of an ice-breaker to crush the anti-Western mood of the Russian public and 
- above all- of the Russian foreign policy community; a mood that had emerged as 
a result of the Kosovo bombardments. Moscow's response came without delay' 
(Malgin, 2001: paragraph 25). The EU emerged from the Kosovo conflict once 
more as the friendly face of the West, in contrast to NATO. 'Despite the fact that 
Moscow's relations with NATO returned ... to the previously established level of 
contacts, the "Kosovo spirit" was still dominant amongst the Russian elite ... the 
situation in Europe at the tum of the Millennium left no choice for Russia but to 
develop relations with the EU. Moscow started perceiving the EU as the most 
efficient (and, at the time, the only viable) channel of communication with the 
Western world as a whole' (Mal gin, 2001: paragraph 27).279 In late March 1999 a 
Russian delegation even consulted the EU on the situation in former Yugoslavia 
after a trip to Belgrade, where Primakov had been accompanied by Foreign 
Minister Ivanov and Defence Minister Sergeev.280 
At the Russia-EU summit in Helsinki (22 October 1999), Russia unveiled 
its 'Medium-Term Strategy for developing relations with the EU for 2000-2010'. 
The joint communique issued on 22 October 1999 by Paavo Lipponen (President of 
the European Council), Romano Prodi (President of the European Commission), 
279 As /zvestiia reported (25 March, 1999), 'The US succeeded so well in putting pressure on its 
partners and bending them all in participating in this military adventure, that even Greece ended up 
in their group ... this military operation is useful to the US so that in the height of the trade and . 
economic tension with the countries of the EU, make them understand who is indeed the master III 
European affairs. Can Europe do without the global support of the US for a not too expensive price? 
During the coming days and weeks the Europeans will have to answer many questions which until. 
today they have ignored, assuming that what happened in Iraq could not happen in Europe ... RUSSia 
is a European state, just like England or France or Yugoslavia, and it also loses much from the 
current turn of events. ' 
280 A series of interviews and focus groups carried out in Russia in the aftermath of the K~sovo 
conflict revealed how many Russians perceived the difference between ~ATO and the EL to be an 
important one: 'NATO and the USA were widely seen as synonymous; in the words of one _ 
participant, "NATO is America, even children know that". The war in Yugo~la\·ia was "the res~lt of 
America's aspirations to world-wide hegemony", according to a participant III the \loscow regwn. 
Even among the foreign policy elite, far less blame for the attack on Serbia \~·as attached to . 
European NATO members than to the USA. NATO is "being used ?y the l sA to weaken :: estern 
Europe" ... "the EU was subservient to NATO and the Americans" m the ~osovo conflICt. The 
USA now openly says it wants to rule the world'" (Light et aI., 2000b: 49)). 
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Javier Solana (Secretary General of the Council, High Representative), and 
Vladimir Putin (Russian Prime Minister, representing Yeltsin) stated simply that. 
'The European Union and the Russian Federation exchanged views on the situation 
in the Northern Caucasus' (Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999) and dealt 
blandly with general matters, describing the fact that the summit 'provided a 
unique opportunity to discuss the ways to strengthen our partnership ... We 
welcomed the Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia adopted in June 
1999 by the European Council in Cologne as well as the Medium-term Strategy for 
Developing Relations of the Russian Federation with the European Union for 2000-
2010 ... The documents highlight the significance both sides attach to a close 
political and economic partnership and its further development within the 
framework of the PCA. They are based on common values such as respect of the 
principles of democracy and human rights, the rule of law and the market economy 
and share the common objectives of enhancing political stability and economic 
. . E ' 281 prospenty III urope. 
The EU's Common Strategy 
The adoption of the Common Strategy was the first of its kind 'towards a third 
country ... Russia was selected as the first partner for this new instrument of EU 
policy' (European Commission, 2001: paragraph 9). In the Strategy the EU 
identified 'two clear goals: a stable, open and pluralistic democracy in Russia, 
governed by the rule of law and underpinned by a prosperous market economy 
benefiting alike all the people of Russia and of the European Union; maintaining 
European stability, promoting global security and responding to the common 
challenges of the continent through intensified cooperation with Russia (European 
Commission, 2001: paragraph 10). Along with the PCA, the Strategy 'is the 
political basis for EU-Russia relations'. 
By means of the Strategy the EU laid down the law as to what it expected of 
Russia. Despite the friendly tone of this document, once again there is the clear 
suggestion that Russia is still 'in transition' and these things are not at all sately 
achieved. The EU aimed to 'strengthen the rule of law ... by encouraging' Russia to 
281 Text taken from the Delegation of the European Commission in Russia web site: 
http://www.eur.ru. 
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develop the necessary institutions in the creation of 'a modem and effective 
administration with Russia's Executive, Legl'slature and J d' . u lClary at federal, 
regional and local levels; in particular by developing the capacity of an 
independent judiciary, public administration [and so on]'.282 In the economic 
sphere, the EU claimed it would consolidate the process of economic reform in 
Russia, by among other things, 'encouraging Russia to remove obstacles to trade 
and investment, in particular through the improvement of border crossino 
/:) 
procedures and facilities and by examining, in accordance with EU rules and 
procedures, Russian concerns with [ways] to access to the EU market' . 
However, the Common Strategy goes on to state that, 'the issues which the 
whole continent faces can be resolved only through ever closer cooperation 
between Russia and the European Union. The European Union welcomes Russia's 
return to its rightful place in the European family in a spirit of friendship, 
cooperation and the accommodation of interests and on the foundations of shared 
values enshrined in the common heritage of European civilisation'. The Strategy 
thus ascribes to Russia a place in Europe, rather than on the edge of Europe, but 
this is only on condition that Russia meets certain requirements. 
Russia's Medium- Term Strategy 
Russia's Medium-Term Strategy (2000-2010) was the official response to the 
Common Strategy, reflecting Russia's concerns, and was presented to the European 
Council in October 1999. It determined the 'objectives of development of Russia's 
relations with the European Union for the next decade and means of their 
achievement. It is a consistent evolution of the general foreign policy concept of 
Russia in the European area and it stems from the objective need to establish a 
multipolar world, common histories of nations and responsibility of European 
States for the future of the continent, and complementarity of their economies. It is 
also directly coordinated with the concept of economic security of Russia. It 
provides for the construction of a united Europe without dividing lines and the 
eSc These and following quotations from the Common Strategy taken from the European 
Commission's web site: http://\y\\w.europa.eu. 
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interrelated and balanced strengthening of the positions of Russia and the EC 
within an international community of the 21 st century' .283 
The Strategy claimed to reflect 'the main orientation and objectives of the 
EU's Common Strategy. In this context, Russia indicates the following areas as 
priority tasks in developing and strengthening the relations of partnership and 
cooperation with the EU up to 2010: strategic character of the Russia - EU 
partnership; enlarging the format and improving the efficiency of the political 
dialogue; development of mutual trade and investments; cooperation in the 
financial field; securing Russian interests in an expanding European Union [and so 
on]'. The document thereby viewed the EU (and Western Europe generally as 
detached from the US) as the positive face of the West. It placed Russia firmly in 
the heart of Europe. The Strategy also suggested that 'the development of 
partnership with the EU should continue consolidating Russia's role as a leading 
power in shaping a new system of ... political and economic relations in the CIS 
area' . 
Section 5 of the Strategy described the 'ambivalent impact' of enlargement 
on Russian interests. Taking this into account 'and the terms of its cooperation with 
Russia and in the Russian interests, to [achieve] the best advantages of such 
expansion (lower customs protection civilised transit standards etc.) while 
preventing, eliminating or setting off the negative consequences.' Before the next 
expansion of the European Union the Strategy advocated conducting 'consultations 
with its individual members and candidates aimed at securing Russia's interests 
[regarding] ... EU agricultural, technological and antidumping policies ... [and] visa 
regimes ... to safeguard ... the rights of the Russian-speaking population in the 
[former Soviet] states ... In accordance with the Declaration signed by the EU, to 
take an active role in creating the "European information society" and to assur~ that 
Russia is considered to be an integral part of it' . 
The Strategy 'sets as a priority "achieving the best advantages" and 
"preventing, eliminating or setting off possible adverse consequences" of 
enlargement. It also calls for consultations to secure Russia's interests as the aC(juis 
. ., 1 (on of the 
283 These and the following quotations taken from the European ComnusslOn S trans a 1 
Medium-Term Strategy at: .' d htm 
1 · /. d' m term stralL,,'\'m ex. http://www.europa.eu.intlcomm!extemal re atlOns ruSSIan me lU -
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is adopted in the [central and eastern European] countries The' fl" 
. Issue 0 exc uSlon IS 
thus raised as potentially harmful to Russian interests' (Light et aI., 2000a: 8). The 
Medium-Term Strategy maintained that 'efforts will continue to be made for 
further opening of the EU's market to Russian exports, elimination of the 
remaining discrimination in trade ... protection of Russia's leaitimate int -t 
b ere:::. s ... 
opposing possible attempts to hamper economic integration in the CIS ... to the 
detriment of Russia's interests'. The point was repeated once more: Russia's aim 
was 'to continue to work on creating favourable conditions for access of Russian-
made goods and services to the EU market and eliminate elements of 
discrimination, fully recognizing the market status of Russia's economy'. One 
attempt to increase links between the EU and Russia came in the form of the 
Northern Dimension Initiative.284 
As regards the EU's emerging defence capabilities, 'the authors of the 
Medium-Term Strategy were clearly well informed on the subject. .. and they took 
a positive view of the prospect of the CFSP acquiring a defence aspect. The 
preamble to the Strategy maintains that a "strategic partnership" between Russia 
and the EU can achieve a pan-European system of collective security based on 
"equality without dividing lines". This system will not isolate the United States and 
NATO but nor will it permit them to dominate the continent. The Medium-Tenn 
Strategy also calls ... for practical cooperation with the WEU in the area of security 
"which could counterbalance ... the NATO-ism in Europe". In other words, a 
military aspect to the CFSP was perceived to offer an alternative European security 
structure, which would diminish NATO's importance in Europe' (Light et aI., 
2000a: 8-9). 
The document IS revealing of Russian elite attitudes to EU expanSIOn, 
touching on points of concern and their potential rectification. It is in the nature of 
such documents to avoid controversy; but the document is clearly in keeping with 
284 The initiative aimed to increase trade between Russia's northern regions and those of the EC, 
Reaction to the project was mixed, and from a Russian national identity point ofvie:\. cOII?ected to 
, 'd' 11 'The '\orthern DimenSIOn was the manner in which different aroups saw RUSSIan I entIty overa . . , 
first recognised EU-wide at th: Luxembourg European Council in December 1997., In the followmg 
" Th V' European CounCil In December years, It was developed mto a more concrete concept. e lenna , ' ' , 
1998 adopted a Commission Communication on a 'Northern DimenslO~fo~ the pohcle.1 of the 
Union'. Six months later in Cologne the European Council adopted Glildelmes for th,e d 
. . ' b 1999 th Finnish EC Presldencv he! a Implementation of the Northern DimenSIOn. In ;-.Jovem er , e . , " , 
. "'h n Inn'll torr of current aCf/\ ifil'l Foreign Ministerial Conference on the ?\orthem DimenSIOn. \\ ere a , 
, ' " '10(1). 
under the Northern DimenSIOn was adopted (European ComrrusslOn. - -
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the overall tone of the relationship established by the . 
vanous Sources oyer the 
decade noted previously. This tone is generally positive tho gh . 1 
u occaslOna 1\ ed~\ 
- ~. 
with regard to being excluded from the EU and resulting discrimination. The ED 
makes somewhat high-handed remarks about assisting Russia to attain and sustain 
democracy. But the sense is one of optimism. 
At the same time, the two strategies also show some signs of talking past 
each other, which is partly explained by the somewhat vague attitude of the 
Russian side: 'The partners underline somewhat different fields although trade is 
the main focus of both sides ... EU's focus is on economic and social de\elopment 
and the ambition [ of Russia] is rather to be an economic superpower. The actors of 
the partnership are thus highly asymmetrical and the future of the partnership is an 
open question' (Cronberg, 2002: 5). 
A partnership without thrills 
The EU, being viewed as primarily an economIC organisation, was generally 
perceived neither as a threat, nor even particularly interesting; rather, it was hoped 
that it would provide some economic opportunities which were clearly vital to the 
successful development of the Russian nation. There were some aspects of the 
relationship that caused irritation, sometimes over long periods, owing to denial of 
those opportunities. But Russia's national identity debate did not explicitly make 
much of the EU, and it seems that it was ignorance that played a large part in this 
situation. The fact that the EU had not been, like NATO, a military force brought 
into being specifically as an enemy of the USSR made its existence less directly 
threatening to Russian existence and self-perception as a great power. The Russian 
elite, full of anguish over NATO enlargement, and coping with a plethora of 
domestic and international crises, found itself without time to worry about the EU. 
The very intensity and urgency of Russia's national identity debate perhaps left 
little room for discourse on matters which were, objectively perhaps, of vital 
importance to Russia - such as trade with the EU. The very intensity \\ith which 
NATO was constructed as Russia's other left little space for the EU in th(' 
discourse. 'It is much easier for Russia to establish relation with a union of se\eral 
large countries than with one superpower. Russia will be much more comfortable 
"h " than as '1 fonner as an equal partner among other dwellers of the European orne c 
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great power standing opposed to one of the mightiest forces III the world' 
(Inozemtsev,2002: 132). 
The nationalist opposition, which made little of the EU's expansion. if 
anything saw it as a counterweight to NATO, symbolising reasonable European 
intentions towards Russia. Sections of the Russian elite did recognise the 
importance of the EU, and the fact that it could be 'a vital actor in the process of 
improving the Soviet Union's and then Russia's relations with what was referred to 
in different contexts as "Europe" and "the West" and also fostering the domestic 
political and economic transformation of the Soviet Union and its former allies' 
(Williams & Neumann, 2000: 376).285 But such recognition remained low key -
thus in terms of Russian national identity the EU played a role, but a small one. 
In terms of exclusion, clearly a crucial matter for Russian national identity. 
the EU played a mixed role. On the one hand, the Union excluded Russia from 
membership: to some Russians, including Vladimir Lukin, 'it was evident that the 
EU wants to build "an all-European club of civilized nations" using Russian 
resources and concessions; but it bars Russia from participating in European 
processes,.286 Such developments were 'not very reassuring as far as Russia is 
concerned' (Baranovsky, 2000: 450-451). Yet on the other hand the EU also helped 
Russia achieve acceptance by other Western institutions, and as a player more 
generally in Western political life. The role that the EU played in this regard was 
often positive, and was seen to be expediting Russia's acceptance among the 
world's leading nations. This included the EU's assistance to Russia in its efforts to 
obtain membership of the World Trade Organization and public support for 
Russian concerns about the diaspora in the Baltic republics. In April 1998, for 
example, the Italian foreign minister, Lamberto Dini,287 criticised Latvia's human 
rights record suggesting it would prevent Latvia's acceptance into the EU. In late 
July 1999, the Russian side responded in kind, when the Prime Minister, Sergei 
Stepashin, advocated a generally 'increased EU role. After meeting Finnish Prime 
Minister Lipponen and EU Foreign Affairs Commissioner Hans van den Broek in 
285 See also Aalto (2001: 10): 'The fact that the EU is becoming a geopolitical subject, is in 
constructivist terms evident in the EU's and Russia's mutual recognition'. 
286 Vladimir Lukin, writing in Moscow News in December 2002. Cited in .\1oscow Ne\l's, 27 
February 2005. Online at http://ne\v.rnn.ruJenglishJissue.php. 
287 At a joint press conference held with Primakov, 8 April 1998. 
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Moscow ... [he] said that given recent "changes" in the international arena "the role 
of the EU must be sharply increased in deciding international problems". 
particularly in the "military-political" sphere. [He] ... urged that Russia be regarded 
as an "equal partner" in Europe ... [he added that he believed that] the planned EU-
Russia summit in Helsinki in October will put cooperation between the Union and 
Moscow on a "new level''' (RFEIRL, 30 July 1999). 
The Russian attitude was generally to subsume the problems encountered in 
relations with the EU within the overall positive relationship. In the Foreign Policy 
Concept of 2000, for example, the EU was given a mixed review, relations not yet 
having achieved 'full effectiveness' and the union being castigated for not showing 
'adequate respect for the interests of the Russian side in the process of EU 
expansion and reform' (Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2000: 
paragraph 81). In general, though, 'the document describes in 'optimistically 
affirmative terms ... a relationship with actors within a worldwide framework that 
assumes its inclusive and multilateral nature, and a hopeful, cooperation-oriented 
outlook employing terminology of partnership towards states/groups of states, 
relations with which may be expected to be problematic, the EU being recognised 
as the single most important "partner'" (Kassianova, 2001: 833-834). 
The Russia-EU relationship also reflected different views of Russian 
national identity among the elite. 'Moderate nationalist positions hold that Russia, 
owing to its geographic position and cultural heritage, has to strike a balance 
between East and West. Russia's natural task is seen as assuming the role of a 
bridge in the Eurasian region, representing, among other things, the interests of 
Russians living in the countries of the CIS and in the Baltic States. This trend is not 
anti-Western, but seeks to draw attention to the problem of securing Russian 
national interests in the East. Its adherents believe that cooperation with Western 
institutions in the field of security represents a deal, a concession to the West in 
exchange for cooperation with the EU, which they welcome and support' 
(Parkhalina, 2002: 2). Parkhalina's view was that a generational change among the 
elite is required to alter Russian foreign policy; the Yeltsin period was one of 
transition. 'As for the Westernizers and the radical national conservatives, they are 
losing public support. [Yet] ... the younger generation does not want to see itself 
cut off from the West on ideological grounds' (Parkhalina, 2002: 2). In such 
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domestic struggles over Russian identity and consequent international role. the EC 
was regarded positively by almost all sides. 
In general, the Russian elite did not closely connect Russia's national 
identity with the EU. This was somewhat surprising from the constructivist point of 
view. It is hard to explain why, given the way the EU challenged Russia's place in 
the world in very similar ways to NATO, the Russian side remained indifferent. As 
the Russian domestic identity debate ground on, pivoting around the question of 
Russia's relationship to the West, the question of Russia's relations with the EU 
was more or less ignored, at least until the appearance of the Medium-Term 
Strategy. 
The persistence of feeling in Russia of the contrast between "'the good 
West of Europe/EU' with the "bad West of AmericalNATO'" was a major reason 
for this lack of interest (Light at aI., 2000b: 497). It was also connected to Russian 
domestic politics, in the sense that Russia's '''entry into Europe" cannot be 
negotiated with Brussels. It has to be first "made in Russia" itself. A decade after 
the end of the Soviet Union, there are fewer and fewer illusions among both the 
elite and the public about a "unique Russian way". The next hurdle to take is to 
recognize that Russia as a self-contained and self-sustained "pole" (or a traditional 
great power) is already history' (Trenin, 2002: paragraph 5). After this is achieved, 
Russia will be in a better position to negotiate with the EU and develop closer 
relations with it. In this way, Russian national identity had an influence on Russia's 
relations with the EU, impeding (despite the avowedly pragmatic nationalist 
foreign policy) a coolly rational examination of Russian national interests. 
In an article written in 2001, Igor Ivanov looked back on the post-Soviet 
period with a view to summing up Russian foreign policy. He suggested that 'the 
new Russia cannot consider itself a successor to the USSR as the champion of the 
theory of a global "class struggle," which had once served as an ideological basis 
for confrontation with the West as well as for the well-known use of force in 
Europe and Asia ... Russian diplomacy combines the firm protection of national 
interests with a consistent search for mutually acceptable solutions through 
dialogue and cooperation with the West (Ivanov, 2001). 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSION - FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH 
Each of the two theoretical frameworks provided convincing answers to the 
research questions - but their weaknesses also became apparent. In any analysis of 
Russian foreign policy under Putin's presidency, the weaknesses would perhaps be 
reduced by combining the realist and constructivist approaches, and a brief 
overview of what has gone before will highlight the scope for such integration. It 
will also identify the need for a more detailed examination of Russian domestic 
politics. 
The realist framework 
Russia was initially interested in joining NATO - a bandwagoning strategy _ 
because alliance with the former enemy, now the hegemonic power on the 
continent, was seen to be a way of enhancing Russian power. It soon became clear 
that Russia was not going to be able to join NATO and that NATO was expanding 
in size and in operational scope, both of which were perceived as threats. The 
Russians seemed to be on the point of moving to a balancing strategy. For example, 
they tried to use their agreement to NATO expansion to legitimise greater control 
over the CIS. But the realities of power - Russian weakness - meant that the latter 
strategy floundered. Bandwagoning continued, along with attempts to obtain as 
many concessions as possible for Russia, and the use of bargaining tactics to do so. 
The response to the EU was very different and the evidence is thinner. The 
EU was not a military threat; rather, it was a potential source of economic 
recovery. At the same time, exclusion from the EU's area of free trade offered a 
threat to the rebuilding of the Russian state and its immediate security. The EU 
case does not in fact sit comfortably within realism's traditional focus of study -
military security - although the framework developed in Chapter 2 outlined how 
states would be sensitive to economic threats owing to the links b~t\\'een 
economics and military power. The Russian leadership responded somewhat 
haphazardly to the promise and threat offered by the EU. Despite fears oyer trade 
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barriers, Russia pursued an economic 'bandwagoning' strategy towards the EU. 
But the realist explanation was relatively weak in explaining the detail of Russia's 
policies - or lack of them - towards the EU. 
Generally, Russian reaction to the imbalance of power fitted many of 
realism's predictions. The neoclassical realist framework of Chapter 2 offered an 
effective means of organizing the facts of Russian policy towards both the EU and 
NATO, though it was more effective with regard to NATO. The Russian state 
followed reasonably clear policies towards NATO and the ED, despite serious 
conflicts among the elite and the institutions of policy-making, and its policies 
were coherent given the brute facts of the balance of power. The realist analysis 
was therefore able to make a coherent link between the external stimuli of material 
power and state policy. The Russian leadership used all the bargaining chips at 
their disposal - including the threat of nuclear war - to improve the situation and 
gain concessions. Their ambitions largely failed, though it could be argued that 
some useful concessions were obtained and that progress was made in rebuilding 
the state and laying the groundwork for the rehabilitation of the Russian military 
and economy. Yet, as Yeltsin left office he would have had to acknowledge that 
Russian exclusion from the important economic and security developments, and the 
continuing weakness of Russian military and economic power relative to the EU 
and NATO amounted to the strategic failure of the regime's avowed intentions. 
The realist framework leaves some gaps in explanation. The original pro-
Western course of Russian foreign policy took place because the leadership was 
strongly inclined towards a pro-Western view, a stance that changed quite radically 
and in ways that realism cannot entirely grasp: why was the change so sudden and 
so extreme? Why did the Russian elite focus so much on the West, despite the 
avowed 'independent' and balanced foreign policy? Realists would be obliged to 
acknowledge that some of the causes lie outside realism's remit. 
It is also possible to argue that Russia's policy was not at all a rational 
response to the international environment in the 1990s, and that nationalist 
'pragmatism' from the mid-l990s was quite the opposite. As Parkhalina (2002: 4) 
put it, 'the mentality of a beleaguered fortress allows a national consensus to 
emerge without addressing the real domestic problems in the political and 
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economic fields. This explains the behavior of Russian politicians at present. There 
are hardly any realistic assessments of Russia's real interests in a changed world'. 
The constructivist framework 
The second framework attempted to tackle some of the issues left unanswered by 
realist analysis. The view of Russia's national identity that dominated among 
members of Russia's elite changed over the decade so that by the mid-1990s 
foreign policy had become pragmatically nationalist, and this forms the basis for 
understanding why Russia became so hostile to NATO expansion. It is also a token 
of the manner in which Russia's elite felt betrayed by NATO's post-Cold War 
policies. The pragmatic nationalist strategy reflected a prevailing view of Russia as 
a great power, situated between East and West. Russia's relations with NATO also 
reflected the uncomfortable process of coming to terms with the country's new 
status as a much smaller, weaker Eurasian power than its Soviet predecessor - and 
of the failure of the pro-Western course. 
The deals signed with NATO, like the Partnership for Peace, the Founding 
Act and the fonnation of the Permanent Joint Council, took place against a chorus 
of anti-NATO protest. The deals, however, still took place. Policy carried on 
unhappily despite NATO'S challenge to the attempt to define a place for the new 
Russia in the post-Cold War world. Constructivist theories argue powerfully for the 
influence of national identity in constraining the roles that foreign policy-makers 
feel able to play. Russia's national identity pushed the country's leadership towards 
fierce opposition to NATO, and NATO came to occupy a central place in policy-
making. Yet the fonnation of national identity takes place in dialogue with the 
outside world, and it can be convincingly argued that NATO's construction of itself 
and potential members was a powerful influence on Russia's development and its 
relations with the West. NATO had been the most powerful challenge and primary 
cause of the failure of the pro-Western course; the manner in which NATO dealt 
with Russia - shifting it finnly if politely to the margins of the European security 
structure - helped to alter the perceptions of the elite, and the increasing suspicion 
of the West. 
The constructivist explanation on its own is not enough, however, and, the 
conclusion of the constructivist framework 'in no way means that material po\\er is 
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unimportant. Indeed it is doubtful that NATO could have played the role it has 
without its capacity for military strength and its reputation as such. But :\ATO's 
power cannot be reduced to this. Indeed, the power of the Alliance in the post-Cold 
War period derives in considerable part from the ability to maintain its military 
dimension while at the same time combining that dimension with a powerful 
cultural and political narrative that overcame the challenges faced by a purely 
military representation of the Alliance' (Williams & Neumann, 2000: 386). A 
combined explanation would seem to be the most persuasive. 
NATO, in Russian discourse, became the 'other' par excellence. All 
political groups made the case that their preferred policies towards NATO were 
crucial matters for Russia's future. The EU, on the other hand, formed an almost 
incidental part of their programme, and discourse on the subject was much less 
divisive. Its role was therefore much less clear and much less important in Russian 
politics. 
The EU was not seen as significant by the elite, and the constructivist 
framework struggles to supply a reason for this neglect. The potential significance 
of the EU was that it gathered together the nations of Western Europe while 
excluding the US. It showed what the future of European international relations 
would be like, as it expanded eastwards its unique manner of tying together the 
legal economic, democratic and ultimately defence systems of member nations. 
The manner in which the EU shifted Russia to the margins of this new Europe was 
carried out in a very similar way to NATO, and might have produced a much more 
urgent response. 
Yet the reaction from Russia was very different. The EU was regarded as 
the positive aspect of the West, and Russian exclusion from the Union was seen as 
significant by a small minority among the Russian elite. Yeltsin and his foreign 
ministers (let alone his defence ministers) made very little of the EU throughout the 
decade. The constructivist framework did fill in some of the gaps left by the realist 
framework in explaining this situation: it did so by suggesting that in Russia one 
kind of 'West' was constructed as bad, i.e., NATO with the US at its head, while 
another kind of 'West' was constructed as good, i.e., Europe, often represented by 
the EU. Under Baranovsky's schema, the EU represented 'true' Europe, a Europe 
to aspire to, while NATO represented something threatening and n~gati\'e. The 
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debate in Russia 'on foreign and security policy, future European security, future 
European security architecture, the role of NATO and the logic of European 
integration processes ... manifests a certain type of culture shaped under the 
influence of some cultural and philosophical actors. [This] ... partially explains the 
attitude of different political forces towards fonnulating foreign and security policy 
as a whole and towards interacting with Western institutions in the field of 
security' (Parkhalina, 2002: 4). 
Using the frameworks together 
The possibility of using two such theories to provide a more complete explanation 
than either on its own has been considered in similar cases, showing how it might 
be done here. Charles Hennan, for example, 'links dramatic changes in Soviet 
foreign policy and the end of the Cold War to the "new thinking" of parts of the 
Soviet elite. In this case a realist argument offers a plausible starting point of a 
more fully specified causal chain. Adverse shifts in the relative capabilities of the 
Soviet Union may have been a major factor in how the refonners could install 
themselves in power in the first place' (Katzenstein, 1996: 70). The ways this 
might be done include 'stage-complementarity', 'whereby one argument covers 
one phase of a process while another argument takes up the next phase. Thus the 
project's focus on the problem of interest definition leaves virtually unattended 
problems of strategic interaction, a complementary process' (Katzenstein, 1996: 
70). In Carlsnaes' (1986) model, similarly, the intentional dimension could equate 
to what in this thesis the realist framework covered (realist considerations of power 
calculation), while the broader beliefs about the world and correct modes of 
behaviour operate in what Carlsnaes called the dispositional dimension. As Jervis 
(1998: 978-979) puts it, 'strategic rationality and deductive logic can be - indeed 
need to be - coupled with an appreciation of how actors attribute meaning to 
behavior. Rationalism cannot supply this knowledge, but constructivism is one of 
the approaches that can guide the required empirical research' . 
In the case studies here (focusing on identity and interests), the 'stage 
complementarity' might flow both ways. 'It is useful analytically to distinguish 
identity from interests - if only to get some critical purchase in the issues raised in 
identity theory and politics ... As already noted, the relationship between interests 
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and identity is best conceived as a recursive one, inseparably linked and "feeding 
back" reflexively one upon the other' (McSweeney, 1999: 168). Thus 'if identity is 
learned through the dual processes of domestic and international interaction ... 
where do interests come from and how are they related to identity? Lorricalh. they 
b • "' 
derive from identity, suggesting the priority of identity over interests ... But this 
does not mean that identity cannot be altered, in practice, through a change in the 
interests which logically flow from it. We can be led to perceive ourselves 
differently - to choose a different position on the continuum of identities - by the 
opportunities which may be offered to satisfy new interests' (McSweeney, 1999: 
167). 
Thus the facts of material power that caused tactical shifts in Russian policy 
were filtered through various lenses through which the Russian elite viewed the 
world. One of the most important of these, in foreign policy-making, was that of 
national identity. This was the means by which the leadership made sense of Russia 
in the international field, and their role as foreign policy-makers. Yet the dominant 
shared understandings of national identity themselves changed (as the theory 
suggests they will always do), in part as a result of the manner in which policies 
demonstrated success or failure in relation to perhaps random external factors. 
These successes and failures were predicated partly on material factors, such as 
economic strength. Moreover, the understanding of Russian interests themselves 
altered as a result of Russia's physical attributes. 
Given that there is the possibility for the two theories to work together in 
the ways suggested, what does the outcome tell us? Realism does not explain 
entirely the details of why the shift from Atlanticism to Eurasianism came when it 
did and took the form it did. Constructivism fills that role by outlining the 
frameworks within which the elite perceived the world and focused on the West. It 
shows, along with the realist perception of threat argument, why NATO came to be 
such an important external factor in Russian foreign policy. Ho\\e\er, 
constructivism does not help us understand the tactics used in the struggle against 
NATO's move to the East. It is here that realism's focus on rational attempts to 
alter the balance of power is useful. Realism cannot, and does not aim to, 
understand the domestic causes of policy, and how the realities of the international 
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environment are translated into policy. Yet realism explains in part how identity 
comes to change, and how policies develop in response. 
This combined approach might usefully be applied to the study of Vladimir 
Putin's foreign policy. Yet the inability of the theories to provide a fully 
satisfactory account of Russian policies towards the ED suggests that we need to 
focus on the details of policy-making and thus on the bureaucratic and personal 
rivalries that took place in Moscow. 
The study of bureaucratic and individual interests 
Any satisfactory study of Russian politics therefore has to take account of factors 
not accounted for by the two theoretical frameworks of this thesis. Many studies 
which do so already exist, and could be combined with the approach used here. 
Foreign policy-making in Russia was extremely compartmentalized, 
divided between various power centres. The Foreign Ministry was in charge of 
formal diplomacy, the Ministry of Defence played the key role in arms control 
negotiations, and the Ministry of Finance 'keeps its monopoly over relations with 
the IMF and the World Bank. Such "feudalism" of foreign policy creates many 
problems, since each agency tries to enlarge its "sphere of influence" at the expense 
of all the others' (Kortunov, 1999: 42-43). Russian ignorance about the ED's 
expansion plans may, in fact 'simply reflect the problem of compartmentalisation 
which is characteristic of most bureaucracies but which afflicts Russia particularly 
severely. In other words, they may have been unaware of the ED's plans because 
their business was the economy, while military security was dealt with in other 
departments, and there was effectively no communication between departments.' 
(Light et aI., 2000: 8). 
In the near future, too, 'it seems clear that foreign policy decisions will be 
guided mostly by particular group interests, not by any broad public consensus on 
what Russian national interests really are ... Groups with more financial resources 
will enjoy better connections in the Kremlin and will have more impact on the 
decision-making process' (Kortunov, 1999: 44-45). If policy is carried out in this 
way, and those making decisions are only concerned with the very near future (and 
their careers), the only way to understand policy-making is to take a \'ery close 
examination of day-to-day politics. 
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Lo (2002), for example, argued that it might be necessary to 'accept _ 
reluctantly from a political scientist's perspective - that [Russian foreign policy] ... 
cannot be encapsulated except as a series of largely random and unconnected 
events, responses and policies ... [perhaps] Moscow's overall approach reflected 
the dominant realities of the times: the primacy of sectional interests over any 
consensus vision of the national good, and the consequent factionalization and 
fragmentation of policy. It was this environment which ensured that much of the 
Kremlin's handling of business would be ad hoc and reactive' (Lo, 2002: 124-125). 
As the compartmentalised bureaucracies fought for their own interests, 'different 
groups and interests neutralizing one another... the outcome, almost entirely 
accidental, was a lowest common denominator conservatism that conveyed the 
illusion of consensus, but which amounted to little more than pragmatism by 
default' (Lo, 2002: 125). 
This kind of argument assumes that policy-makers are rational actors 
interested solely in self-preservation (owing to the exigencies of Russia's particular 
political situation). Yet this does not refute the argument that policy-makers can 
only make sense of reality by means of shared understandings of the world. One of 
these relates to Russian national identity and consequent national interests, which is 
the way policy-makers make sense of Russian foreign policy to themselves and 
others. Moreover, despite the claims of randomness and inconsistency in Russian 
foreign policy, the factors in the external world that realists focus on could not be 
ignored. The various bureaucracies could not simply do as they liked, and were 
constrained by the international distribution of power. In short, the conclusion must 
be that particularly after 1993, the Russian state functioned more or less as a 
unitary actor in terms of the important issues such as NATO expansion. Future 
research in the field might, however, couple what has been attempted here with an 
examination of bureaucratic politics. 
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